C1/2006L Incident at Helsinki-Vantaa Airport 2 February 2006

On Thursday February 2nd 2006 at 16:10 UTC (Finnish time -2 hours) occurred at Helsinki-Vantaa airport an incident with FIN095 (MD11 operated by Finnair Oyj) departing on a regular flight from Helsinki to Bangkok and EAY230 (AT72 operated by Aero Airlines As) that had landed after a regular flight from Turku. Because a preceding taxiing BLF282 (SB20 operated by Blue 1 Oy) had stopped, EAY230 was compelled to stay too close to the runway 04R while FIN095 was performing the take-off.

The Accident Investigation Board Finland decided February 7th 2006 to investigate the event and nominated air-traffic controller Erkki Kantola as the board chairman and airline pilot Markus Bergman and air-traffic controller Pekka Orava as board members.

Runway 04L was in use for landings and 04R for take-offs at Helsinki-Vantaa airport. BLF282 took contact with the control tower (TWR west) and got clearance for landing. After the landing it was given instructions to taxi to holding position PD to wait for crossing of runway 04R. The next approaching EAY230 got the clearance for landing and after the landing similar instructions to wait for the crossing of runway 04R. Both aircraft acknowledged the clearances properly. The control tower (TWR east) managed the departing traffic from runway 04R and the aircraft, which had landed, were transferred to the frequency of TWR east for permission to cross the runway in question. Due to departing traffic both aircraft were compelled to wait at PD and then successively got clearances to cross runway 04R to holding position ZD and to contact traffic control for taxiing (GND). The frequency for taxiing control was busy and the taxiing aircraft did not immediately get contact with it for a further clearance, but they had to stop on taxiway ZD so that EAY230 taxiing behind was partially inside the area between the sign for the holding position and the runway. Consequently the runway was not clear in a manner required for giving a clearance for take-off. The tower controller (TWR east) did not notice this but gave FIN095 a clearance for take-off from runway 04R. Consequently, during the take-off run FIN095 passed EAY230 closer than the required separation minimum.

The incident occurred because the tower controller gave a clearance for take-off from runway 04R without noticing that the runway was not clear according to the requirements. Contributing factors were, that BLF282 and EAY230 did not directly get contact at the taxiing control frequency, but had to stop at the holding position ZD given as a limit for the clearances, for which reason the taxiing of the aircraft did not proceed in a way expected by the tower controller. Besides the controller’s visual cues were hampered by snowfall, darkness and a vertical column of the control tower structure.

The investigation board gave no safety recommendations.

C1/2006L Report (pdf, 0.6 Mt)