M2013-01 NORDEP (FIN), fire in the engine room on 27 January 2013

The commuter ferry M/S NORDEP owned by JS Ferryway Oy Ltd. was on her way towards Nagu without passengers or cargo. The Master and the Chief Engineer were in the wheelhouse when they observed an alarm on low fuel pressure and a subsequent fire alarm at approx. 18.30. The NORDEP was then off Laupus in the Iniö opening. The Chief Engineer went to check the situation. When the door to the engine room was opened, a lot of smoke came out and spread elsewhere on the vessel. The fire valves of the engine room ventilation and quick-closing valves of fuel were closed, the CO2 system was discharged and the Master informed Archipelago VTS about the fire; the VTS then alarmed the Maritime Rescue and Co-ordination Centre. The Master and the Chief Engineer moved onto the ice in order to wait for rescue units.

The MRCC made an assessment on the situation and transmitted it to the Emergency Response Centre Southwest Finland in order to alert rescue services. A maritime rescue helicopter from the Finnish Border Guard, the patrol vessel Tursas, two Coast Guard hovercrafts, a specially trained MIRG maritime rescue unit from the Southwest Finland Rescue Department and several fire brigade units were alerted to perform the rescue mission. After arriving to the scene, the MIRG unit made sure that the fire had burnt out and after that they stopped the auxiliary engine which had been running. The hovercraft evacuated the crew from the ice and took them to Laupus for emergency care control and later back to the vessel. One of the hovercrafts had to interrupt her voyage as the hovercraft hem was damaged when the she crossed the fairway.

The investigation studied the fire, its causes and rescue activities in winter conditions. The Safety Investigation Authority decided, in accordance with the Safety Investigation Act, to extend the investigation to include the procurement of traffic services and contract related issues and the consideration of safety in the contract process. The investigation does not take stand on other factors than those affecting safety.

The most probable cause of the fire was hot fuel or lubricant which had come in contact with a hot surface. A crack had developed in the fuel injection pipe, and fuel may have spurted from the crack onto a hot surface. Oil may also have spurted on the hot exhaust pipe support from the broken oil pipe which runs to the oil pressure gauge of the main engine reduction gear. These alternatives are supported by the fact that based on fire cracks the fire has started near the aft-part of the main engine.

The rescue activities concerning the NORDEP were efficient on the whole. The hovercrafts' vulnerability to damages was noticed in connection with the rescue activities. The NORDEP did not raise the VHF DSC distress alert required by the situation nor did the vessel have a voluntary AIS receiver/transmitter, from which the vessel’s position data and movement factors could have been checked. The position of the vessel did not become clear until in a phone call with the Master.

Since 2010 the Southwest Finland Centre for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment (ELY-Centre, shortly Centre) has been the authority responsible for arranging commuter ferry traffic in Finland. The Centre contracted the service by public tendering from private service providers in the form of so-called inclusive service and signed 5–10-year long contracts. The tender processing has two stages. The first stage includes quality assessment and possible elimination of tenderers which do not meet quality criteria. The second stage comprises a price comparison in which the company submitting the cheapest tender is chosen. In the contract of service to be drawn the Centre is the “ordering party" and the company offering the services by using its vessels and equipment is the “producer".

The service contract for commuter ferry traffic as a whole is built on the numerous documents gathered during the tender process. These documents include safety and risk management related provisions, which have been put forth in a difficult manner and by making references to various contract papers and other documents. The contracting parties may get an ambiguous understanding of what has been agreed upon safety including responsibility related issues. In the service contract the Centre emphasises the extensive overall safety responsibility of the producer. With reference to technical and safety aspects the Centre emphasises the responsibility of the controlling authority, i.e. the Finnish Transport Safety Agency. The Centre with the duty to organise the services holds, however, responsibility for the overall safety of the service.

In the service contract there are provisions which are imprecise and open to interpretation concerning e.g. traffic during frost heave. The contract does not define clearly what is meant by frost heave and when the producer shall or when the producer may switch to the service level definition for difficult frost heave which allows reduced number of sailings per day nor does it define when the producer may provide services by using hovercrafts. The circumstances in which hovercraft traffic may be interrupted are also not defined. Although a negotiation procedure is required on the matter, in the last resort it is the ordering party who can decide when the frost heave is difficult and when timetables should be observed. If difficult circumstances force the master of the vessel to interrupt the vessel’s voyage or to stay at berth, the interruption of the services may even be interpreted as a breach of the contract.

Before the traffic service is commenced, the Centre reviews and approves the operating and quality plan which is presented by the producer and which among other things comprises an appraisal of the safety risks in work and a description of the equipment to be used. The Finnish Transport Safety Agency inspects the producer’s equipment and checks the ISM plan, a part of which is comprised by a risk analysis. On the basis of the investigation it can be concluded that the risk analyses by the producers handle mainly risks in the work and risks for the environment.

There are safety norms for open sea periods and for vessels which operate in ice, and vessels are inspected accordingly. When it comes to carriers suitable for the frost heave period (hovercrafts, hydrocopters, etc.), there are shortcomings in the safety regulations when the service need is taken into consideration. The Finnish Transport Safety Agency has compiled brief inspection requirements for hovercrafts, but they are not official to their character. Risks of hovercrafts are not handled using methods of risk analysis.

As the result of the investigation the Safety Investigation Authority recommends that:

Shipping companies engaged in commuter ferry traffic install camera monitoring systems in unmanned engine rooms and AIS receivers/transmitters onto vessels as well as compile emergency plans together with rescue authorities.

The Southwest Finland Centre for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment add the safety requirements related to the aforementioned recommendations to the call for tender documents and compile and define present safety requirements including a risk analysis of types of vessels used in commuter ferry traffic. These requirements could be compiled into a separate safety document with the assistance from the Finnish Transport Safety Agency. The Centre is also recommended to develop a procedure to introduce safety improving changes to long-term contracts. The Centre should also specify the period for "difficult frost heave" and the risk factors concerning traffic service during that particular period.

The Finnish Transport Safety Agency take measures to compile inspection requirements for hovercrafts and make them official as soon as possible. Even before such requirements are ready, the Finnish Safety Transport Agency should add a note to the inspection certificate of hovercrafts stating that the manufacturers’ instructions should be observed.

M2013-01 Investigation report, in Finnish (pdf, 4.13 Mt)