C4/2011M M/S TRADER (FIN), grounding in Varkaus on 4.9.2011 and in Sulkava on 16.9.2011

The Finnish cargo vessel M/S TRADER was laden with raw timber when she ran aground at 17.45 on 4 September 2011 soon after departing the port. She was en route from Varkaus to Imatra. The scene of the grounding lies in Varkaus off the Akonniemi oil harbour, and its coordinates were latitude 62°16.43’N, longitude 027°55.93’E.

The vessel had departed the port at 17.30 on the same day, and the Master had handed over the manoeuvring of the vessel to the officer of the watch (OOW) on a straight channel section at approx. 17.37. The vessel was then in manual steering. The Master had left the bridge soon after this. The OOW manoeuvred the vessel to a yaw which curved gently towards port. At the end of the yaw the vessel drifted out from the fairway outside the curve, and from there on the wrong side of the red lateral buoy. The vessel stuck on the ground and got a leakage in her forepeak.

It is not possible to point out one single reason which would have caused the accident. Several factors together resulted in the failed yaw and made the vessel drift out from the fairway and run aground. The Officer timed his use of the bridge equipment incorrectly, and estimating the speed of turn with the help of the chart was inadequate. The Officer was not sufficiently familiar with the manoeuvring characteristics of the vessel. In addition, he did not have sufficient qualifications or experience to work as the OOW on a vessel of this size class. Bridge cooperation on the vessel did not work, because the Watchman had left the bridge in the middle of the yaw.

The factors undermining the effective bridge cooperation were partly caused by the undeveloped safety culture of the shipping company. The safety culture did not support the development of safe practices on the vessel. The weaknesses of the bridge operations were realised in the fairly difficult turn and the vessel drifted aground.

The TRADER ran aground for the second time at 12.00 on 16th September 2011 on a voyage from Varkaus to Joutseno. The grounding took place in Sulkava, on the Lepistönselkä open sea area of lake Pihlajavesi, approx. two nautical miles south of the Vekaransalmi strait. The TRADER was laden with raw timber. The vessel got firmly stuck on the shoal. The coordinates of the scene of grounding were latitude 61°42.3N, longitude 028°31.7E.

Before the accident the Master had manoeuvred the vessel through the narrow passages of the Vekaransalmi strait after which he had handed over the manoeuvring to the OOW on a straight channel section. The vessel was then in automatic steering. The OOW did not start a starboard turn after the straight channel section, which caused the vessel to veer to the wrong side of a green lateral buoy and to the shoal behind it.

The cause of the accident was the mistake brought on by the incorrect situational awareness of the Officer. After taking over the watch, the Officer made an optical observation of a spar buoy further away, a mistake concerning the general direction of the channel and an incorrect decision to leave the spar buoy on the starboard side of the vessel. At no stage did his incorrect situational awareness change, and the vessel ran aground without changing speed or course.

There were many factors contributing to the accident. If these factors had been in order, the mistake would not probably have caused the grounding. When changing the watch, watch change routines related to the safety of the vessel and comprising a situation report were not observed. In addition, the vessel did not have an applicable voyage plan. Furthermore, the Officer did not actively monitor the navigation line nor did he make effective use of the navigational instruments. Moreover, the watchman, who might have contributed to the correct choice of route if he had been instructed correctly, was not present on the bridge.

On the basis of the investigation, the Safety Investigation Agency of Finland recommends that the Finnish Transport Safety Agency develop a detailed written instruction on the preliminary inspection performed when issuing temporary safety management system certificates. In addition, a light intermediate inspection is required for the transitional period to ensure that appropriate safety management procedures are maintained on vessels also during this period.

There was confusion in the emergency calls between Saimaa VTS and the emergency response centres about the perception of the situation and determining the scene of the accident. On the basis of the investigation, the Safety Investigation Authority recommends to the Finnish Transport Agency that the reporting procedure between Saimaa VTS and the emergency response centres functioning under the Emergency Response Centre Administration be developed in order to minimize delays in raising alerts.

C4/2011M Report (pdf, 1.42 Mt)