B1/2005R Passenger train car derailing between Saakoski and Jämsänkoski on 30 March, 2005

At Jämsä on the Jyväskylä - Tampere section of line between the Saakoski and Jämsänkoski stations, on Wednesday March 30, 2005 early in the morning an incident occured where a bogie of a car of the 802 passenger train derailed at a rail breakage. The train was carrying about 50 passengers. Neither the passengers nor the train crew were injured in the incident. The total cost of the accident was 127 600 euros.

Earlier at night the engine driver of a freight train travelling from Tampere toward Pieksämäki had noticed something grey on the rail, and while running over the grey point the locomotive had shaken. The driver was not sure whether there had been a rock on the track or whether there was something wrong with the rail. The driver notified the remote control operator of his observations by line radio, specifying that the exact location was at electric rail pole seven, track kilometre 298. The remote control operator then warned the driver of the following freight train of the matter, requesting its engine driver to pay close attention to that location. Having passed the specific point, the driver of the freight train called the remote control operation by line radio. He told the remote control operator that he had felt a violent bang in the locomotive and that the engine driver of the approaching passenger train should be warned thereof.

The remote control operator contacted the engine driver of the passenger train, by line radio and told him of the observations and experiences of the drivers of the two previous freight trains and of the broken rail. The remote control operator told the engine driver to run over the place in question at a reduced speed and to inform the remote control operator of his relevant observations. As the train approached the breakage point, the driver reduced the speed from 118km to 87km/h. When the locomotive passed the rail breakage point, the driver heard a bump. The conductor in the fourth car heard a loud bang as the car ran over the breakage point. By using his interphone, the conductor advised the driver of his observation. The driver viewed the rear end of the train in the mirror and saw a big cloud of dust behind the train and sparks flying beside the train. The driver started to brake and notified the conductor of the sparkling. When the train had come to a full stop, the conductors went out to check the situation. The front bogie of the second last car of the train had derailed.

The immediate cause of the incident was the rupture of the rail that had broken just a moment earlier, under the weight of the cars of the train. The rupture of the rail was probably due to the combined effect of a poor finishing of the hole drilled in the rail and the local characteristics of the rail steel. Moreover the important stress of the rail possibly also contributed to the rupture.

The rail breakage resulted in the incident as due to an incorrect reaction thereto. The drivers of the two freight trains had perceived the bang caused by the rail breakage but the traffic control unit had failed to appraise the situation as hazardous enough to generate derailment.

As a result of the incident, the Finnish Rail Administration decided to replace the rails on this particular section of line over the summer 2005. Furthermore VR Ltd introduced a modification in its traffic control instructions: should the remote control operator receive a notice of a bang or a swing from the engine driver, he shall regularly introduce a speed limit of max. 50km/h at the location in question. The Central Finland Emergency Response Centre has adopted in its data systems the track-km localization data of the sections of line of the region.

In order to prevent similar accidents in the future, the Accident Investigation Board of Finland recommends that the instruction on a 50km/h speed limit to be introduced in unclear situations as specified in the Traffic Control Operator's Manual of VR Ltd, be also adopted and included in the Train Safety Regulations. VR Ltd should moreover introduce a modification in its emergency situation instructions: in addition to a notice addressed to the traffic control unit from the railway accident or incident scene, also an emergency response centre should be directly contacted in case urgent help is needed from a rescue service. The Emergency Response Centre Administration should ensure the compatibility of the data system of the Emergency Response Centre Agencies with the localization data used by the railway.

B1/2005R Report (pdf, 2.69 Mt)

•Recommendation S210

•Recommendation S211

•Recommendation S212