B1/2002R Passenger train running at high speed into a turnout in wrong position at Kolho on 19 August, 2002

On Monday 19 August 2002 a hazardous situation in train traffic arose at Kolho, Finland, when a passenger train travelling from Tampere towards Haapamäki ran into a turnout in a wrong position, at a speed of 83 km/h. The maximum speed admitted on the turnout was 35 km/h. The train carried about 20 passengers.

On the day of the incident, an on-duty locomotive of Vilppula railway yard had picked up cars at Kolho and then returned at 14.22 hrs to Vilppula. The on-duty locomotive had left the Kolho turnouts towards track 2 and the keys to Kolho control key lock, in the derailer.

The passenger train M 425 travelling from Tampere towards Haapamäki arrived at Vilppula at 17.17 hrs. The engine driver received an exit permission from Vilppula train operator and set out for Haapamäki at 17.20 hrs as specified in the timetable. The train approached Kolho at a speed of 100 km/h when the driver noticed that the Kolho south-end turnout pointed towards the secondary track. The driver then immediately activated the emergency brake, and as a result the speed of the locomotive decelerated to 83 km/h on the turnout. The train stopped on track 2 at 17.27 hrs at a distance of about 360 m from some empty freight cars standing on the north end of the track.

Vilppula train operator gave permission to the engine driver to push the train back behind the turnout. The locomotive and the turnout having been checked, the driver then pushed the train behind the turnout, and the conductor having operated the turnout to point towards track 1, the train continued its journey.

The immediate cause of the generation of the hazardous situation was the wrong position of the turnout when the passenger train was passing the station. The reason for the wrong position of the turnout was the instructions given by the Vilppula train operator (in morning shift) to the shunting work foreman: when leaving, the on-duty locomotive accordingly left the Kolho turnouts pointing towards track 2 and the keys to the control key lock in the derailer. Moreover the fact that the on-duty Vilppula train operators had only poor knowledge of Kolho railway yard, had its impact on the generation of the hazardous situation. Another contributing factor to the incident was to be seen in the work practice: the keys to Kolho control key lock were used in a way contrary to the relevant instructions. The adopted practice contrary to the instructions may have caused misunderstandings on the location of the keys and the position of the turnouts.

In order to avoid corresponding hazardous situations in the future, the Accident Investigation Board of Finland recommends that the communications concerning train traffic should be operated via the line radio. Furthermore the Accident Investigation Board of Finland recommends that the initiation training programmes for train operators be extended to include all stations and railway yards within the area of responsibility of the train operators in question. In view of ensuring an improved rescue readiness, the Accident Investigation Board reiterates its earlier recommendation proposing an alarming of rescue resources in excess, as specified in the Instructions 21/70/92 of 14.9.1992 by the Ministry of the Interior.

B1/2002R Report (pdf, 0.65 Mt)

• Recommendation S179
• Recommendation S180
• Recommendation S156