Transport craft U 619 collision with an islet in Upinniemi Archipelago 16 November 2016

A U619 landing craft was participating in a marine warfare exercise in the Upinniemi Archipelago when it veered off course and collided with an above-waterline islet. The crew consisted of two conscripts. In addition to the crew, on board the boat were a team trainer, who is a member of regular staff, and 20 conscripts, who were participating in the exercise.

On the day of the incident, the U619 landing craft had been operating as an evacuation boat, moored on the beach for the duration of the exercise of a team of Finnish coastal jaegers. After the exercise was completed in the afternoon, the U619 picked up the team and started to transport it along a connecting waterway for a distance of less than two nautical mails to the team's temporary base. The crew were familiar with the route.

When the voyage began, it was dark and it began to rain. The position determination system used was optical navigation supported by radar. Due to the rain, the officer on watch adjusted the radar screen so as to be able to see the east spar buoys on the sides of the narrow passageway ahead.

As the vessel approached the narrowest part of the waterway, the east spar buoys disappeared from the radar screen due to an adjustment made to eliminate the flicker caused by rain in the nearby area. At this point, speed was approximately 20 knots. The officer on watch and helmsman tried to see the east spar buoys without using a searchlight, on account of their interpretation of blackout conditions.

During the voyage, the craft had drifted off course to the eastern side of the waterway. When the crew saw an east spar buoy on the starboard side of the craft, they assumed it was the first one, which led them to incorrectly determine their location as further north than where they actually were, and that they were still on course. The officer on watch prepared to go to the bow for mooring. Left to steer the craft was the helmsman, who simultaneously was looking out for the latter east spar buoy, in the light of the navigation light, assuming that the spar buoy would be on the starboard side.

Suddenly, the helmsman saw an islet directly in front of the craft and commenced an emergency stop while turning the wheel to port to avoid head-on collision. The speed of the craft came down to 15 knots before the collision. After the collision, the craft remained afloat and operational.

12 of the 22 conscripts who were on board the craft reported having sustained a range of injuries as the result of the collision. Most of the injured had been sitting at the front of the cargo space at the time of the incident. None of the injuries were serious. The helmsman’s manoeuvres prevented a head-on collision with the islet, thus preventing serious damage to the craft and serious injuries to the people on board the craft.

The rescue measures after the collision, escorting the injured to medical care, went without problems. Psychiatric support to those involved in the accident was provided according to plan and was sufficient.

Key factors affecting the accident

The key factors affecting the accident were going off course, uncertainty about the exact location of the craft, and insufficient use of the radar. Problems with radar use have also been found in previous accidents resulting from craft operated by conscripts going off course. Another common feature is that, contrary to the instructions, the craft had not been stopped immediately upon the crew realising that its exact location is uncertain.

The military craft operator-sub-officer training includes very few theory lessons on navigation equipment, especially with regards to radar use. Insufficient understanding of the capabilities of radar is therefore provided. Radar use is mainly learned during practical training, which can cause significant variation in the quality and total amount of training.

During the exercise, the craft's crew had been taking turns in assuming the roles of the officer on watch and the helmsman. Such practice is permitted and often necessary, but there are no specific routines for how the responsibility for steering the craft changes from one crew member to another. This may blur the roles and cause uncertainty in the division of responsibilities. Blurred roles may have had something to do with why the accident took place.

The final part of the route, from Haukipää to Hietanen, is narrow and rocky. The U619 pilots had used the same route in daytime during the exercise. However, it was dark and raining when the accident took place. The complexity of navigation on the route in such visibility and weather conditions was not known. This meant that less caution was used, resulting in insufficient planning of the transport operation and a lack of risk assessment.

As regards safety management, it can be stated that the risks and risk avoidance methods which, as such, were described quite clearly in the order for the exercise, were not fully put into practice or conveyed to everyone on the teams. The master for landing craft did not use a searchlight to aid optical navigation, even though this would have been justified. It has not been clearly defined in the safety instructions for the exercise which transports are to be carried out as battle exercises during which unnecessary use of lights should be avoided. Contrary to the rules of the order for the exercise, life vests were not in use, nor was their use supervised.

As the result of the investigation, the Safety Investigation Authority recommends the following:

1. The Navy increases the amount of navigation training for military craft operator-sub-officers, especially with regards to the use of electronic navigation equipment.

2. The Navy develops a procedure for the assessment and management of risks relating to a beginning marine transport operation.

3. During the training stage, the Navy creates an operating model for the crew of each boat class for ensuring that the crew members understand the division of responsibilities when roles are switched.

Published 31.7.2017