Y2020-01 Fire at a senior residential facility in Jyväskylä on 10 July 2020

In the evening of 10 July 2020, the balcony of a retirement property in Jyväskylä caught fire, which spread rapidly into the roof structures, i.e. a hollow in the roof. Later, the fire spread into different parts of the same block of flats, destroying two other roofs. Four people sustained personal injuries when cinders flew on them from the roof as a result of extinguishing activities. Nearly one hundred flats sustained smoke and water damage, and as a result, a large number of people had to move out of their homes due to the repairs, which took a long time. The fire only spread into one of the flats.

The fire spread into a large area because burning material fell down to the level of the lower roofs inside the vertical hollows behind the facade. There, the fire penetrated the deficient compartmentation and spread into other hollows in the roof. The vertical hollows had surfaces with combustible materials.

The problematic structures had been created as a result of deficiencies in the plans, construction management, control and communication with the authorities. The structure that had been implemented with production subassembly and subcontracting had not been designed as a whole, and the parties who were involved in implementing the sections were not responsible for the whole. The problematic areas remained hidden behind the structures, and the form of construction site supervision based on acknowledgement was not able to detect the problems.

The rescue department started an extensive and proactive evacuation before reconnaissance. The solution tied up the rescue services’ resources at the cost of reconnaissance, security and extinguishing measures. Some of the evacuees suffered burns.

The situation picture did not stay up to date, and therefore the progress of the fire surprised the rescue services. The rescue department noticed that the fire had spread to the adjacent roofs more than 1.5 hours after the fire was ignited, when the fire on the roof that had been ignited first was already starting to be under control. The observation was made after a delay of more than a half an hour, because there was no one on the adjacent roofs to secure the area. Extinguishing the roofs was not successful, because the ability to extinguish and limit the fire progressing in the hollow under the roof covering was poor. Extinguishing the hollow structures was mostly inefficient, and there were deficiencies in the management of the fire-extinguishing water supply.

The evacuation plans had not been made in cooperation, and the duties of the authorities were unclear. No leader was assigned to the evacuation centre. Taking care of the well-being of the evacuees and implementing the evacuation centre remained largely the duty of volunteers.

The Safety Investigation Authority recommends that:

• The Confederation of Finnish Construction Industries RT and its building construction sector-specific association Talonrakennusteollisuus ry develop the construction site inspection procedures and inspection document so that they are more suitable for large construction sites. When a certain issue is marked as inspected, it must be based on actual procedures, sufficient documentation and real preconditions for proper inspections.

• The building inspection association Rakennustarkastusyhdistys and the partnership network of rescue departments clarify together the practices on the division of labour between building control and rescue authorities in large-scale construction projects. In particular, the procedures of keeping the guidance and approval of structural solutions separate as well as the changes that can be permitted without additional planning must be reviewed.

• The Emergency Services Academy Finland and the Ministry of the Interior ensure that the fundamentals of management design are drawn up and published for rescue departments. The instructions must include the principles of implementing the overall leadership and management of rescue formations simultaneously in large-scale rescues. The instructions must also help with ensuring the continuity of the authorities’ actions and cooperation at the end of the rescue activities.

In addition, the Safety Investigation Authority repeats the recommendation issued in the investigation into the incident in Vihtavuori in 2013, according to which:

• The Ministry of the Interior should ensure that guidelines be prepared for the implementation of large-scale evacuations.