M2020-01 Sink­ing of pa­trol boat PV83 of the Finnish Bor­der Guard in Lovi­isa on 20 June 2020

The patrol boat PV 83 of the patrol vessel Turva of the Finnish Border Guard was grounded and sank in Loviisa on Midsummer 20 June 2020. When the accident occurred, the crew was going on a break, and the route of the boat passed outside the fairway area. When the boat sank, the helmsman remained in the cab, and saving the helmsman failed.

The patrol boat was used for patrol duties, for which it had not been originally designed or equipped. For the maintenance of personnel, the crew was supported by VL Turva, among others. The large amount of equipment required for patrol duties made the cab cramped. The helmsman’s visibility outside was limited and using paper charts was difficult without a chart table. The ergonomics of the cab meant that in practice, navigation relied on using an electronic nautical chart. However, the accuracy of the information of the digital nautical chart varied according to the scale used.

On PV 83, the observation of map data was secured with several screens, and safe navigation was ensured with the cooperation of navigation team. During the accident, the helmsman navigated and steered the boat alone. The crew had made a practice of occasionally abandoning the navigation team model in conditions that were felt to be safe and familiar. Navigating and steering a fast boat alone is especially stressful, and therefore the active participation of several people is required to ensure the safety of navigation. The organisation must ensure that the correct operating model is followed.

Even though the crew of the patrol boat were aware of the risk of sinking, they started to evacuate the equipment from the boat. Such a severely dangerous situation requires prioritising the protection of human lives regardless of material losses. In addition, escaping from a sinking boat requires decision-making and ability to act that are acquired through training.

In practice, the cab of the patrol boat had only one emergency exit, the same door on the back wall of the cab. It suddenly sank under water when the bow of the boat rose as a result of the water that rushed in rapidly through the door. The two skylights in the ceiling of the cab did not meet the requirements for an emergency exit. Safe exits and the entry of rescuers in emergencies must be taken into account in the design of boats. Rescuing the helmsman from the cab of the partially sunken boat was impossible without a diver. However, the arrival of divers on site took time, because the need for divers was not immediately identified. The threshold for including divers in water rescue tasks should be low.

Without being aware of each other, the Maritime Rescue Sub-Centre and the Emergency Response Centre alerted units from different rescue organisations to the site. The emergency medical service personnel had difficulties with contacting each other, and the emergency medical resources alerted to the site were not utilised. The cooperation between the leaders in charge of different duties was not very successful. The Maritime Rescue Sub-Centre did not have sufficient information on the procedures of emergency medical services.

The Safety Investigation Authority recommends that

• the Border Guard develop the user training of fast boats by emphasising the impact of navigation equipment and systems as well as the type-specific limitations of boats on safe navigation work in the cab.

• the Finnish Transport and Communications Agency Traficom increase awareness of how dangerous leaks are in its communication to boaters.

• the Border Guard draw up instructions on rescuing people from inside a boat and ensure that the rescue units have the tools and equipment required for the purpose.

• the Border Guard ensure that maritime rescue centres have clear and up-to-date operating models as well as instructions for leading emergency medical tasks and the related communications.