M2019-03 Risk of collision between two passenger ships in the Archipelago Sea on 13 November 2019; the RoPaX ferry Finnswan and the road ferry Mergus

On Wednesday 13 November 2019 at 12.50, Finnlines Ltd’s RoPax vessel M/s Finnswan, sailing from Naantali to Kapellskär, and Finferries’ road ferry L/a Mergus, on its way to Korppoo from Norrskata, came close to a collision.

Only the master of the Mergus was on the bridge. He was steering the vessel from the rear steering position while simultaneously taking care of other work-related business on the telephone. When the vessel’s bearing was set for Galtby, the master switched on the autopilot and moved to the front steering position.

The pilot on line service and second mate standing watch on the bridge of the Finnswan saw the ferry and observed its movements, but did not immediately discuss the situation. The Mergus had not given a departure notification to the VTS, as a notification is only required when the visibility is less than one nautical mile. Soon after the departure of the Mergus, the Finnswan gave a VTS report of its arrival on Smörgrund. When the Mergus’s direction of travel was stabilized, the Finnswan’s ECDIS estimated the closest passing distance at 0.12 nautical miles, with the Mergus passing behind the vessel’s stern. When the Mergus increased speed, the estimates were reduced to 0.01 nautical miles, putting the vessels on a collision course.

Approximately 90 seconds after this, the pilot on line service responsible for navigation on the Finnswan hailed the Mergus on the VTS channel. When the Mergus did not reply, the pilot initiated emergency evasive maneuvers to the left. Soon, the master of the Mergus also noticed the risk of collision and steered his ship sharply to the right. The Mergus’s evasive maneuver began approximately 30 seconds after the Finnswan’s, when the distance between the vessels was only approximately 75 meters. The collision was avoided at the last instant while the distance between the vessels was less than 30 meters at its shortest.

The vessels’ routes and evasive maneuvers

The investigation identified practices indicating that maritime operating culture and the application of the rules of the road at sea are based on established practice. Finland lacks a system for facilitating safety discussions either between shipping companies navigating the same routes or between shipping companies and the authorities.

The VTS does not monitor or control the passage of road or commuter ferries, nor does it take the risks posed by traffic volumes or vessels operated by a single crew member into account in its risk assessments. The VTS’s operating models have remained mostly unchanged regardless of the merging of control centers and larger amount of more advanced technology used in them. There have also been considerable advances in ships’ navigating systems.

The Safety Investigation Authority recommends that:

1. Finferries clarify its instructions on at least departure, telephone use and keeping a lookout, and develops its safety management and training system to better address both ship- and ferry-specific and human risks and their management;

2. The Finnish Shipowner’s Association, together with the Finnish Transport and Communications Agency Traficom, Finnpilot Pilotage Ltd and VTS Finland, develop the safety cooperation between route users, route managers and traffic control operators, along with the open sharing of information, for example with regular route meetings as is the practice in Sweden;

3. VTS Finland develop its operating models, vessel traffic risk assessments and information systems so that vessel traffic controllers will have a real chance to detect imminent congestion or risks and take preemptive action to warn all traffic under their responsibility; and

4. VTS Finland develop the traffic report practices for road and commuter ferries in cooperation with Traficom, so that the reports as a whole will provide the greatest possible safety benefit and will not be strictly coupled to poor visibility.

Furthermore, the Safety Investigation Authority reiterates recommendation 2020-S13 issued in investigation report M2019-01:

the Finnish Transport and Communications Agency provide instructions for the assessment of the functionality of the bridge ergonomics of vessels and the usability of the equipment during vessel surveys.