First wave (1.1.-31.7.2020) of the COVID-19 pandemic in Finland

An unusual strain of pneumonia was identified in China in late 2019. Its cause was established as the Sars-CoV-2 coronavirus, which had been transmitted from animals to humans. The virus initially spread in China, arriving in Europe in January. By the end of February, five cases of coronavirus infection had been confirmed in Finland. The Finns grasped the threat caused by the epidemic in the first two weeks of March, when numerous restrictions and other measures were prepared. On 16 March 2020, the Government and President jointly declared that Finland was in a state of emergency. The powers granted by the Emergency Powers Act began to be implemented.

Many functions of society were closed. Nearly all schools transitioned to remote teaching and gatherings of more than ten people were forbidden. Travel between Uusimaa and the rest of Finland was restricted. Restaurants were closed. In the second week of April, the number of infections in Finland first levelled out and then began to slowly decrease. The Government started lifting the restrictions gradually. The situation improved to the extent that the emergency was declared to be over in mid-June. In an international comparison, Finland managed the first phase of the epidemic well.

In the early phases of an epidemic, it is essential to quickly identify the danger posed by the virus so that it, and the disease it causes, can be contained at the local level. Authorities were slow to identify the coronavirus as a global threat to human health.

The virus arrived in Finland from abroad. Even though the spread of the disease was noticed in Finland and abroad, the borders cannot be completely closed for a variety of reasons. The practical arrangements and legal considerations were especially demanding, and it took a long time to get the situation under control. No preparations had been made for restricting cross-border travel as part of stopping the spread of epidemics. The preparations had focused solely on preventing individual patients carrying an infectious disease from crossing the border.

Finland had a comprehensive national pandemic plan drawn up for influenza in 2012. The plan had not been updated sufficiently in recent years, nor its implementation practised, so the plan was not applied in time. The planning process itself is essential to preparedness planning, since it improves crisis-awareness in the organization’s daily operations and generates development ideas, and thereby capabilities for dealing with a variety of situations.

Finland had the capability for quick decision-making and implementation of restrictions and other measures. A political consensus and the fact that the authorities succeeded in retaining public trust in the measures and leadership contributed to Finland's readiness. Official responsibilities and leadership were based on the “competent ministry” model. However, there were differences of opinion on which ministry was competent in individual matters, and cooperation across administrative branches was lacking. The Government was forced to carry out detailed drafting in its negotiations because it did not receive adequate proposals. Finland’s crisis leadership model was not functional enough or sufficiently familiar to the administration to be successfully implemented.

The measures were initially focused on managing the epidemic, but it soon became clear that many other factors were influencing the decisions. At this stage, the authorities began collecting information in a variety of ways. Traditional methods for gathering, utilizing and sharing information proved to be inadequate. All of the potential consequences were not always identified or assessed in time in the preparation of restrictions. This course of action poses a risk of increasing inequality and having those who were already the most vulnerable suffer the worst of the crisis.

The Finns were largely able to work, study and use services from home. The quick development of a mobile application to help combat the coronavirus failed, however. The ability to rapidly implement technological development projects is necessary in times of crisis.

The situation called for clear communications, and this need was answered with Government press briefings. Ambiguities arose when time was short, coordination failed, or unambiguous facts were not available. Open debate between experts and free reporting by the media are cornerstones of democracy. In an emergency, good coordination and a clear chain of command contribute to clear and uniform communications.

During the period under review, January–July 2020, 333 people died of an infection caused by the virus. There were a total of 7,500 confirmed cases of COVID-19. Not all of those who fell ill felt that they received the help they needed from the health care services.

Face masks and other protective equipment played an important role in managing the spread of the virus, first in the health care system and later in the everyday lives of Finnish citizens. The need for protective equipment had been taken into account in preparedness planning, but quantities of protective equipment needed came as a surprise. The use of masks by the public was a novelty in Finland, so capabilities for a smooth transition into using masks and instructing the public in their use were lacking.

In the summer of 2020, the situation improved due to containment measures and seasonal epidemiological variations, and restrictions were lifted. Sufficient preparations were not made for the second wave that could be expected to arrive in the autumn. A protracted crisis requires continuous proactive planning.

The investigation team recommends that

1. The Prime Minister’s Office ensure that the crisis leadership model is updated and awareness of it increased so that it can be applied in future crises. The model must ensure that open, proactive and adequate cooperation, preparations and leadership are implemented in time. In addition, a body with overall responsibility for ensuring that preparations are made and measures implemented and monitored actively is required and must be specified in advance. Clear leadership of and responsibilities for communications are required, so that a clear distinction can be made between political decisions and expert opinions.

2. The Prime Minister’s Office ensures that a model for the exchange of information between the government, regions and municipalities is developed, so that a situation picture can be maintained and shared securely in both directions, and that decisions and planned measures can be communicated. Such a model requires appropriate and uniform points of contact in all regions.

3. The Ministry of Justice will prepare a legislative framework within which the Government will be able to direct the State Regional Administrative Agencies and municipalities to take uniform and rapid action that nevertheless takes regional specifics into account in the event of a widespread crisis.

4. The Prime Minister’s Office will ensure that a joint function is instituted for central government, the regions and municipalities, which regularly reviews the state of preparedness, for example through audits, and supports organizations in their preparedness work. At the same time, this will provide information on the sufficiency of preparedness obligations, performance management, resourcing and strategic goals.

5. The Prime Minister’s Office will ensure that procedures are developed for networking between official actors and the dissemination and use of open data, so that this data and the expertise of universities and other expert organizations can be leveraged in the event of a crisis. This requires models for the secure, two-way flow of information, also to non-authorities. This aspect must be included in preparedness plans.

6. The Ministry of Finance will ensure that practices for the planned and smooth transfer of personnel within central and municipal government are prepared for municipalities and the central government, even in smaller crises or disruptions that do not cause a state of emergency.

7. The Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare will enhance its function that monitors the spread of dangerous diseases on a daily basis in the manner of a situation center, produces analyses and communicates actively and systematically at least with the Government situation center, administrative branches of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, international actors and the scientific community. A common taxonomy is also required to enable the decisive initiation of the necessary measures planned in advance.

8. The Ministry of the Interior will ensure that a comprehensive plan that takes all perspectives into account is implemented across administrative branches for the functioning of border crossings and the controlled restriction of cross-border traffic, health examinations and border control in times of crisis.

9. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment will develop procedures and cooperation with key commercial operators, so that large urgent procurements will be made by organizations with networks and expertise in foreign trade. Procurement capabilities are rehearsed by acquiring the material stored for security of supply through the same diverse channels, and domestically where possible.

10. The Ministry of Finance will ensure that Finland possesses capabilities for the rapid launch of digital technology projects and for ensuring access to the application development, data protection and information security expertise required in times of crisis.

11. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health will investigate possibilities for improving autopsy capabilities in the event of a rapidly escalating crisis, with the purpose of gathering information to mitigate the damage.

12. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health will ensure that the social welfare and health care system is capable of identifying the assistance needs of large groups of people in various widespread crises and of responding to such needs in a coordinated fashion, regardless of the individual's place of residence or care.