M2020-03 The sinking of the fireboat FIRRP1083 in front of Vaasa on 24 October 2020

The fireboat FIRRP1083 Helga of the Ostrobothnia Rescue Department was on its way to an urgent emergency medical service assignment in the archipelago in front of Vaasa, when it drifted outside the fairway due to a navigation error and was grounded in the sea area between the Kantörarna and Hålören islands at 7.26 p.m. In the grounding, the boat sustained an uncontrolled leak and the stern of the boat sank quickly to the bottom while the bow remained on the surface. The Coast Guard managed to rescue the firefighters who acted as the crew as well as the two paramedics who were the passengers a bit before the bow went under water and the boat and its equipment sank down to the depth of approximately four metres. During the accident, the weather was calm and it was fully dark. The boat was mainly navigated optically. The emergency medical service assignment to which the boat was going was completed with a helicopter of the Border Guard. The accident did not result in environmental damage.

Contrary to the original plan, the decision was made to transport the paramedics to the patient with the fireboat Helga due to the urgency of the assignment. This information did not reach the paramedics, and as a result, they were not able to equip themselves as required. In the investigation, the paramedics’ readiness for assignments on a boat was found to be insufficient due to a lack of training and the small number of assignments on a boat.

The training and practice for assignments on a boat of the firefighters who acted as the crew of the boat owned by the rescue department had mainly taken place in good conditions during the summer. There was no documentation on the content of the training.

The deficiencies in the ergonomics of the cabin made it difficult to use the navigation equipment effectively and keep a proper lookout especially in the dark. The users were aware of the deficiencies of the boat, however these deficiencies had not been documented. The rescue department did not have a comprehensive maintenance and defect notification system for the fleet of boats. Sufficient attention had not been paid to the deficiencies in ergonomics or their consequences in the inspections by the respective authorities either.

The difficulty with accessing the distress signal transmitter and rescue equipment as well as the lack of experience in using them, made the situation worse and hindered rescue activities. There were no instructions on what to do in emergency situations, nor was there any documentation on haven practised them.

The severity of the situation was not realised immediately. The crew of the boat believed that the rescue services’ management systems followed the position of the units automatically and that they had a good situational awareness. The positioning features of the PEKE and VIRVE systems on the boat as well as those used by the people on it had not been activated, and as a result, locating the accident site proved challenging. The location was eventually determined with VIRVE communication. In the investigation, it was discovered that the emergency call feature of the VIRVE system does not send the caller’s location information automatically to the Emergency Response Centre, which may prove critical in certain situations. The boat’s marine VHF-radio was not used, and the boat’s EPIRB emergency transmitter buoy did not activate. The buoy was placed inside the cabin and could thus not get released when the boat sank.

The debriefing of the accident at the rescue department was conducted in accordance with the valid instructions.

In the investigation, deficiencies were found in the actions of the boat owner, the training of the users, the technical condition of the boat and the monitoring of its maintenance. As the boat’s owner, the rescue department was not aware of all its duties and responsibilities as an owner - nor as the party handing the boat over to the user.

In order to avoid similar accidents and mitigate their consequences, the Safety Investigation Authority recommends that

• The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health instruct and monitor hospital districts so that they specify their instructions with regard to the management of emergency medical service assignments, the internal flow of information, and the training of emergency medical personnel for different modes of transport.

• The Ministry of the Interior specify the instructions on the use of positioning in the VIRVE terminal devices and guide the development of current and future management systems so that the positioning on terminal devices is activated automatically based on the assignment.

Furthermore, the Safety Investigation Authority reiterates recommendation 2019-S21 issued in the investigation M2018-01.

• The Ministry of the Interior draw up a regulation on the vessel operations of rescue departments and issue instructions for the transition period in order to ensure the safe use of the existing fleet of vessels.

As well as the recommendation 2020-S13 in the investigation M2019-01.

• The Finnish Transport and Communications Agency provide instructions for the assessment of the functionality of the bridge ergonomics of vessels and the usability of the equipment during vessel surveys.