M2020-02 Grounding of M/S Amorella in the Åland archipelago on 20 September 2020

The Viking Line shipping company’s passenger-car ferry MS Amorella drifted out of the shipping lane and touched bottom several times on the Apteekkari lane in the Archipelago Sea on 20 September 2020. The accident was caused by a malfunction in the vessel's propulsion system that controlled the pitch of its propellers. After maneuverability was restored, the vessel was navigated to the shore of a nearby island to stabilise the situation and evacuate the passengers. The vessel was later floated off the shore and sailed to a dockyard in Turku.

The investigation revealed shortcomings in the maintenance programs of critical equipment. Communication between the shipping company and equipment manufacturers regarding risks related to the life-cycles of equipment also turned out to be insufficient. The investigation also discovered that situations like this require seamless and rapid cooperation between the vessel’s bridge and engine room in order to implement immediate corrective measures.

The functionality and usability of communications channels play a major role in emergencies at sea. The investigation revealed that, in situations such as this, the mobile telephone network is easily overloaded and a satellite phone connection can be a somewhat slow alarm channel. Regulations specify a VHF marine radio connection as the primary emergency communications channel.

Vessel inspection tasks falling within the competence of the Finnish Transport and Communications Agency have been transferred to classification societies. The impact of changes to the bridge on navigation safety is not monitored sufficiently. Earlier accident investigations have revealed the same phenomenon (M2019-01, grounding of the M/S Skarven and M2019-03, near miss between the L/A Mergus and M/S Finnswan).

The Safety Investigation Authority recommends that

1. Viking Line Oyj specify its instructions for preventive maintenance so that components necessary for the continuous functioning of critical systems are identified and their condition is verified regularly with a reliable method. The replacement schedule of necessary components must be evaluated according to use and linked to the vessel's docking cycle if necessary.

2. Viking Line Oyj develop cooperation between the bridge and engine control room in investigating the causes of faults and in the management of incidents.

3. The Finnish Border Guard develop the work processes of Maritime Rescue Centres and the use of assistive technologies in their work, so that the situation can be analysed quickly, maritime rescue units can be alerted and instructed efficiently, and cooperation partners can be given a clear picture and assessment of the situation.

4. The Finnish Transport and Communications Agency draw up application instructions for vessel inspectors and authorised classification societies for confirming compliance with requirements set by regulations on bridge arrangements — such as SOLAS Chapter V, regulation 15 — in the inspections of SOLAS and non-SOLAS vessels, and for rectifying shortcomings in these areas.