




Turku stabbings on 18 August 2017



FOREWORD

On 19 October 2017, the Government appointed an investigation team pursuant to Section 32 of the Safety Investigation Act (525/2011) to investigate the stabbings that took place in Turku on 18 August 2017, in which two people died and eight were injured. The investigation is of an exceptional incident as referred to in Chapter 5 of the Safety Investigation Act.

The investigation team attached to the Ministry of Justice is led by Chief Safety Investigator Kai Valonen from the Safety Investigation Authority. The team consists of Mika Hatakka (PhD in Psychology), Vesa Lund (Chief Physician), Marja Nyrhinen (Head Coordinator of Immigration Affairs), Olli Ruohomäki (Visiting Senior Fellow), Tarja Wiikinkoski (Director) and Kari Ylönen (Master of Political Sciences). Head of Communications Sakari Lauriala contributed to the investigation in terms of communications. Sometrik Oy and Optifluence Oy prepared a social media analysis for the investigation team at their request.

A safety investigation establishes the course of events, causes and consequences as well as the rescue operations and actions of the authorities. Cause refers to the various underlying factors of the incident and the direct and indirect factors affecting it. Any deficiencies in regulations and provisions on safety and the authorities are established, if necessary.

The investigation report includes an account of the course of events, the factors that led to the incident, the consequences of the incident and safety recommendations to the competent authorities and other actors for measures that are necessary to increase public safety, prevent new incidents, prevent damage and to enhance the efficiency of rescue operations and other actions of the authorities.

The parties involved in the incident and the authorities in charge of control in the field of the investigated incident were given opportunities to give statements on a draft investigation report. The statements were taken into account in the final phase of the investigation report. There is a summary of the statements at the end of the report. Statements given by private persons are not published in accordance with the Safety Investigation Act.

The investigation report has been translated into Swedish by Semantix Oy and into English by Lingoneer Oy.

The investigation report and a summary have been published on the Safety Investigation Authority website at www.sia.fi.

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1 EVENTS

1.1 Course of events

In May 2016, a Moroccan man arrived in Finland and applied for asylum. He was allocated a place in supported housing of the Turku Reception Centre in Pansio. From spring 2017, he spent a lot of time in Kaarina at the flat of his friend, a fellow asylum seeker who had received a residence permit and an assigned municipality of residence.

On the morning of Friday, 18 August 2017, he wrote a manifesto at his friend's flat, justifying his upcoming act with Jihadist ideology and goals. The manifesto ended with a request to pray for him and for entry into Paradise as a martyr and a confession of faith.

He took two kitchen knives from the flat and cycled to Turku. At noon, he attended Friday prayers at a mosque in the city centre. Next, he cycled to a park next to Turku Cathedral. There, at around 3 pm, he read his manifesto aloud in Arabic, recording it on video on his mobile phone. The perpetrator released the manifesto video in an instant messenger service and took a bus to the Turku Bus Station. There, he saw a military serviceman and decided to stab him. However, disruptions occurred and he gave up the idea.

The man took a bus to Turku Market Square and bought an ice cream from an ice cream stall. In the middle of eating the ice cream, he moved to the southwest corner of the square and lethally stabbed a woman who had been standing there. A bystander who witnessed the stabbing went to help her. The stabber, who had been moving towards the centre of the square, noticed this and turned back after a few steps. The man who was helping the victim stopped the stabber from approaching by kicking him. The stabber turned away but returned again, stabbing the man that was helping and another woman who was there. A bystander who witnessed the stabbing made the first emergency call at 4:02:11 pm. Several other bystanders who saw the incident called the Emergency Response Services soon afterwards.

The stabber moved towards the centre of the square, stabbing a man who tried to stop him. He attempted to stab another man, who managed to avoid being hit.

Most of the people at the square did not notice that anything unusual was happening and continued to make purchases at the stalls, for example. Some of the people who noticed the events did not understand the seriousness of the situation and stopped to observe the developing situation. Some of the people who noticed it started running away.

Closer to the centre of the square, the stabber first ran past a woman with a pram and then turned back and stabbed the woman. The stabber continued running towards the northeast corner of the square, stabbing a woman there. After crossing the intersection of Yliopistonkatu and Kauppiaskatu, he stabbed two women at the corner. One of the women died on her way to the hospital.

Some of the young men who witnessed the incident started running after the perpetrator. One of the bystanders had a baseball bat in his car and handed it to a man who was running after the stabber. The men running after the stabber tried to warn people by shouting.

The stabber ran uphill along Kauppiaskatu and onward along Maariankatu towards Puutori Square. A police patrol turning from Brahenkatu to Maariankatu noticed the stabber coming from the opposite direction. The stabber stabbed a woman at the corner. The police patrol made a U turn back to Brahenkatu. The stabber attacked another woman, stabbing her and holding on to her. The police patrol left their vehicle. A police officer gave the stabber orders

and shot him in the lower limb at approximately 4:05:00 pm. The second police officer used a Taser. The stabber was immobilised and the police patrol took him into custody.




Figure 1. Events at Turku Market Square and its immediate vicinity The stabber's route is marked in red. The locations of the victims are marked with red circles. The deaths are marked in black, injured victims in white and the person who survived the attempted stabbing unharmed is marked in green. Approximately three minutes passed from the first stabbing to stopping the man. During this time, he moved almost 500 metres. (Aerial photo: Orthoimagery © National Land Survey of Finland 1/2018.)

1.2 Emergency alerts and rescue actions

1.2.1 Emergency reports and alerts

Turku Emergency Response Centre answered the first emergency call at 4:02:15 pm. The call was answered in two seconds. According to the caller, a woman had been stabbed at the Market Square, there were at least two victims and the perpetrator was no longer nearby.

The Emergency Response Centre gave the assignment to the police patrols in the Turku region through the authorities' telecommunications network (VIRVE) at 4:03:20 pm. Three police patrols signed off the assignment as received within half a minute.

The Emergency Response Centre (ERC) alerted emergency medical services (EMS) at 4:03:41 pm. The alert was received by the EMS field supervisor (unit code EVS 01), physician unit Finnhems 20 (FH 20) and one EMS unit, or ambulance (EVS 1121).

The first four emergency calls were made almost simultaneously. After that, there was a break of approximately 20 seconds, after which up to 25 calls were received per minute. Over a period of five minutes, 64 calls were received, over 50 of which were connected to the incident. In 31 of the calls, the caller disconnected when the wait grew long due to the congestion.

As the number of victims increased, the ERC alerted two more ambulances that were free and then more ambulances as soon as they were released from previous assignments.

The ERC gradually gained a clearer overall picture of the situation. A general picture of the exact location and number of victims did not form until approximately 10 minutes after the first emergency call was received. It was particularly difficult to get an idea of the location of the victims because several calls were received about the same victim, describing their location in slightly different ways.

Rescue services units were not alerted because, according to the alert instructions issued by the police, they are not alerted in case of stabbings unless specifically requested by the police.

1.2.2 Catching the perpetrator and emergency first aid

The ERC passed to the police descriptions given by the callers and information according to which the stabber was running in the square and stabbing passers-by. The police field command patrol closest to the Market Square was able to reach the square 30 seconds after receiving the assignment. The patrol stopped by the first victim for only a moment and immediately continued on as people pointed in the direction the stabber was heading.

A second patrol heard the assignment on their way to another assignment near Turku Bus Station. The patrol interrupted their assignment, started driving towards the Market Square via Brahenkatu and took the perpetrator into custody when they encountered him.

The general commander of the Southwestern Finland Police Department instructed the police patrols to stop the perpetrator's actions through VIRVE radio concurrently with the arrest.

Some of the men running after the perpetrator behaved aggressively, and the police had to protect the perpetrator. The situation quickly calmed down.

Around twenty seconds after the arrest, the field command patrol following the perpetrator arrived from the direction of the Market Square. Soon afterwards, a third police patrol arrived and went to the Market Square. Over the following ten minutes, several police patrols arrived in the area.

Bystanders gave emergency first aid to the victims. One of the victims was helped indoors. At Puutori Square, the staff of a nearby private clinic came out to help the victims. The police safeguarded the area where the events took place, helped provide emergency first aid and reported the locations of the victims to the ERC. The police also gave emergency first aid to the perpetrator.

Soon after the perpetrator's arrest, the police started to form the view that there was probably just one perpetrator. However, there was no absolute certainty. The role of the bystanders who ran after the perpetrator was partly unclear. The field commander stayed at the Puutori scene to manage the situation as the situation commander and instructed another police officer to take the lead in finding the other perpetrators, if there were any. Some of the police patrols started investigating the situation by patrolling in the immediate surroundings.

At the situation centre of the Southwestern Finland Police Department, based on the alert and the radio traffic in the early stages, it was clear to the general commander that this was an extraordinary act of violence. The continuous communications traffic about the situation demanded all of the attention of the command centre staff.

1.2.3 Emergency medical services

EMS received the alert at 4:03:53 pm with the assignment code A032 stabbing. According to the initial information, only one person had been stabbed. Because this was an assignment in the highest risk category A, EMS field command unit EVS 01 and physician unit FH 20 were alerted in addition to EMS unit EVS 1211.

When the alert arrived, EVS 01 and FH 20 were on Vähä-Heikkilänkatu returning to Turku University Hospital (TYKS) from their previous assignment. The ERC informed them that there were two stabbing victims and alerted a second EMS unit.

EVS 01 and FH 20 stopped at a bus stop on Kaskenkatu and the staff put on protective vests. The units continued towards the Market Square. The EMS field supervisor informed the EMS operators by VIRVE radio that he was taking the lead in managing the EMS and ordered arriving units to wear protective vests. The supervisor declared Aurakatu 1 as the staging area, or point of entry, for the units and ordered other units to stay at a distance of 200 metres of the Market Square.

The field supervisor ordered by VIRVE radio the EMS units to transfer their message communications to the cooperation call group of the police and EMS. Contrary to the expectations of the EMS, the police field patrols did not start using the call group. The EMS field supervisor also monitored two other call groups, the cooperation call group with the ERC and the internal call group of the Turku region EMS. Because the police were not in the cooperation call group, in the early stages, information about the situation did not pass directly between the police and EMS but through the ERC.

The EMS field supervisor notified the emergency clinic at TYKS of the stabbing assignment he had received by VIRVE radio at approximately 4:07 pm. Immediately afterwards, the ERC reported that shots had been fired at the site. EVS 01 and FH 20 were the first units to arrive at the staging area. The first EMS unit reached the staging area at approximately 4:08 pm. The units stopped to wait for information from the police about the safety of the site, which is the general procedure in ordinary stabbings.

The ERC found out that there were at least 5–6 victims. The ERC alerted three more available EMS units. The ERC informed EMS of its estimate of the number of victims at approximately 4:08 pm. The EMS field supervisor independently activated an ambulance that was at TYKS handing over a patient to come to the site.

The EMS field supervisor had difficulties getting an idea of the safety situation at the site because there was no direct contact between the police and EMS. The field supervisor knew that people had been stabbed and shots fired, but no information about the number of victims or who had used the firearm.

At 4:08 pm, the ERC heard in police radio traffic that the police had used the firearm and stopped the perpetrator's actions. The police field commander requested several ambulances to the site. The ERC asked the police whether it was safe for ambulances to come, and the police confirmed that it was safe. At the same time, the ERC informed the EMS field supervisor of several patients at the Market Square and Puutori Square.

At approximately 4:09 pm, the ERC informed the EMS that one perpetrator was in police custody and had been shot by the police. The police had no knowledge or observations of other perpetrators. The EMS field supervisor gave an advance notice specifying the number of victims to TYKS emergency clinic at approximately 4:10 pm, stating that there were at least five victims.

The EMS field supervisor decided to wait for police to give permission to move to the site. The ERC gave the field supervisor more information about the locations of the victims and repeated that the perpetrator was in police custody. The field supervisor moved to the first victims in the northwest corner of the square at approximately 4:11 pm. The field supervisor requested a physician unit and EMS unit to the site. The ERC informed all EMS units that it was safe to go to the square.

The EMS field supervisor established a command post in the northwest corner of the square. He ordered the EMS units to enter through there. The field supervisor ordered the physician of FH 20, the HEMS crew member¹ and two paramedics to go triage patients in the Market Square. The police and the ERC had a fairly clear picture of the location of the patients, but this situation picture was not fully conveyed to the EMS.

There were two victims in the northwest corner of the square, one of who was being resuscitated by a physician who happened to be nearby. A police patrol was present. The physician of FH 20 pronounced the victim dead and treatment was discontinued. Another victim was sitting on the cobblestones, bloody but conscious. He had an incised wound on the left side of his neck. EMS unit EVS 1217 assessed the patient's condition and decided on immediate transport². The transport to TYKS started at approximately 4:20 pm.

It was difficult to spot the next victims due to the large crowd and the market stalls. Some of the bystanders guided the paramedics to the victims, but the information provided by the public was partly conflicting. Due to the large crowd, the EMS units had difficulties driving directly to the victims.

Many were recording the victims with their cameras and mobile phones. Some of them were in the EMS personnel's way and had to be ordered to move back.

The field supervisor ordered EMS unit EVS 1219 to start treating the patient in the northeast corner of the square. The unit proceeded to the corner of Kauppiaskatu and Yliopistonkatu at approximately 4:15 pm. The victim had a stab wound in her shoulder, and two bystanders were helping her. The patient's level of consciousness had decreased, and her status was progressing to hypovolaemic shock. A police patrol was also present. After an initial assessment, it was decided to immediately transport the victim to TYKS. The transport started at approximately 4:17 pm.

The field supervisor ordered the next EMS unit arriving at the site, EVS 1213, to the side closest to the square of a hamburger restaurant on the east side of the square. The unit reached the victim at approximately 4:15 pm. When the unit arrived, the physician of FH 20, the HEMS crew member and two paramedics were already there. The airway of the victim, who had life-

¹ HEMS = Helicopter Emergency Medical Services; a HEMS crew member is a firefighter, paramedic or nurse trained as a helicopter flight assistant.

² Penetrating wounds to the torso and neck involve a great risk of severe internal bleeding, which cannot be managed outside of a hospital. Even if the patient seems to be in good condition, their status may deteriorate suddenly. For this reason, patients are transported to a hospital capable of immediate surgical treatment as soon as possible (load and go). In such cases, the treatment provided by the EMS is restricted to immediate life-saving measures, minimising the time spent at the scene.

threatening wounds, was secured, and she received an intraosseous access route. The transport started at approximately 4:20 pm.

When the transport of the previous victim started, bystanders escorted to the physician of FH 20 a victim near the taxi station on the north side of the square. The slightly injured victim had been stabbed in the chest. Because the victim was in good condition and an EMS unit was not available for transport at the time, the physician asked a taxi that was at the taxi station to take the victim to TYKS.

The field supervisor had received notice from the ERC that there was a victim indoors in a bank on the east side of the square. The field supervisor ordered EMS unit EVS 1218 to move to the bank directly from the staging area on Aurakatu. The unit reached the victim at approximately 4:15 pm. Bystanders had helped the victim indoors from the square and provided emergency first aid. The bank personnel had locked the doors. The slightly injured victim had been stabbed in the shoulder. The transport started at approximately 4:25 pm.

The field supervisor ordered EMS unit EVS 1211, which was in the staging area, to provide medical care to a victim by the outdoor café on the Market Square. There were several cafés in the square, and it took a while before the victim was found. The unit reached the victim at approximately 4:16 pm. The slightly injured victim had been stabbed in the shoulder and was conscious. The wound was bound up and a haemostatic dressing was applied. A vascular access was also opened. The transport started at approximately 4:30 pm.

Once the victims at the Market Square were, according to the field supervisor's understanding, all being treated, he ordered free EMS units to move to Puutori Square.

EMS unit EVS 5211 received an alert to the Market Square at approximately 4:13 pm. The field supervisor ordered the unit directly to Puutori Square, where it reached the victim at approximately 4:20 pm. The slightly injured victim had several stab wounds in the torso and a lower limb. The victim was sitting on the ground. Bystanders had already bound up some of her wounds. The transport started at approximately 4:34 pm.

The crew of FH 20 arrived at Puutori Square at 4:22 pm. At the same time, EMS unit EVS 1221, which had been alerted at 4:14 pm, reached the victim in the southwest corner of Puutori Square. The victim, who had life-threatening injuries, had been stabbed in the upper chest and neck. The victim was conscious. She had received emergency first aid from the police and the staff of a nearby private clinic. The transport started at approximately 4:26 pm.

EMS unit EVS 1311 had been alerted to Puutori Square at 4:15 pm and arrived at approximately 4:22 pm. The unit was assigned to treat the perpetrator of the stabbings. The gunshot wound in his lower limb caused serious bleeding, which might have been life-threatening without emergency first aid. The police had placed a tourniquet at the base of the perpetrator's thighs as emergency first aid. The physician FH 20 examined the perpetrator's condition, and immediate transport was decided on. The transport started at approximately 4:26 pm. A police officer rode on the transport.

Units EVS 01 and FH 20, which stayed at the scene, checked the area for any other people in need of help.

During the situation, the EMS regional field supervisors of the province carried out preparedness transfers closer to Turku. The preparedness transfers secured the operational readiness of EMS in Turku.

At approximately 4:30 pm, the EMS field supervisor gave the ERC an order in accordance with the disaster procedure to leave non-urgent assignments to wait until the resources became available.

1.2.4 Turku University Hospital (TYKS)

The emergency clinic at TYKS received the first information of the incident at 4:06 pm after an eyewitness of the shooting informed a friend who worked there. At 4:07 pm, the EMS field supervisor informed the emergency clinic that there had been a stabbing in the city centre. The triage nurse reported the shooting and stabbing to the emergency clinic field supervisor and the chief medical officer. The surgical back-up on-call physician was called but was in surgery and thus unable to come and lead the situation at the emergency clinic. The primary on-call physician took the lead in managing the situation.

The hospital was informed of the large number of injured at approximately 4:10 pm when the EMS field supervisor informed the emergency clinic's A&E triage nurse. According to the information, there were at least five stabbing victims in the city centre.

The readiness of the emergency clinic was raised by informing the staff and discharging patients who did not need immediate treatment. The clinic was closed to walk-in patients. The emergency clinic chief physician and trauma on-call physician were called at 4:15 pm. The chief physician ordered the emergency clinic into disaster readiness and started travelling to the hospital.

The order for disaster readiness caused the emergency clinic to start using the appropriate procedure. Surgical activities were stopped and the operating room prepared to receive patients with stab wounds. Emergency clinic staff went to the intensive care unit and operating room to provide information about the incident. Nurses from the intensive care unit came to the emergency clinic to provide assistance. The children's emergency clinic was transferred entirely to the paediatric outpatient clinic.

Security guards closed the main door to the emergency clinic and started to control entry to the emergency clinic. At TYKS, the decision to close the doors was made in the early stages at the emergency clinic chief physician's orders. Normally, the decision is made by the chief of security. Guards were posted at the doors, and new arrivals had to show the contents of their bags to the security guards.

Just before the stabbing began, the TYKS emergency clinic was experiencing a high workload. The emergency clinic chief had submitted a request for overtime work to the nursing staff because there was a shortage of four nurses from the normal manpower per shift. A normal number of physicians were present. There was a high workload in the treatment of patients with internal diseases, so two extra physicians had been called in.

Due to the on-call shift, two anaesthesiologists, an on-call physician in gastroenterological surgery and an on-call trauma physician were also present. The operating room was ready to receive two patients almost immediately after being notified. The anaesthesiologists alerted more staff using WhatsApp. The staff of the emergency clinic and intensive care unit were alerted using two other instant messenger applications. More additional personnel came in because of the alerts during the first hour than was actually needed.

The first two victims arrived at the emergency clinic almost simultaneously at approximately 4:25 pm. There was not enough time to perform all the actions connected to disaster readiness. There was no time to take the disaster action cards into use; instead, decisions were made based on experience and intuition.

The victim who arrived first had died during transport. At the emergency clinic, she was pronounced dead after brief resuscitation. The victim who arrived second had life-threatening injuries. After emergency measures, the victim was moved into the operating room for emergency surgery at 4:46 pm.

The other six victims encountered by EMS and the perpetrator all arrived at the emergency clinic within the next 15 minutes. One of them was transferred to an operating room for emergency surgery at 4:52 pm. The perpetrator was operated on a bit later.

Three victims were moved to the operating room's recovery room after being examined. Three were treated at the emergency clinic and discharged from there. The perpetrator and the victims who underwent emergency surgery were treated in the intensive care unit after their operations. The victims who were not discharged from the emergency clinic were transferred to a follow-up treatment location approximately within an hour of their arrival at the hospital.

One slightly injured victim came to the emergency clinic independently after 9 pm. He had received a slice in the shoulder at the Market Square but left before the arrival of the EMS. One victim died at the Market Square and was not brought to the hospital. All victims who were brought to the hospital alive were discharged. At least one incurred a permanent handicap.

During the treatment of the patients and even afterwards, the hospital maintained an elevated readiness to receive more patients and security measures were increased. Guard patrols were increased and access to the T2 hospital building's³ entry routes was controlled. Increased security at the entry routes and the emergency clinic throughout the hospital area continued until 1 am. The police stood guard over the perpetrator throughout his hospital stay. The strict security measures continued until the perpetrator was transferred from the hospital the following week.

The hospital staff's sense of security was affected by the fact that nobody knew whether there were more perpetrators and whether new acts could be expected. It was also uncertain whether someone involved might be among the victims. The hospital received threatening phone calls towards staff and the perpetrator. This increased the staff's fear and need for security guards and control.

Two internal information sessions were organised at the emergency clinic at 5 pm and 7 pm. Other units of the hospital were informed by bringing messages to the responsible people in person. The hospital district director provided information to the media and answered approximately 50 telephone calls per day over the course of the weekend. There were calls from Finnish as well as foreign media.

A hospital-wide disaster alert was not sent out. The hospital district's senior management and the hospital's chief of security received notice of the incident through channels other than the hospital's internal alerts. The hospital's management group did not meet on the day of the incident, which hindered internal and external information distribution, among other things.

1.2.5 Rescue services

Rescue services were not alerted because, in accordance with the alert procedure, they are not needed for normal stabbing assignments. Two EMS units departed from Turku Main Fire Station towards the Market Square at 4:04 pm, but rescue services staff are not informed of EMS alerts.

³ The T2 hospital building includes the emergency clinic, intensive care unit and A&E operating rooms.

The executive fire officer on duty (P3) received notice of the events on his telephone from an acquaintance approximately 5–10 minutes after the beginning of the events. The executive fire officer on duty believed it to be a normal stabbing. However, after seeing several emergency vehicles heading for the Market Square, the executive fire officer started to investigate the matter. The executive fire officer had telephone contact with the Rescue Department on-call chief (P2) and the police situation centre, due to which the executive fire officer went to the Market Square to offer assistance from rescue services to the EMS and the police. The EMS field supervisor and police field commander both stated that the assistance was not needed. However, the police forensic investigation asked the Rescue Department to help cordon off the area relevant for the investigation. The executive fire officer on duty organised three rescue units from the main fire station, which arrived at the Market Square at 5 pm.

The duty chief immediately called the chief of regional rescue services (P1), who had already heard of the events on the radio. The chief of regional rescue services notified the management of the City of Turku and, at 4:48 pm, the duty chief notified the duty officer of the Ministry of the Interior Department for Rescue Services, who had already been informed by the National Police Board duty officer a moment earlier. The duty chief also informed the Rescue Department management with WhatsApp group messages, visited the Market Square and, of his own initiative, relocated to the police command centre to serve as a contact person around 6 pm.

At the Market Square, Rescue Department units assisted the police forensic investigation, for example by monitoring the cordoned-off area, moving vehicles for privacy and building other structures for privacy. At first, the first deceased victim was kept at the scene, covered, in order to secure the investigation. Curious people gathered nearby to watch and take video and photos, so the Rescue Department staff asked them to move back. The people did not significantly hinder operations but, according to the Rescue Department staff, some of the people taking photos and videos did not understand the need to respect the dead. Some people were indignant at being asked to move further back to wait for their bus. Once the forensic investigation was complete, the rescue services units washed the blood stains off the surface of the square.

The readiness of the rescue services was raised by establishing a rescue services command centre at the Turku Main Fire Station at 6 pm. The duty chief, who was at the police situation centre, conveyed information to the rescue services and to be recorded in the situation journal. The readiness of the rescue services was brought down to the normal level at 9 pm. The duty chief informed the duty officer of the Ministry of the Interior Department for Rescue Services at 10:25 pm.

1.2.6 Immediate further actions by the police

After the victims had been taken away, the police operations at the Market Square and elsewhere in the city centre continued with a determination of potential other perpetrators. The situation was unclear for quite a long time. For example, one eyewitness had seen one of the individuals who ran after the perpetrator with a black bag that the eyewitness considered suspicious. The police investigated the matter, which did not involve anything unusual.

Immediately after the incident, the Emergency Response Centre received telephone calls that stabbings were taking place at large shopping centres, Mylly and Skanssi, and at the Turku Railway Station, with people hurt. The ERC conveyed the assignments to the police, who checked the locations. However, nothing unusual was observed at the locations. The ERC was soon able to doubt the truthfulness of the information because there were only sporadic calls.

The ERC also received reports of cars that might be involved in the situation. Later, it was discovered that the cars had nothing to do with the incident.

In the early stages, all of the attention of the Southwest Police Department situation centre staff was focused on the communications about the situation. At first, nobody had the time to document the course of events into the system available to convey the situation picture to police patrols and the rest of the police organisation, such as the National Police Board. A little later, more staff arrived at the situation centre. The situation centre informed the National Police Board duty officer of the incident at 4:12 pm. The national police rapid response unit was alerted to the scene.

The first bulletin from the authorities was released by the Southwestern Finland Police Department at 4:37 pm. According to the Twitter message, several people had been stabbed in Turku city centre, and people were asked to avoid the centre. Ten minutes later, the police department tweeted again. The message stated that the police had shot a suspected perpetrator, who was now in police custody.

Investigation of the incident started quickly. At first, the Southwestern Finland Police Department was responsible for the investigation, but the responsibility transferred to the National Bureau of Investigation at approximately 5 pm. The Southwestern Finland Police Department assisted in the investigation. In connection with the investigation, the police, for example, conducted house searches in places where the perpetrator had spent time and took a few people into custody.

At 5:28 pm, the Southwestern Finland Police Department tweeted that it was looking for more potential perpetrators. The message also advised people to leave Turku city centre. The city centre grew significantly quieter. The police was visibly present in the city centre throughout Friday evening and the early morning hours in order to increase the people's sense of security.

The West Finland Coast Guard of the Finnish Border Guard was informed of the incident by the police at 4:23 pm. The general commander of the coast guard moved to the coast guard command centre at 4:29 pm. The readiness of the coast guard crime prevention unit was raised, and the number of patrols in the Port of Turku area was increased.

At 5:37 pm, the police verbally asked the general commander of the coast guard for official assistance for an assignment to maintain public order in the Port of Turku in terms of the arrivals and departures of passenger ships⁴. The coast guard further raised its operational readiness, for example by increasing the number of patrols in the port and by making readiness transfers in order to secure its statutory main duties. The written request for official assistance from the police arrived at 5:53 pm. At the request of the police, the general commander of the coast guard moved to the police situation centre at 6:30 pm.

At 6:04 pm, the Southwestern Finland Police Department posted on its Facebook page about the stabbing, mentioning that the police was providing information about the incident on its Twitter account and website. The Finnish Security Intelligence Service released its first bulletin at 6:08 pm. The Security Intelligence Service stated that it was taking part in investigating the events.

⁴ According to the Border Guard Act (578/2005), in individual cases, at the request of commanding police officers, the Border Guard may perform the urgent police actions necessary to maintain public order and security referred to in the chapter on general powers of the Police Act which the police are unable to perform without delay. In such cases, border guards have the powers prescribed for police officers in the said chapter.

The National Police Commissioner gave a statement to Yle, the Finnish Broadcasting Company, at 6:28 pm. According to the commissioner, it was too early to judge whether the events were linked to terrorism. The commissioner also said that the police was increasing surveillance and visible patrols throughout the country within the next 24 hours.

A police press conference was held at the Turku Police Station at 7 pm. At first, information was provided by the Police Chief and Detective Chief Inspector of the Southwestern Finland Police Department, the Detective Chief Inspector of the National Bureau of Investigation, the National Police Commissioner and the Minister of the Interior. Later, they were joined by the TYKS emergency clinic chief physician and, finally, the Mayor of Turku. The press conference described the events and the beginning of the investigation and answered various questions from the press. The information provided about the number of victims during the conference was conflicting, and nobody was able to give an unambiguous figure. Some counts included the perpetrator while other did not. Furthermore, the numbers stated by the hospital did not include the deceased victim who was not brought to the hospital. The fact that one injured person only sought treatment late in the evening contributed to the discrepancy in the final number of injured.

In the social media, people wondered why an emergency warning was not announced. The police justified the decision in a Twitter message sent at 8:30 pm. According to the message, the alert came at 4:02 pm, the perpetrator was caught at 4:05 pm, and there was no time for an emergency warning.

At 9:18 pm, the police released a bulletin outlining the events of the day. The bulletin mentioned that there were eight victims, two of whom died. At 1:27 am, the police released a bulletin specifying that the victims included eight injured and two dead.

The readiness level of the Finnish Border Guard was returned to normal after 9 pm. The police reduced its readiness around 1 am. Over the following week, the coast guard provided official assistance to maintain public order according to the request of the police. Three coast guard patrols patrolled the Port of Turku and the railway station, bus station and Turku Airport during daytime.

The police and the Finnish Border Guard increased their readiness level on the national level.

1.2.7 Government Situation Centre

The Government Situation Centre (VNTIKE) first received notice of the stabbings by telephone at 4:38 pm. A few minutes later, the Prime Minister's Office requested information about the incident, of which they had received initial information elsewhere. Around the same time, an SMS arrived to the Situation Centre from the National Police Board duty officer, stating that several people had been stabbed in the neck in Turku and the police had shot the suspect during his arrest. Other possible perpetrators were being sought.

At approximately 4:50 pm, the corresponding situation centre in Sweden telephoned and requested more information about the incident. At 4:51 pm, the Situation Centre gave the first message about the case to the ministers, the management and preparedness management of the ministries, the civil service departments and government institutions. The content of the message followed the content of the message received from the National Police Board duty officer 10 minutes previously. After 5 pm, the Prime Minister tweeted about the matter, stating for example that the Government would hold a meeting later that evening.

A second SMS to the ministers and management of the ministries regarding several details connected to the stabbings was sent at 6:06 pm. At 8:15 pm, the Situation Centre sent out notices of the Government meeting and information connected, for example, to the safety of the ministers. The Situation Centre provided a situation report at 9:15 pm and again in the morning at 8 am. Over the course of the day, the Situation Centre distributed information via SMS, forwarded another notice of a Government teleconference and informed the corresponding situation centre in Sweden. A text message sent at 11:54 am informed the ministers that the act was being investigated as an offence committed with terrorist intent. In the afternoon, the preparedness management of the ministries was informed that there was no acute need to call extra meetings of the ministries' preparedness organisations. The last situation report at 4:30 pm shared more detailed information in accordance with the press conferences held by the National Bureau of Investigation and the Security Intelligence Service.

The Government meeting convened by the Situation Centre was held on the day of the incident at 7:50 pm. The Government released an announcement to the victims, their friends and family and the Finnish public in general, condemning the act and communicating that the situation was under control, for example. A meeting of the heads of preparedness was not convened.

1.2.8 Finnish Immigration Service

The Situation Centre of the Finnish Immigration Service (Migri) assisted the National Bureau of Investigation in determining the perpetrator's identity because it was discovered early on that he was probably a resident at a reception centre. The police was unable to access the UMA information system on aliens because the system was temporarily down for maintenance. The Situation Centre called in people who were able to retrieve data from the system back-up. The National Bureau of Investigation received the information it needed at 5:41 pm.

The Situation Centre also instructed reception centres around Finland to increase their safety measures. The incident inspired various fears, especially at units with minors. No significant threatening situations occurred at reception centres. The Situation Centre was on duty throughout the weekend, producing information for the needs of the police.

1.2.9 Crisis communications of the City of Turku

The Director of Communication received notice of the incident through the media and quickly assembled a communications team capable of communicating in three languages. Intensive information distribution continued from Friday to Sunday.

The City of Turku announced the availability of crisis support on its website and in the social media. The most-read news item released by the city was about crisis assistance. In accordance with the communications procedure, the city focused on conveying only confirmed information that had been received from the police. On Monday, a Wilma message was sent to the parents of schoolchildren. The website and social media functioned well during the crisis.

The city had an online crisis communications system, but it was not used during the situation. There were also digital noticeboards along entry routes, but no direct communication channel with the company managing the boards.

The city's communications staff asked their colleagues in Barcelona and Stockholm for advice about handling the situation. In its message, the city management appealed to the citizens to not give in to fear. The city also organised flags at half mast, the casting of flowers into the River Aura, memorial illumination of the bridge and a tree of memories at the square. These

collective memorials formed a continuum of mourning communications that lasted for approximately a month.

1.2.10 Psychosocial support

The emergency social services and crisis teams of the City of Turku launched acute crisis work in the same evening. Starting from the following day, the Finnish Red Cross (FRC) volunteers and emergency team of psychologists and Vantaa Social and Crisis Emergency Services were also involved. Long-term crisis work was handled by the City of Turku psychologist unit and supplemented by the FRC emergency team of psychologists and, partly, the Turku and Kaarina Parish Union. The organisations that participated in the activities organised support for their own staff.

The City of Turku Emergency Social Services received notice of the stabbing after 4:15 pm from the Emergency Response Centre, the Director of the Welfare Division and the police situation centre. A pair of workers from the emergency social services arrived at the Market Square at 4:45 pm and, at the request of the police, took charge of the baby of one of the stabbing victims. The emergency social services duty officer asked the FRC to prepare to launch crisis support. The emergency social services received the official assistance they requested from Vantaa Social and Crisis Emergency Services, which had been arranged to handle national assignments in case of suddenly arising situations. The duty officer at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health authorised the official assistance.

A crisis centre was opened in conjunction with the coordinated accident and emergency services at TYKS less than an hour after the stabbings. The coordinated accident and emergency services were selected as the location because the police had requested that people avoid the city centre, so it just thought that people would hesitate to come into the city centre. The hospital's mental health services were also close by. The crisis centre was staffed with emergency social services employees and volunteers of the FRC's mental health support team. The coordinated accident and emergency services guided victim's family members and others who sought help to the crisis centre. Except for the nights, the crisis centre operated until 6 pm on Sunday, 20 August 2017. The crisis centre was visited by over 40 people.

The emergency social services immediately started preparations to open a crisis helpline. At first, there was a problem because the code needed to activate the system was missing, but the Division Director was able to obtain it from the city's IT services. The crisis helpline was opened at 6:30 pm, which was announced on the city website. The crisis helpline functioned under the principle that if one line was busy, the next call transferred to the next available employee.

Emergency social services employees staffed the telephones through the first evening and night. On Saturday morning, volunteers of the FRC's mental health work arrived to help. From then on, the crisis helpline was staffed by emergency social services employees during office hours and at night, and by FRC volunteers in the evenings. During the first evening and night, the crisis helpline was staffed by four people. The average call duration was 45 minutes. During its two weeks in operation, the crisis helpline received over 200 contacts. During the calls, a form was used to assess the caller's exposure to psychological stress. Callers were advised to contact the crisis centre at the hospital. The forms were delivered to the city's psychologist unit, which organised further support.

In addition to the emergency social services crisis helpline, calls related to the stabbings were also received by the crisis helplines of the Finnish Association for Mental Health and the Church. The Finnish Association for Mental Health received approximately 80 such calls. The

callers included eyewitnesses and individuals for whom the events had triggered previous trauma or otherwise caused distress. The number of calls to the Church helpline did not increase, but their contents were largely connected to the stabbings. The service hours of the helpline for boys of Väestöliitto, the Family Federation of Finland, were extended, but it only received a few calls connected to the stabbings.

A cooperation meeting was held at 9 am on the morning after the incident with the aim of formulating a plan for the psychosocial support of the injured victims in the hospital and their family members and for the continuation of the crisis centre operation. In a meeting between the authorities held at 11 am, an acute crisis work plan was drawn up and the organisation of crisis work agreed on. The meetings were attended by representatives from Turku Emergency Social Services, Vantaa Social and Crisis Emergency Services and the FRC regional office as well as the leader of the FRC's emergency team of psychologists. The meeting also included the City of Turku's director of psychosocial services, service director and division director as well as the person responsible for crisis work at the hospital district. Vantaa Social and Crisis Emergency Services reported to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.

There were problems in obtaining the necessary information for psychosocial support because the information of the people needing help, meaning the family members of the victims, was not received for the needs of psychosocial support until during the first two days following the incident. The problems were communicated to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the National Police Board. The delay in obtaining the information was problematic because crisis work must be launched as soon as possible.

The police had the information of the family members of the deceased. The police considered the request for the information problematic and refused to disclose the information. The problem was whether the police could use the Population Information System for such a purpose and whether it was permissible to contact people in order to provide crisis support based on contact information obtained from the police. The police decided to provide the family members of the deceased with the contact information of the parties providing crisis support. However, the family member contact person of the police provided a list that was useful. It was not possible to obtain the information of the family members of the hospitalised victims by telephone, so crisis workers visited the intensive care unit to obtain the information.

The Director of the Welfare Division decided already on the day of the incident that anyone needing further support could be treated at the psychologist unit of the City of Turku regardless of their municipality of residence. In addition to the staff of the psychologist unit, the City of Turku crisis team was also attached to the activities. The group consisted of city employees as well as retired professionals in the field and parish employees. The FRC's emergency team of psychologists also mainly based its operations at the city's psychologist unit, although some of them operated in the FRC's facilities.

The City of Turku's psychologist unit received 111 requests for contact through the crisis helpline, which took two and a half weeks to go through. During the first week, the psychologist unit spent 700 work hours on crisis work. Over the first weeks, there were 140 telephone conversations. There were also group meetings with market sellers and the staff of shops near the square. All in all, there was contact with approximately 200 people. The members of the FRC's emergency team of psychologists met with members of the perpetrator's immediate circle. The city's crisis team had contact with the Moroccan community. Over ten people needed long-term support.

At first, there was confusion about entering crisis work interactions into the system. Crisis helpline interactions were entered in the system. However, some of the members of the city's

crisis team did not hold an office, which made entering interactions into the system difficult due to the lack of access rights. This issue was solved by forming teams where one person held an office and handled the documentation. Due to varying practices, the FRC's emergency team of psychologists did not enter interactions into the system at first. Vantaa Social and Crisis Emergency Services repeatedly instructed to enter all interactions into the system. In such an extensive case with such long-term consequences, entering interactions into the system is important for further measures.

The great need for crisis work caused problems for the normal operations of the psychologist unit providing long-term support. The operations rested solely on the shoulders of the psychologist unit and the city's crisis team even though basic health care, for example, had personnel suited for the work.

The FRC's local head of preparedness received notice of the incident through the media and started networks even before the contact from emergency social services. The FRC's volunteer duty officer alerted their own team, which comprises approximately 25 people in the Turku region. Teams from neighbouring areas were also alerted. Volunteer patrols started circulating in the Market Square the morning after the stabbing. The patrolling continued for nine days with a total of 120 volunteers. Their shifts ranged from two to ten hours.

There were 2,000–2,500 interactions at the Market Square. Leaflets on getting through a traumatic experience were handed out, 2,000 at the Market Square and approximately 1,500 elsewhere, including nearby shops. The interactions at the square varied from handing out a leaflet to longer conversations. The most distressed individuals were advised to call the crisis helpline, and a few were referred directly to the FRC's team of psychologists.

In the first two days after the stabbing, a private clinic situated next to the Market Square, health services company Mehiläinen Oy, offered crisis assistance at its own initiative, provided by occupational health psychologists. The activities were announced on the company website. The activities were free of charge although by appointment. The service was used by over 20 people. Clients of Mehiläinen's occupational health services also used some crisis assistance services within the frameworks of their agreements.

For the crisis support of emergency medical services personnel, shift change was scheduled earlier so that the crew of the units involved in the situation were able to attend a processing session later that night from 7 pm to 9 pm. The session was also attended by the EMS field supervisor, the crew of FH 20 and paramedics from the Rescue Department and hospital district.

Rescue services units were also able to attend the processing session from 7 pm to 9 pm. The following day, instructions were given for a discussion led by professionals, which was attended by one employee.

The police organised a processing session for the police officers involved in the operation in the evening of the day of the incident. Discussions were also organised the following day.

At the Emergency Response Centre, one member of the after-care team was called in earlier. The member had separate conversations with each person who was on shift during or immediately after the incident. Nobody felt that they particularly needed after-care. Based on the feedback received from the personnel, occupational health care organised a processing session a little over a month after the incident.

Processing sessions for TYKS staff started gradually once the situation calmed down. The first joint feedback session for all staff members involved in the situation was held on the following Tuesday.

A processing session was organised for the employees of Turku Emergency Social Services after each shift. The FRC volunteers also had a processing session after each shift.

Other actors might also have a need for crisis support. It is known that at least one security guard company organised a processing session for its personnel.

1.2.11 Spiritual care

The welfare manager serving as the head of preparedness at the Turku Parish Union was informed of the incident by a family member at approximately 4:20 pm. The manager started distributing information about the incident within the parish union according to the emergency plan. The parish union actively contacted the cathedral chapter of the archdiocese to agree on practical actions. The parish union started to organise the opening of churches according to the standard practice.

The special assistants of the bishops of the cathedral chapter of the Turku archdiocese received notice of the incident through Church communications at 4:33 pm. The information was forwarded to the emergency preparedness team of the diocese and to the Archbishop and Bishop of Turku, both of whom stated that they were on standby, waiting for more information. In accordance with the emergency plan, preparations were launched for a prayer to be held the very same evening. The request from the police to avoid the city centre caused uncertainty about the arrangements.

At 5:19 pm, the first post was published on the diocese's Facebook page, reaching over 87,000 people. A post that was published on the Archbishop's Facebook page after 7 pm reached over 300,000 people. It was decided to hold the non-denominational prayer prepared for the cathedral at 9 pm. It was announced in the social media from 8 pm onwards.

The non-denominational prayer was held at the cathedral at 9 pm. Representatives of different religions were present, and the President of the Republic, three ministers and high command of the police represented the state authorities. There were many members of the media in the church to interview the bishops, for example.

Over the weekend, the cathedral chapter distributed information about the different events organised by the Church in the social media and coordinated the attendance of the bishops at events. Both bishops attended the memorial held at the Market Square on Sunday morning.

Church communications first received notice of the incident from the media at 4:24 pm. The communications manager and online communications manager remained at the Church Council to monitor the situation.

Crisis communications followed the emergency plan. Members of the crisis communications team were informed of the incident with a group message at 4:33 pm. Although there was no definite information yet about the nature of the incident, the first messages of consolation were posted on the Church Twitter account soon afterwards. Over the course of the evening, consolation communications were carried out through various social media. The Turku Cathedral Chapter and the parish union were supported in communicating about the incident organised at the Turku Cathedral.

The contents and music of the devotionals on Yle Radio 1 that evening and the following morning were adjusted to be more appropriate for the events of the day. The following morning, the Archbishop took part in a live devotional broadcast at 7:50 am. A national moment of silence coordinated with the Government was held at 10 am on Sunday at the beginning of mass.

Hospital priests received notice of the incident through the telephone of the priest on duty at 4:23 pm. The information was communicated to all off-duty priests, three of which reported being available. The first assignment came at 6:40 pm when the hospital priest on duty was requested to lead a processing session. Two of the priests attended the prayer at the cathedral, ready to speak with anyone in need. Through the evening, the priests spoke with the victims' family members and hospital staff.

The hospital priests organised four staff processing sessions during Saturday and Sunday, and three the following week. The hospital priests assisted traumatised patients who came to the emergency clinic.

According to the observations of the parishes, there was not much need for discussions with youth workers. However, there was a great need to process the matter at facilities for the elderly. Parish workers also visited educational institutes.

The Church has a service unit for providing help through the telephone and Internet. There were no significant changes in the total number of calls and no need to change the activities into a crisis helpline or chat. However, the number of calls classified as being connected to a national crisis increased significantly compared to the normal situation.

1.3 Consequences

Two women died of serious wounds from the stabbings. There were eight injured who needed treatment, two of who had life-threatening injuries, one had serious injuries and five had minor injuries. The perpetrator incurred a life-threatening injury from a bullet shot by the police.

The stabbings were mostly targeted at women; eight of the victims were women. There were two male victims. One of the men tried to help the first stabbing victim and the other tried to stop the stabber.

The case shook citizens' sense of security. The leadership of the City of Turku, for example, appealed to the people, asking them not to give into fear. Among the immigrant communities, the incident inspired fears of threats and negative attitudes towards them.

There was a great need for psychosocial support. This showed as a large number of interactions when the FRC volunteers patrolled at the Market Square. Concerned citizens also requested information from security company patrols in the field, for example. The crisis helpline received many calls, and dozens of people visited the crisis centre at Turku University Hospital. A great labour input was also needed for long-term support.

The incident caused a potential security threat at reception centres, the hospital and the cathedral, at a minimum, and their security arrangements were increased. The need for security guard services at shops and meeting places increased. The evening after the incident, the security guard companies were not able to fully meet this need.

2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION

2.1 Surroundings and conditions

When the stabbings took place, Turku Market Square was crowded as usual on a normal, busy Friday afternoon in summer. The weather was dry and cloudy, and the temperature was approximately +20 °C. The Market Square is a bus traffic hub, so there were many commuters on the move. There are many schools in the city centre, but schoolchildren's trips home from school were mostly over. The market stalls and cafés were open. There were no particular events held at the square.

Nothing indicated the coming act of violence, and the events started unexpectedly. Reactions to the ensuing noise, shouts and acts of violence varied. Some people turned towards the action in the belief that something interesting was happening at the square. Others ran away after seeing acts of violence.

There were plenty of people capable of rational action present. Eyewitnesses of the stabbings might have trouble believing their eyes, but many were able to quickly make an emergency call. A group of young men had the ability and courage to start running after the perpetrator, trying to warn others by shouting about him. Several people, including security guards, had the ability to help the victims by providing first aid, for example. None of the victims was left alone. Citizens were smart enough to guide the police patrol in the perpetrator's travelling direction and to direct EMS units to the victims.

Awareness of the situation did not pass throughout the entire square. According to observations, parts of the square seemed fairly calm, with no perceptible panic. According to many observations, considering the events, the situation was perplexingly calm even though there were several police vehicles and EMS units at the square.

2.2 People and organisations

2.2.1 Perpetrator

Within a few hours, it became clear to the police that the stabbings were done by one person. He was a 22-year-old Moroccan male who had received a negative asylum decision and who had given a false name and age when he entered Finland. The police discovered the perpetrator's identity from the perpetrator's own account and a witness account. It was confirmed a week later through an information request sent abroad by the police. The information about the perpetrator is partly based on his own account, and it is not possible to verify every detail.

The perpetrator was born in Morocco in October 1994. He had a broken family. His parents divorced when he was 7 years old, after which he first lived with his father and later with his mother. He had two step-sisters. The perpetrator attended school and learned to read and write.

The family was religious and the perpetrator prayed and followed religious customs. However, his religiousness waned during his time at school. The perpetrator grew estranged from his mother due to her new relationship. His father's ability to take care of the family was poor.

The perpetrator's departure from Morocco was connected to family issues, but also the fact that, according to his own account, he participated in the activities of a football hooligan ultra gang. Ultra gangs are hierarchical and violent gangs. The perpetrator received head

wounds in a fight which are still visible on his face. The perpetrator judged that he would either die in the gang or be killed in revenge if he tried to leave the gang. These reasons made him think that he needed safety elsewhere.

The perpetrator left Morocco with a friend on his birthday in October 2015. He first flew to Turkey and continued to travel in a little over a week through Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia and finally to Germany, possibly through Italy, Switzerland or Austria.

The perpetrator and his friend reported as asylum seekers in Germany in November 2015. The perpetrator used his real identity. In accordance with the German system, they were directed to a reception centre to wait for a call to court, where the actual asylum application would be submitted. Their fingerprints would not be taken until that stage. The court visit did not take place before his arrival to Finland.

The friends stayed in different parts of Germany for approximately six months, although the perpetrator spent 2–3 months in Italy alone at one point. Upon his return from Italy, he was stopped at the Swiss border in April 2016. He requested asylum in Switzerland. However, he withdrew the request the following day, saying that he wanted to continue to Germany and onward to Finland. His fingerprints had already been taken but, apparently due to the withdrawal, they were not kept in Eurodac, the EU asylum fingerprint database.

In Germany, the perpetrator got into trouble with the authorities, so his fingerprints were taken and his real passport stayed in the possession of the authorities. However, the fingerprints were not stored in the Eurodac database but rather elsewhere. The issues were not serious enough to take the perpetrator into custody. However, he and his friend decided to leave, fearing refusal of entry and being returned to Morocco. They chose Finland as their country of destination; the friend, in particular, had a good opinion of Finland.

The perpetrator probably came to Finland through Poland, Lithuania and Estonia, landing in Helsinki. In May 2016, the two friends arrived at a reception centre in Pansio, Turku with another Moroccan man. The following day, the perpetrator registered with the immigration police at the Southwestern Finland Police Department as an asylum seeker under a false identity. The perpetrator has stated that he gave a false name and an age four years younger than his actual age because he wanted to enter Finnish basic education and to make it easier to get asylum. He did not want to go back to Morocco. Possibly to avoid being returned to other countries, he did not want to use the same name he had used in Germany or other countries. His friend also registered at the same time under a false name and age.

In Finland, the perpetrator was directed to a reception centre in Pansio, where he lived in supported housing intended for minors in accordance with his reported age. He had problems with managing the cleanliness and upkeep of his living space. The perpetrator failed to perform a compensating work task ordered because he neglected to clean, so his reception allowance was reduced. The perpetrator also reacted to a situation where he saw that an instructor had arranged to have a nice meal with another asylum seeker. The perpetrator disrupted the situation and behaved poorly. In his circle of friends, the perpetrator was something of a leading figure. He was sometimes arrogant and argued about cleaning, for example. An asylum seeker has said that the perpetrator got angry at them after seeing a cross on them. The perpetrator also disapproved of other asylum seekers drinking beer. However, the perpetrator himself smoked tobacco and cannabis. Nevertheless, the perpetrator was generally not considered particularly difficult.

In August 2016, the perpetrator started preparatory education in a school in Turku with the aim of applying for a vocational school. The instruction took place at an upper comprehensive

school. The perpetrator's health was examined as normal and was found to be good. His language skills improved and he found friends among other immigrants. The perpetrator visited a gym, played football and basketball and took swimming lessons. He was active in sports. At school, there were only a few disciplinary issues, and the perpetrator was clearly liked among friends and teachers. There were communications between the school and reception centre, for example about the perpetrator's ability to consider others in certain situations. The perpetrator did not like it if something was available to others, and took losses in sports very hard, for example.

In September 2016, the perpetrator wanted to see a psychologist. The idea probably came from a friend's visit to a psychologist. However, he changed his mind after meeting with a social worker and a physician. Nothing alarming was revealed.

In November 2016, the perpetrator reached the age of majority according to the age he had reported, so he moved to live at the reception centre's group home with three Iraqi men and a Syrian man. At the group home, suspicions arose about misuse of the facilities, drug dealing, stealing and causing harm to other residents. Around the same time, a negative decision on his asylum application came from the Finnish Immigration Service. The perpetrator appealed the decision to the Administrative Court. The perpetrator thought that his demonstrated desire to study would help him get asylum; in reality, it makes no difference. Due to problems with his living situation, the perpetrator was moved to live in the reception centre's main building in early May 2017. Soon afterwards, the friend who came to Finland with him, who was still registered as being a minor, received a temporary residence permit and a flat. The perpetrator started spending time at his friend's flat in Kaarina.

In June 2017, the perpetrator started studying Finnish on a voluntary five-week summer course organised by the Christian Institute. He initially made a positive impression on the teachers there. His strong reactions to losing at games were also evident in the summer course. At first, his participation in the course was fairly regular. At the beginning of July, the perpetrator dropped out of the course without giving a reason. In summer 2017, his sports activities also decreased.

The perpetrator's interest in radical Islamism, Jihadism and religion first manifested clearly in early 2017, but even before that he had expressed strict views on what is forbidden for Muslims. He practised religion sporadically. The perpetrator listened to the Quran online and spoke to others about Islamic State, or ISIS⁵. According to his account, he wanted to find out whether ISIS had a good or bad cause. The perpetrator's friends, who he considered secularised, did not want to have anything to do with ISIS ideology and considered violence objectionable. His friends were disturbed by this talk. The perpetrator visited two different mosques irregularly and alone. His friends were not interested in attending prayers. As far as is known, it was not possible to speak of the Islamic State at the mosques.

In January 2017, the things the perpetrator was saying caused enough concern that the issue was reported to the immigration police. The report stated that the perpetrator had threatened to kill an asylum seeker three times and that the perpetrator spoke about ISIS and joining it and listened to its recordings. According to the report, other asylum seekers had started to be wary of the perpetrator and many thought that he appeared to have been radicalised. The perpetrator had also accused other asylum seekers of doing business with unbelievers. It was said that the perpetrator was using a false identity and had possibly sold drugs while in Italy.

⁵ In English, ISIS = Islamic State in Iraq and Syria; in Arabic, Daesh = al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham.

The immigration police forwarded the report to a local unit of the Security Intelligence Service. A few days later, the information reached a local unit of the national Bureau of Investigation. The tip-off did not lead to any practical actions in these organisations or at the reception centre.

The perpetrator's interest towards ISIS had increased after his negative asylum decision. According to the perpetrator, however, the interest was not due to the negative decision but rather curiosity and having extra time for such contemplations. The contemplations grew stronger in the spring, which manifested in, for example, the perpetrator's enthusiasm in sharing his thoughts with others and interest in watching and listening to ISIS-themed recordings online.

Ramadan, the important month of fasting for Muslims, was from 26 May to 24 June 2017. Over the last 10 days of Ramadan, the perpetrator started visiting one mosque more regularly, often spending long stretches of time at the mosque's social facilities. The end of the fast is considered especially important in terms of religion, so spending time intensively at mosques at that time is fairly typical. A person who only attends religious events during Ramadan is not necessarily considered very religious. The perpetrator mostly kept to himself at religious events, and the religious leaders acting at the events did not, according to their accounts, notice anything unusual about his behaviour.

During Ramadan, the perpetrator met a Finnish man of foreign background who he thought was religious near the mosque. The man repeatedly visited the mosque, and while there, he stayed quiet and just prayed. The man spoke with the perpetrator a few times and, as far as is known, he was the only one who sympathised with the perpetrator's positive thoughts on ISIS. Apparently, the man also gave advice and showed him websites and instant messenger services where he could find ISIS materials. They also spoke of the meaningfulness of a terrorist attack in Finland and methods, such as bombs. According to the perpetrator, he received answers from the man for his contemplations that started at the beginning of the year regarding whether ISIS was wrong or right. After the conversations, the perpetrator became convinced that ISIS was right. The man may have had connections to ISIS.

During Ramadan and afterwards, the watching of videos became a daily and addictive activity for the perpetrator. Even the perpetrator himself felt distressed and occasionally tried to disengage from his thoughts. He intentionally broke his mobile phone with this motive but got a new one from the man he had met. The man also tried to help the perpetrator get a job and pondered on going to fight in Syria with the perpetrator. As far as is known, the contact with the man ended around three weeks before the stabbings, as the man no longer fully trusted the perpetrator. The trust was reduced by the perpetrator's cannabis use. There was still some kind of anxiety and desire for a change in life because, according to his account, the perpetrator was aggressive and felt addicted to his mobile phone. He also tried to delete the information on his new phone.

In summer 2017, the perpetrator's thoughts changed to believing that the Western countries treat Arab countries poorly and that the world is against sharia, or Islamic law. He thought that it was right to avenge the attacks on innocent Muslims by Western countries. When one person dies in Syria, one must die in Finland, for example. The perpetrator said that he used to think that the terrorist attacks carried out in Europe were evil acts but, in summer 2017, the thought changed after he understood the matter correctly.

His friends have said that the perpetrator did not like his thoughts about proper Islam being questioned. The perpetrator disapproved of his acquaintance's affairs with non-Islamic women and listening to music even though he himself smoked a lot and used cannabis. The

perpetrator also disapproved of people who converted from Islam to Christianity. The perpetrator's friends were afraid of him but did not report their concerns to the reception centre or authorities, for example. His friends were reluctant to listen to his talk. As far as is known, the perpetrator never expressed his plans to carry out any act even though, based on his own account, it had already crossed his mind during Ramadan. Towards the end of the summer, the perpetrator's thoughts revolved more and more around ISIS. According to his friend, he became grim, did not sleep at night, spoke more aggressively and had barely any contact with other people. The perpetrator attended Friday prayers and also acquired a Quran. At one Friday prayer, he strongly criticised the clothing worn by a person assisting in the ceremony, which featured a visible British flag.

According to the perpetrator, the first thoughts of a concrete act came after he watched videos of the bombings of Raqqa in Syria. In the days preceding the act, the perpetrator kept talking to his friends about ISIS, showed them videos and said that the actions of ISIS were right. The day before the stabbings, there was a terrorist attack in Barcelona, in which the perpetrator expressed interest to his friend.

The night before the act, he decided to carry out an attack and sent a farewell message to his friends. He planned to purchase a knife but, due to the risk of getting caught, he settled for knives that he could find in the flat. His original plan was to kill a soldier because, according to ISIS propaganda, soldiers are more responsible for wrongdoings than others. The perpetrator wanted to demonstrate that ISIS also had power in other parts of the world. He was ready and willing to die during his act.

The morning of the act, the perpetrator wrote a manifesto, mostly based on the sermons of radical imams he had listened to on YouTube. In the manifesto, he justified his upcoming act with Jihadist ideology and goals. The manifesto ended with a request to pray for him and for entry into Paradise as a martyr and a confession of faith. After Friday prayers at the mosque, he had an aggressive discussion with a stranger, speaking about an imam who has been linked with terrorism and the justification of acts of terror, but the other man did not sympathise with his views. The perpetrator released his manifesto through an instant messenger service, which was apparently meant to motivate him and prevent him from backing out. A second objective was to spread information of the attack to members of the Islamic State.

The perpetrator was not under the influence of intoxicants during his act. According to the mental examination connected to the trial, the perpetrator was of sound mind.




Figure 2. A timeline of the perpetrator's arrival to Europe (grey) and the events in Finland (blue).

2.2.2 Reception centre

Throughout his stay in Finland, the perpetrator was registered at the Turku Reception Centre in Paimio.

Turku Reception Centre is a reception centre maintained by the FRC's Southwest Finland district⁶, which had three locations: Halikko (200 places), Pansio in Turku (300 places) and Punkalaidun (150 places). The Pansio unit serves as a transit unit where asylum seekers who have applied for asylum wait for their interview with the Finnish Immigration Service. After the interview, they move to other reception centres to wait for their residence permit decision. Most of the residents are directed to Pansio by the Raisio immigration police of the Southwestern Finland Police Department.

The Pansio location includes a group home with 14 places for unaccompanied minor asylum seekers and supported housing with 10 places⁷ for underage asylum seekers near the age of majority. The perpetrator first lived in supported housing in Pansio. He transferred to the adult side after turning 18 according to the birth date he had reported. Children under 18

⁶ Reception centre refers to a place where persons seeking international protection and receiving temporary protection are housed and which organises reception services for persons seeking international protection and receiving temporary protection. Group homes and supported housing for children are also reception centres.

⁷ Children over 16 years old without a guardian can be housed in supported housing if it is justified for their development and well-being.

years are subject to a curfew, but the movement of adults is not restricted. Duties include taking care of their own food and taking turns cleaning.

The reception services at Pansio⁸ included the social and health care services specified in the Act on the Reception of Persons applying for International Protection in accordance with the sizing of the Finnish Immigration Service. Social and health care services are provided and organised for applicants by private and public service providers outside reception centres. Because many also need mental health services, the reception centre has an outsourced service agreement with a local mental health association.

The funding for operations and services comes from the Finnish Immigration Service. Adult asylum seekers are not entitled to all of the services funded by the municipality. Their services are organised at the reception centres and by private and public service providers outside the centres. For example, municipalities organise specialised medical care, maternity and child health clinic services and school health care services. Most dental health care services are also provided by municipalities. The funding for operations and services comes from the Finnish Immigration Service. A person is not designated a municipality until they get a positive residence permit decision. The situation is different for minors; comprehensive school, for example, is guaranteed for all compulsory school age children regardless of their residence permit or a lack thereof. Public health care services meant for all normal residents of the municipality and child welfare services are also guaranteed for children.

Underage asylum seekers are guaranteed the opportunity to attend preparatory training for comprehensive school or vocational training. Asylum seekers who are over 18 years old have a work obligation to participate in the general chores of the reception centre and a study obligation to attend a Finnish language course.

Necessary social and health care services are provided at the reception centre. Residents are supported in various situations requiring social services. Although the Paimio unit is primarily a transit unit, the needs of approximately 300 private residents are also handled there. The initial need for social services is slightly different from those in private accommodation during the waiting stage or those who have already received a negative decision. After initial hopefulness and employment and settling plans, many become apathetic and wait for the decision fairly passively.

Reception centres have experienced that the restrictions of the asylum process in the life during the waiting period make asylum seekers passive and institutionalised. The sums allocated for recreational activities are small, so many hobbies are organised on a volunteer basis, including at Paimio. There is also some project funding available, which is used to maintain empowering services aimed at preventing mental health issues. Despite the numerous recreational activities planned with the help of psychologists, the residents do not always have the energy or interest to participate as long as their asylum process is ongoing.

Mental health services are increasingly needed by many when the process drags on. In Turku, the services are partly outsourced from a local mental health association. A private clinic selected by the Finnish Immigration Service is also available, especially for those who need medicinal treatment. In case of acute crises, some asylum seekers have been hospitalised and returned to the reception centre after a period of treatment. Approximately one-half of

⁸ Reception services include housing, a reception allowance and spending money, social services, health care services, interpreter and translation services as well as exemplary employment and educational activities. Meals can also be organised as reception services.

those who receive a negative decision need mental health support with their situation. Clients are usually referred to mental health services by social workers and health care staff.

Safety-related issues are discussed at staff team meetings, after which appropriate action is taken. However, there is a high threshold for intervening with the life and lifestyle of adults. Incidents are mainly recorded in a journal-style incident log. Incident reports of disturbances are only forwarded to the Finnish Immigration Service for the most notable incidents.

2.2.3 Religious communities

Turku has several mosques that serve the city's Muslim population. They not only provide a place to practise religion but also important opportunities for social interaction. The most important day of the week is Friday, on which believers gather for shared Friday prayers. In addition to prayers, there is a sermon, typically on a selected piece of Islamic doctrine. Politics is something that has no place in a religious ceremony. It would also be difficult because mosques are attended by people of different nationalities and representing different religious sects. The sermons and teachings may focus on how to live like a good Muslim. Mosques are especially important during Ramadan, the sacred month of fasting, when people gather to share meals. According to the representatives of the Islamic communities of Turku, the mosques are open to everyone. People who are not Muslims are also welcome to visit the premises.

During the investigation, two mosques were visited in order to learn about the activities and the opinions of the administrative representatives on possibilities of preventing radicalisation. On the second visit, information was received about the activities of the Islamic community of Turku.

The perpetrator was known at these two mosques, slightly better at the smaller one. At mosques, it is customary that people are left in peace to focus on praying if they wish.

In the basic activities of a mosque, opportunities to intervene in, for example, radicalisation are connected to the teachings of Islam on how to be a good Muslim and what is accepted or not accepted. Muslims who visit mosques regularly are usually not in the group at risk. Scholars of Islam can recognise extremist thinking, but it is difficult to influence, and the methods are few.

Jihadist propaganda is cleverly designed, skilfully produced and addictive. The propaganda takes advantage of Quranic verses, takes them out of context and interprets them in a way that suits its goals. Muslim communities lack trained persons who could help individuals at risk of social exclusion or radicalisation.

The Islamic community of Turku had a relatively optimistic view of its possibilities of preventing radicalisation. It is an organised community that works on a wider scale to improve the life of Muslims more than just maintaining a mosque. One problem that they saw was the lack of faith in authorities among immigrants, often due to the situation in their country of origin. For this reason, the community has developed cooperation with the police. Another problem is that any problems observed are not reported because it is thought to give a bad impression of Muslims.

The community focuses on young people, in particular. Young people without a proper education or family support are especially at risk. The community has established a team to focus on family issues and organises youth work on understanding Islam. The community has also organised training to detect radicalisation.

If a person is noticed whose behaviour or thoughts cause concern, they can speak with this person, try to find out more and share the concern with this person's parents. However, the lack of human resources is a problem.

2.3 Preventive activities by the authorities and other actors

2.3.1 Ministry of the Interior

Prevention of radicalisation by the Ministry of the Interior is based on the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism published in 2016⁹. The first document of this nature was published in 2012. The 2016 plan strives to meet the new challenges and changes that have taken place in the operational environment. The aim is a safe and pleasant Finland – a country whose inhabitants share a sense of belonging and participate in the development of society through non-violent means.

The action plan includes several objectives connected to the prevention of radicalisation and extremism, such as coordination between authorities and cooperation with various organisations. The setting of objectives includes several items on how to create structures, launch operations, advance the work and increase competence and expertise. The programme takes into account international best practices from other European countries.

Parties responsible for objectives have been designated to ensure that the measures are implemented. At several points, the responsible party is the Minister of the Interior, National Police Board, police departments and cities, such as Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa. In some cases, the responsible party is an organisation, such as Finn Church Aid and religious communities. Civic organisations are considered as important service providers in the implementation of the action plan. Furthermore, the items of the action plan reflect the view that civic organisations are more approachable than authorities. The action plan does not address funding.

Perhaps the most important sub-goals for the prevention of radicalisation and extremism are connected to multi-professional Anchor activities and Radinet (exit) activities. Anchor activities for minors are led by authorities and involve police officers, psychiatric nurses and representatives from social and youth services. Radinet (exit) activities are coordinated by third-sector actors, such as Vuolle Settlement, and Aggredi anti-violence work is coordinated by HelsinkiMissio.

The Reach Out project of the mediation network of Finn Church Aid and other religious and conventional acts supports the cooperation between the Finnish authorities, various religious communities and organisations to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism. The key goal of the cooperation is to find a support model for families, which are the most important factor in the prevention of radicalisation. The Reach Out project also participates in international cooperation and supports the dissemination of best practices and expert cooperation.

The project was launched in August 2016 with funding from an ISF-P instrument of the European Commission's Internal Security Fund. It is a part of Finland's National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism. The project employs two project workers.

The Radinet project of Vuolle Settlement is developing a national, organisation-based Exit operating model for individuals who have been radicalised or are at risk of radicalisation and

⁹ Ministry of the Interior (2016) *National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism*. 4 May 2016. Ministry of the Interior publications 17/2016. Ministry of the Interior: Helsinki.

want to disengage from violent extremist thinking and activities. Target groups include supporters of faith-based violence and violent extremist groups. Radinet (exit) is a part of the Exit work group maintained by the European Commission's Radicalisation Awareness Network¹⁰.

During the initial phase, the Exit model was developed for working with faith-based violent extremism. During the second phase, an Exit operating model for client work will also be developed for violent extremism motivated with politics or ideology. The development work was launched in early 2016 under RAY (currently STEA, the Funding Centre for Social Welfare and Health Organisations) funding, and it is implemented in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior, anti-violence organisations and other organisations and partners. Radinet is a nationwide project with two full-time employees in Oulu and Helsinki.

Aggredi is a Helsinki Missio work method established in 2006 focusing on the perpetrators of street violence, also funded by STEA from gaming revenue. Aggredi maintains and develops a system for reaching poorly motivated and hard-to-reach clients and making them accessible to care-related work.

Aggredi is a care-related work method that focuses on 18–49-year-old perpetrators of acts of non-domestic violence. The aim is to reduce or end violent behaviour. Aggredi provides opportunities to process issues caused by violence on neutral soil.

Organisational actors face a problem of long-term funding in the prevention of radicalisation and development of operations.

The implementation of the action plan and its results are monitored by a management group featuring key organisations. The management group approves the annual work plan, which describes in detail the implementation-related actions to be carried out over the course of the year and their schedule.

In order to support the plan's implementation, monitoring and reporting, the Ministry of the Interior has appointed a national cooperation group with representatives from various local and national authorities, organisations and youth organisations, for example. The cooperation group meets regularly once every two months and is a key organ for implementation-related cooperation and coordination. The cooperation group also prepares items to be processed by the management group.

The annual report for the 2016 action plan was published in September 2017¹¹. According to the annual report, the short-term objectives have been achieved quite well. There were 36 individual practical actions recorded. Their realisation has been assessed with quantitative and qualitative indicators depending on the content of the action.

2.3.2 Finnish Immigration Service and administrative court

A foreigner can apply for and be granted asylum in Finland if they have a well-founded reason to fear persecution in their home country, for example due to their membership in a specific social group.

They must inform the police or border control authority of applying for asylum upon entering the country or as soon as possible afterwards. The police or border control authority registers

¹⁰ Radicalization Awareness Network, Exit working group. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-exit/index_en.htm Website of an EU work group for prevention of violent radicalisation. Accessed 14 December 2017.

¹¹ Ministry of the Interior (2017) *Annual report – National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism*. Ministry of the Interior publications 23/2017.

the application, which is processed under an asylum procedure. The registration involves taking down basic information and fingerprints and carrying out the necessary register checks. The application is transferred to the processing queue of the Finnish Immigration Service, and the applicant is directed to a reception centre to live and wait.

The asylum seeker is called in for a combined asylum hearing and interview. All information relevant for the application is established in one go during the combined event. The hearing establishes the applicant's identity, travel route and entry into the territory. The interview establishes the grounds of the application, meaning the reasons why the applicant cannot return to their home country. The Immigration Service arranges an interpreter to attend. The asylum seeker has the right to use an assistant.

In 2015, a record number of 32,000 asylum seekers entered Finland. Even though a significant number of new personnel were recruited into the Finnish Immigration Service and trained, the processing times of adult applicants stretched from four months to almost nine months in 2015–2016. For minors, the times stretched from six months to ten months, respectively.

In a situation where an asylum seeker who registers as a minor seems like an adult, contrary to their own statement, forensic age estimation can be carried out. However, the asylum seeker will receive all the services intended for minors until the result of the forensic age estimation is obtained. Age estimation examinations are typically based on X-ray examinations of teeth and hand bones.

The assessment as to whether to carry out age estimation is based on subjective interpretation. The reception centre may also, based on its own assessment, report an applicant and their need for forensic age estimation to their regional Immigration Service asylum unit.

Forensic age estimation has a margin of error of ± 2 years. For example, if the examination gives the result that the person is 19 years old, it is interpreted as 17 years old. The two-year margin of error is integrated into the examination, so the Immigration Service gets an answer whether the person is probably over or under 18 years. The examination itself costs approximately €200. The result of the 650 age examinations commissioned by the Finnish Immigration Service in 2016 and 2017 was that approximately 65% of the subjects turned out to be adults. The actual share of adults is larger due to the said margin of error.

There is an ethical viewpoint on carrying out forensic age estimations; taking X-rays without a clear medical indication can be considered ethically questionable. The perpetrator did not undergo age estimation.

The perpetrator appealed the negative asylum decision he received to the administrative court within the 21 day appeal period. At the time of the stabbing, the appeal had been in processing for almost nine months and was still ongoing.

It is part of the process that the appellant expresses the grounds for their complaint, to which the Immigration Service is requested to give a statement. The appellant is then informed of the statement and can give a counter-statement. The administrative court also has access to all the documents connected to the previous processing by the Immigration Service. Once the documents have been compiled, the appeal must wait for its turn, which is the most time-consuming part of the process.

The large number of asylum seekers who arrived in Finland in 2015 first congested the Finnish Immigration Service and, in 2016 and 2017, also congested the administrative courts. Previously, all asylum decision appeals were processed at the Helsinki Administrative Court. However, in early 2017, appeals were distributed to four administrative courts to relieve the

congestion. The staff of the administrative courts was also increased. In 2016, 60% of the cases at administrative courts were asylum cases.

Almost all rejected asylum applications are appealed to the administrative court and, in approximately half of the cases, decisions of the administrative court are appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court if given leave to appeal. The administrative court only comments on the appeal and does not make new decisions on residence permits in case new information emerges. If relevant new information emerges, the appeal is returned to the Immigration Service for a new processing.

If the Immigration Service considers that the asylum application is obviously baseless, it is processed under expedited processing by the Immigration Service and administrative court. In such cases, the average processing time at the administrative court in 2017 was 3–4 months. Under normal processing, which the perpetrator had, the average processing time was a little under six months in early 2017 and nine months in late 2017. The processing time can probably reasonably be cut down to 4–5 months.

After the decision of the administrative court, any negative asylum decision is enforceable and the person can be deported unless the Supreme Administrative Court prohibits enforcement. However, deportation involves practical problems because many countries refuse to accept deportees. As a result, individuals who have received a negative and final decision remain in Finland. It is also possible to submit a new application under different grounds. Finland and the EU do not have official deportation agreements with Morocco. However, according to the police, recently it has been possible to deport individuals with a valid deportation decision to Morocco.

From an asylum seeker's perspective, the processing time of the application and appeal can be long. During the wait, there is uncertainty about the future and, for many, the potential return to their home country is an unappealing option. There may be problems, so processing that is as quick as possible is appropriate. If the safety authorities discover a security threat connected to a person, they may ask the administrative court to move their case ahead in the processing queue. There is no established procedure on the matter. If new materials are submitted to the administrative court with the request, the administrative court can only consider the materials by hearing the appellant in the case about the submitted materials. The person's potential security threat does not affect the meetings of the criteria for national protection. As for the perpetrator, no information about a security threat was presented because the investigation of his radicalisation did not go past the assessment of an individual tip-off.

2.3.3 The police

The police is responsible for maintaining public order in cooperation with other authorities and local communities and residents.

The perpetrator had dealings with the police twice before the incident. In May 2016, the Southwestern Finland Police Department received the perpetrator's asylum application. In this context, the perpetrator's personal data was entered into information systems in the form reported by the perpetrator, without travel documents. The perpetrator's fingerprints were taken and compared to the Eurodac database. His fingerprints were not in the database. The police directed the perpetrator to a reception centre.

At the beginning of December 2016, the immigration police informed the perpetrator of the negative asylum decision made by the Immigration Service in late November.

In January 2017, the immigration police of the Southwestern Finland Police Department received a tip-off about the perpetrator, but it did not lead to any practical actions.

Efforts to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism are carried out as a part of preventive police activities in the local police. The efforts are supported by multi-professional Anchor activities and the TUPA operation of the National Bureau of Investigation.

Southwestern Finland Police Department's RAD activities¹² are a part of the criminal investigation and analysis performed by the police. The prevention of targeted violence, such as attacks at schools, has been at the core of RAD activities. Counterterrorism target individuals at the low end of the risk scale have recently been transferred to the local police. Target individuals at the high end of the risk scale are monitored by the Finnish Security Intelligence Service.

Police departments have the preconditions for carrying out preventive work because the police is a common actor in the safety field and meets various groups at risk in its daily work. The aim is to recognise and understand the factors behind tip-offs and whether the incident involves a clear change and deviation in the long term. The information consists of tiny pieces that must be put together to form a bigger picture for conclusions and actions. Furthermore, individual police officers must have competence and training in understanding the behaviour of potentially dangerous individuals of foreign background.

The tip-off about the perpetrator did not reach the group practising RAD activities.

Anchor activities involve goal-oriented cooperation among multiple authorities, namely the police, the social services and health care experts. The target group is minors. The idea behind the activities is early intervention in criminal behaviour. Minor victims are another target group. If a person becomes of age in the middle of a process, their case is handled and completed.

Rapid intervention and crisis support play an important role in Anchor activities. The focus is on examining the client's overall situation in life and directing them to appropriate help and support. Clients are directed to basic services and the third sector on a case-by-case basis.

In 2016, there were 148 minors in the Anchor activities in Turku, a third of them victims. In Turku, the biggest groups are those with problems related to domestic violence and underage offenders and victims. For young people, their parents and families are also part of the work. Typically, there are 1–10 meetings with each client. The aim is not to have client relationships last for over three months.

Another aim of Anchor activities is prevention of the activities of violent extremist movements. Collaboration with the RAD work group of the police is possible. For the time being, however, there is little experience of such. Persons over the age of 18 are mostly not in the target group, so in principle the perpetrator would not have been covered by Anchor activities.

Anchor activities vary between localities. In some cities, such as Turku and Helsinki, the activities have sufficient resources but, in other localities, there are fewer preconditions for cooperation among multiple authorities.

¹² The name RAD is connected to an earlier pilot project and is no longer widely used by the National Police Board.

A manual for Anchor activities is being prepared. It is hoped to clarify issues connected to radicalisation. The manual is expected to provide actions, methods and concrete ideas on what to do around the theme.

The National Bureau of Investigation assists local police through the TUPA function, which involves crime prevention and centralised information exchange connected to the asylum process. Its mission is to secure sufficient access to information and ensure timely flow of information. The TUPA function involves personnel from the police, Customs and Border Guard¹³ as well as the Finnish Immigration Service. The TUPA function gathers, analyses and passes onward observations and information connected to asylum seekers and the asylum process in order to achieve the crime prevention objectives specified above and to uphold safety.

The TUPA function reviews new reports about asylum applications on a daily basis, analyses and links them to previous information and assesses the need for the police to participate in asylum interviews. The TUPA function assesses risk factors discovered at reception centres based on information received from the Immigration Service, reception centre staff and particularly from police patrols on calls, drawing up memorandums according to the risk level at the time.

The key goal is to recognise leading figures among the residents of reception centres as well as networks and threatening situations.

The tip-off about the perpetrator ended up at a local unit of the National Bureau of Investigation but did not reach the TUPA function.

2.3.4 Finnish Security Intelligence Service

The Finnish Security Intelligence Service, which works directly under the Ministry of the Interior, strives to prevent terrorism-related actions and crimes. The Security Intelligence Service maintains a list of counterterrorism target individuals, prepares threat assessments and improves the awareness of public authorities, for example. The Security Intelligence Service has three regional offices and five other sub-offices. The regional office for Western Finland is in Turku.

On 14 June 2017, the Security Intelligence Service announced having raised the terrorist threat assessment to the second level of the four-step scale. According to the threat assessment, the most significant terrorist threat in Finland was still posed by individual actors or small groups motivated by radical Islamist propaganda or terrorist organisations encouraging them. These persons are likely to have either direct or indirect links to radical Islamist networks or organisations. Finland's profile within the radical Islamist propaganda has become stronger. Finland is considered as a Western country.

The Southwestern Finland Police Department passed on the tip-off it received about the perpetrator to the Turku regional office. The tip-off was preliminarily processed by the Security Intelligence Service and entered into the operational information system. The normal register checks were carried out during the entry. The tip-off did not include information about any planning of a terrorist attack, and it was not prioritised over other operative activities.

¹³ The police, including the Security Intelligence Service, and Customs and Border Guard are sometimes collectively referred to as the PTR authorities.

2.3.5 Asylum seekers' entry into Europe and movement there

Many of people from North Africa and the Middle East have tried and succeeded in entering Europe. They are influenced by the poor conditions in their country of origin and the good standard of living in Europe. The pressure is mostly focused on Western Europe.

Entry into the Schengen Area is controlled by the border control authorities of the Schengen associated countries supported by Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. The control does not work properly, so people have been able to enter Europe through various routes, bypassing the control. The numbers peaked in 2015; over 32,000 people came all the way to Finland to apply for asylum. The perpetrator entered Europe via Turkey in late 2015. Since then, the influx of people has decreased, partly due to an agreement between the EU and Turkey. Functioning smuggling routes still exist. In some countries, the arrivals are apparently widely used for cheap illegal labour, which may lessen the interest in monitoring the arrivals.

For Moroccans, the problem is that almost 65% of Moroccan youth have been unemployed for at least a year, and the chronic unemployment among young people has not shown any signs of improvement. The Moroccan society is plagued by deteriorating living conditions, economic difficulties and the lack of civil liberties and democracy. Many young people believe that their only chance of getting ahead in life is to go to Europe. Many end up in Spain doing different kinds of temporary work, especially in agriculture. Others continue on to France and Germany. For many, a trip to Europe means years of wandering from one place or country to another.¹⁴

Starting from February 2017, Sweden has had an agreement with Morocco that the fingerprints of Moroccans could be sent to the Moroccan authorities for identification. Within a year, this has made it possible to confirm the identity of 343 Moroccans. 230 of them had applied for asylum as a minor, but only 15 of them (6.5%) actually turned out to be minors. All told, 283 individuals or over 82% had lied about their identity.

The key principle of the EU's Dublin Regulation is that asylum seekers are registered and their asylum case is processed in the country where they first enter the EU. Other EU member states can thus return their asylum case to be processed in this country of entry. The arrangement does not work well because, in many places, people are not registered or fingerprints are not taken even though it would be an effective way to identify individuals. Its failure is apparently due to the need for and use of cheap and illegal labour and the fact that the number or arrivals has at times been so large as to be impossible to handle. The perpetrator arrived from Turkey to Greece, where his fingerprints were not entered into the Eurodac register. From Greece, he travelled through a few other countries until he arrived in Germany.

The German immigration authority is the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)¹⁵. Asylum seekers usually report to state authorities at the border. It is also possible to report inland by contacting a security authority, such as the police, an immigration authority or a reception centre. The authorities direct the applicant to the nearest possible reception centre. Fingerprints are not taken at this stage.

¹⁴ Juntunen, M. (2017) *Marokon-tutkijan näkökulmia Turun terrori-iskuun* ('Views of a Morocco researcher on the Turku terrorist attack'). Lähi-itä NYT (Middle East NOW), a blog by the Finnish Institute in the Middle East. <https://lahi-itanyt.fi/nyt/marokon-tutkijan-nakokulmia-turun-terrori-iskuun/>. Accessed 20 February 2018.

¹⁵ Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge in German.

All individuals who apply for asylum in Germany are registered, though not until the next stage at PIK stations¹⁶. The wait for registration may be long. During registration, personal data is collected and fingerprints taken.

Asylum seekers receive a proof of arrival so that they can prove that they have registered. The proof of arrival entitles them to reside in Germany and receive income support and gives them the opportunity to live in a reception centre and receive health care services and food.

In Germany, the fingerprints taken from asylum seekers are compared to the national fingerprint database of foreigners¹⁷ and the Federal Police fingerprint database in order to establish any previous applications and other records. The fingerprints are also compared to the European Eurodac fingerprint database to establish whether the applicant's asylum process is the responsibility of another EU member state based on the Dublin Regulation.

Once an asylum application has been received and the registration and background check are complete, the applicant gets a proof of residence permit to replace the proof of arrival. It serves as personal identification in dealings with public authorities and proves that the applicant is in Germany legally. The residence permit is only valid in the area of the reception office handling the asylum seeker's permit process.

The perpetrator visited Italy and Switzerland while apparently being registered as living at a German reception centre. In 2016, Germany had so many asylum seekers that the process was congested. Therefore, the perpetrator apparently was not called in or registered as an asylum seeker during all that time. During the registration, his fingerprints would have been taken for the Eurodac database, which would have made it possible to identify him in Finland, for example.

People who, based on the initial information, have poor preconditions for getting asylum in Germany live at a reception centre until a negative decision is issued. This includes individuals arriving from countries that are considered as safe, for example. During this time, they are not entitled to work and their movement outside their appointed area is restricted.

If, based on the initial information, the person has good chances of getting asylum in Germany, the housing restrictions can be removed after they have lived in Germany for three months. At the discretion of the authorities, they can also move into private accommodation.

The compulsory asylum interview, where the asylum seeker is interviewed about their need for international protection and other relevant factors, is conclusive for the final decision. The interview can also include a representative from UNHCR and a minor's designated support person.

The decision on a residence permit or its rejection is made based on information obtained from the interview, the documents presented and the background checks conducted by the authorities. A negative decision can be appealed to the court.

2.4 Organisations involved in the incident and their operational readiness

2.4.1 Emergency Response Centre Agency

The emergency calls about the stabbing were answered by the Turku Emergency Response Centre (ERC), which handles the provinces of Southwest Finland, Kanta-Häme and Päijät-Häme. The purpose of the ERC is to alert to the scene, based on its risk assessment, units of

¹⁶ Personalisierungsinfrastrukturkomponente in German, Personalisation Infrastructure Component.

¹⁷ Ausländerzentralregister (AZR) in German, the Central Register of Foreigners.

the police, emergency medical services (EMS) and the rescue services, for example, and to support them during the assignment. This support involves conveying notices, message centre duties and initiating measures to warn the population. The alerting is always done according to the standing instructions provided to the ERC by the various authorities. In case of a stabbing assignment, the standing instruction was to alert the police and EMS units.

At the time of the incident, the ERC had a normal shift staff of 16 people. The shift supervisor and two others were not answering emergency calls but on assignment monitoring duties, one on police assignments and the other on EMS assignments. Some of the staff were on break when the situation started. The ERC continued with the same manpower to the end of the shift, although one person started their night shift earlier than normal due to the incident.




Figure 3. Emergency calls to Turku ERC during each minute from 4:00 pm to 4:15 pm. The calls answered by the ERC are marked in blue and the calls disconnected by the caller are in red. (Materials: Turku Emergency Response Centre, Figure: investigation team)

Before the stabbings at 4:00–4:01 pm and five minutes after the stabbings began at 4:07–4:29 pm, the ERC received fewer than two emergency calls per minute on average. The typical response time of such calls was less than 5 seconds. Over the first five minutes after the stabbings began at 4:02–4:06 pm, over 64 calls came, approximately 50 of which were connected to the stabbings. During that time, the ERC had time to answer 33 calls, and in 31 cases the caller disconnected before the ERC managed to answer. The number of calls, including unanswered calls, is presented in Figure 3. The times and durations of individual calls are shown in Figure 4.

When the first call about the stabbings came, at least three operators were busy handling previous emergency calls. Starting from the eighth call, approximately 30 seconds after the first call, the wait time started to extend. The wait time normalised approximately five minutes later. The longest wait time for calls answered by the ERC was two minutes. At most, approximately 25 calls were in queue approximately 1.5 minutes after the first emergency call.

The overview of the situation was created using the ELS information system used by the ERC, which automatically suggests a potential overlapping assignment based on the location. The system worked even in such a small geographical area because there were no other ongoing assignments in the area.




Figure 4. The wait time (blue) and call duration (red) of calls made to the Turku Emergency Response Centre after the incident began. The analysis includes 70 calls that arrived within 8 minutes of the first emergency call. (Materials: Turku Emergency Response Centre, Figure: investigation team)

Emergency response centres have the ability and also duty to convey messages between authorities, if necessary. In this case, the ERC conveyed messages from the police to the EMS in the early stages because the two authorities were not in the joint VIRVE call group.

The ERC did not have active social media monitoring, so its later situation picture was mainly based on monitoring the communications between the authorities.

2.4.2 The police

Southwestern Finland Police Department is one of 11 police departments in Mainland Finland. Its operating area covers the regions of Southwest Finland and Satakunta. The police department has a 24/7 situation centre. Operative field operations are directed by a general commander who is one of the commanding officers. The general commander is at the situation centre in Turku on weekdays and weekends. From Sunday night to Friday morning in the evenings and at night, general command is handled by the command centre in Helsinki.

The local police field commander is responsible for the operative command of field activities in the area under the general commander's supervision. In major situations, a situation organisation is quickly established so that the situation commander can focus on handling the situation. In such cases, the management of other concurrent assignments is handled separately.

The police is a national operator, and its highest operative command is the National Police Board. The high command has standby arrangements to help it receive information of any situations that require actions, including on the national scale. The National Bureau of Investigation is also prepared to take charge of investigation of serious crimes in accordance with a specific distribution of labour. The flow of information within the police organisation functioned well even though there was no time to use the blog intended for conveying a continuous situation picture.

The patrols in Turku city centre had good capabilities to stop the perpetrator. After the perpetrator was captured, the situation was still unclear, so the police had to ensure through many fairly forceful means that there were no other perpetrators and that the act would not continue elsewhere. The National Bureau of Investigation came to support the Southwestern Finland Police Department and took charge of the investigation.

The stabbing was and is generally considered primarily as a police assignment even though at least the Emergency Response Centre, emergency medical services and psychosocial support started handling statutory urgent assignments concurrently. The rescue services also joined the assignment. In the early stages, the other authorities had expectations that the police would give them further instructions. In such situations, we often speak of general command, which is needed to coordinate actions by the authorities. However, there are no other provisions of law on the primary authority in charge or general command than the provisions on accidents in the Rescue Act.

The Finnish Border Guard has the authority and readiness to assist the police with the supervision of public order and safety. The police and Border Guard had good cooperation arrangements.

2.4.3 Emergency medical services

The emergency medical services (EMS) of the Southwest Finland Hospital District are arranged according to a multi-provider model. The hospital district provides field supervision activities and the physicians for the Finnheims 20 physician unit¹⁸. The Southwest Finland Rescue Department and private medical transport companies provide EMS with basic and advanced life support for the hospital district.

¹⁸ Finnheims Oy is a national administrative unit for helicopter emergency medical services. It is owned in equal shares by the five Finnish hospital districts with university hospitals. Finnheims puts out tenders for helicopter operators and signs contracts with them, monitors compliance with the quality and safety criteria for bases and is in charge of the administration of base services.

The Finnhems 20 physician-staffed helicopter operates around the clock on immediate standby. Its primary operating area is Southwest Finland. The staff move around by helicopter and by ground vehicle depending on the place and weather. The unit is situated in Käsämäki near Turku Airport.

The hospital district is divided into EMS areas. The Turku EMS area borders on Paimio and Marttila in the east, Parainen and Nauvo in the south and Masku in the north. The advanced and basic EMS of the Turku EMS area and the surrounding cities is provided by the Southwest Finland Rescue Department.

The Turku EMS area has a field supervision unit and 15 advanced life support EMS units on immediate standby around the clock. There are also three advanced life support units with shorter standby hours. In the Turku area, there are five advanced life support units around the clock and two in daytime and in the evenings. One of these two units operates around the clock on Fridays and Saturdays. Four of the units are based at Turku Central Fire Station, two at Jaani Fire Station in East Turku and one at Käsämäki Fire Station near the airport.

Other EMS areas in Salo, Loimaa and Uusikaupunki have their own field supervisors, who are subordinate to the field supervisor of the Turku area. The field supervisor's units are units that transport patients in these areas. In total, these areas have eight advanced life support units that operate around the clock and five units with shorter operating hours. If needed, all the units in the region can be used anywhere within the region and also be called across regional borders, if necessary.

At the time of the incident, the field supervision unit, physician unit and three EMS units were available in Turku. More EMS units were freed up fairly quickly as they got their patients to a place of treatment. On a case-by-case basis, the assignments of EMS units can be interrupted or exchanged depending on the risk assessment. This was not done in this case; units were added to the stabbing assignment as they became available. At the time of the incident, the EMS load was normal.

The Southwest Finland Hospital District has issued a health care disaster procedure for the ERC. According to the procedure, a disaster is an incident that is estimated to have over 10 patients. The threshold for applying the disaster procedure was not exceeded at the ERC, so it did not alert EMS units according to the procedure or carry out other actions specified in the procedure.

2.4.4 Hospital

Turku University Hospital (TYKS) operates as a facility providing acute care in all of Southwest Finland. The emergency clinic comprises coordinated accident and emergency services of basic health care and specialised medical care. All on-call specialists needed for treating injuries caused in violent situations are available, either at the hospital or to be called in.

The hospital had fairly good capabilities at the time of the incident. A little earlier, the emergency clinic had called in more staff due to congestion, a shift change was under way and the day shift of other units, including physicians, had only just left the workplace. It was possible to get additional resources there quickly.

The biggest problem in terms of sufficient facilities and medical staff was the near-simultaneous arrival of several patients with stab wounds to the emergency clinic. The emergency clinic has a limited number of patient places and staff intended for intensive care until additional

personnel are called in. Now, care staff from the intensive care unit came to help the emergency clinic, and it was possible to get the most urgent patients onward quickly, which alleviated the situation. It was only possible to document the progression of the situation in parts.

The TYKS disaster plan had been updated in late 2016, but its implementation among the staff was still partly incomplete and it had not been drilled. The plan is based on activity cards, which serve as unit-specific and actor-specific guidelines for launching and managing activities. The essential care units in a disaster caused by violence are the management bodies at various levels, emergency clinic, surgery, anaesthesia, medical imaging, laboratory and intensive care. The purpose of the activity cards is to serve as check lists for the management, physicians and the nurses managing the situation, and to direct management functions such as to prevent self-direction of management and activities. There was no time to use the cards.

The disaster plans for the hospital and emergency medical services were drawn up under the assumption that, at the beginning of the situation, there is 30–90 minutes to get organised however required for the activities before the arrival of the largest influx of patients or the before the pressure to release information begins. The plans include operating procedures for alerting personnel, command, maintenance of the situation picture, use of resources, documentation, the messaging system, communications and crisis support.

The hospital is an open institution which people needing help must be able to access smoothly and without delays. The hospital is a difficult location in terms of the security of people and the premises. Openness also means that it is a fairly easy target if one wants to hurt others.

Keeping the hospital as a safe place to work requires a good security guard system, effective access control and the possibility of closing access routes very quickly and in a targeted way. The closing of access routes was done at the emergency clinic but not throughout the entire hospital. At large facilities, such as TYKS, it may be possible to access the emergency clinic if one can enter another part of the building and is able to navigate it.

Afterwards, the restriction of movement raised discussions about authority. Despite the restrictions, people were understanding and let the staff care for the victims in peace. It may be necessary to define powers and their use at a sufficiently low level in order to facilitate sufficiently quick reaction to situations.

The problem at the hospital is that those who need care must have access to care, but it can be difficult for security guards to tell them apart from those with other motivations. For this reason, these entry points also need to have medical staff to assess the need for treatment of the people trying to enter.

At TYKS, it was noticeable that the suspected terrorist attack caused more worry and fear among the staff than an ordinary act of violence. Those working at the hospital also had to consider that the suspected perpetrator might be among the injured and planning to hurt others at the hospital. In such a situation, the police is unable to perform a security check of all the victims at the scene or at the hospital, so the hospital must prepare for the possibility that a patient is carrying items suited to causing harm.

2.4.5 Rescue services

The operating area of the Southwest Finland Rescue Department is the region of Southwest Finland. The main fire station of the rescue department is in Turku city centre, 800 metres from the Market Square. The next closest to the centre are the fire stations of Jaani, Artukainen, Kärsämäki, Lieto and Kaarina. The rescue department has a total of nine 24/7 fire stations and three fire stations that are staffed in the daytime.

At the time of the incident, there were 31 people on shift in the Turku region, ready to leave with a minute's warning, including six executive fire officers, six fire foremen and 23 firefighters. All had sufficient first response skills for encountering emergency patients, and half also had qualifications to serve as a member of a basic life support medical transport unit. There were five back-up EMS units at the fire station, which could have been staffed with personnel capable of providing basic life support. All rescue units had sufficient equipment for encountering emergency patients.

The Turku region had approximately 60 contract volunteer firefighters ready to go out with a five-minute warning. In practice, all of them had sufficient first-aid skills for encountering emergency patients.

Therefore, the rescue services had significant capabilities to assist EMS with units capable of emergency first aid and first-aid activities. They included immediate-response rescue units and back-up ambulances possibly staffed with rescue staff.

2.4.6 Government Situation Centre, Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Social Affairs and Health

The Government Situation Centre is responsible for creating a cross-administrative situation picture for the needs of the state management and various administrative sectors. The situation picture consists of information that is provided to the Situation Centre or acquired independently. The human resources are small during normal hours and do not facilitate work up to standard until the Situation Centre is reinforced with a sufficient number of experts called in and all the necessary connections are achieved.

At the time of the incident, there was one situation picture duty officer present at the Situation Centre, who started supplementing the Situation Centre staff immediately after receiving notice of the incident. The Situation Centre staff includes a situation picture coordinator, analysts and a duty officer.

Outside office hours, the mandate of the Ministry of the Interior comprises the designated duty officers of the rescue division, police division, Border Guard staff and National Police Board. In situations involving several divisions, the situation picture is compiled by the division with the primary responsibility for handling the situation. If necessary, the ministry's situation centre, which creates and maintains the ministry's joint situation picture, can also be staffed. Therefore, the ministry does not maintain a continuous situation picture around the clock. The situation picture produced by the ministry is distributed to the administrative sectors and authorities connected to management the situation. Significant cases are reported to the Government Situation Centre, which is responsible for informing members of the Government, for example. During the incident, the situation centre of the Ministry of the Interior was not used, and messages to the Government Situation Centre mainly came from the National Police Board and the duty officer of the ministry's rescue division. Having the police division on standby is mainly for certain different types of situations than the Turku stabbing.

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has duty officers around the clock. When the duty officer receives information, they have the capability to assign Vaasa Social and Crisis Emergency Services to support the local authorities. The duty officer can direct social and health care actors to raise the readiness level on a national level. The duty officer receives information from their division and the Government Situation Centre, to which they also pass information. The duty officer informs the ministry management, launches necessary actions and, if needed, calls in experts to support the management of the abnormal situation.

2.4.7 City of Turku

The City of Turku has an emergency plan describing procedures for disruptions of normal conditions and for emergency conditions. The general section of the plan describes the principles of operations and the distribution of labour on a general level, and the division-specific section provides more details contents.

The Welfare Division emergency plan describes procedures for launching psychosocial support. The alert diagrams and procedures are clear. When the emergency social services duty officer receives an alert from the ERC, they must prepare a situation picture. In case of a disaster, the situation is immediately reported to the emergency social services supervisor. The information is also passed to the FRC district head of preparedness and mental health support actors.

The Welfare Division has six four-person crisis teams for acute crisis work. The alert to activate the groups in case of a major accident or similar disaster may come from health or rescue authorities. First, the director of psychosocial rehabilitation or their deputy is alerted. If the on-call crisis team received the alert directly from a rescue authority, it launches action independently according to its instructions and also immediately contacts the director of psychosocial rehabilitation. Activated crisis teams are situated at Welfare Division offices or rescue personnel resting areas on a case-by-case basis.

The psychologist unit had been given responsibility for the provision of long-term support, and the utilisation of wider resources, such as other health care units, had not been planned. It was possible to acquire trauma therapy as an outsourced service. The Southwest Finland Hospital District plays a minor role in long-term crisis work.

The city's crisis communications procedure describes the crisis communications order, basic principles of crisis communications and the division of responsibility between other authorities, volunteer organisations and the city. The procedure gives concrete instructions for communications, giving statements and organising press conferences. The instructions stress that the information released to the public must be based on information that has been confirmed by the authorities. The action plans for different divisions also include a procedure for crisis communications.

According to the crisis communications procedure of the City of Turku, in case of a serious situation, the Emergency Response Centre or Rescue Department may send a group SMS to the city's management team. The police may also send a group SMS to a predetermined group. If necessary, the risk management director convenes the management team in accordance with the mayor's instructions. The risk management director has the authority to launch the actions and crisis communications necessitated by the crisis. Crisis communications is managed by the director of communications.

The Education Division's safety procedure includes a crisis plan that also addresses the organisation of psychosocial support. The Education Division has a preparedness team appointed by the division director. The team is responsible for preparedness for abnormal situations, operational policies, the crisis communications procedure and the planning and preparedness for crisis recovery. The plan describes the arrangements for launching and providing psychosocial support for schoolchildren and school staff.

The regional public transport (Föli) does not have a special plan for events like the stabbing. Since the incident, the city's public transport authorities have considered the matter, and regional public transport staff have been instructed to send a message directly to drivers' fare

collection device in case of any emergency situations. In some cases, it could be necessary to quickly stop or redirect public transport.

The emergency plan of the urban construction service area does not include instructions for situations exactly like the stabbing. However, procedures for keeping CCTV recordings, for example, have been agreed on with the police. In this type of situation, the doors of schools and day-care centres would be locked. Maintenance has also acquired heavy-duty equipment to use for traffic control to protect public events.

2.4.8 Psychosocial support

According to the general section of the City of Turku emergency plan, the social and health care authorities and facilities in the division are responsible for organising emergency medical services and psychosocial support services. The Welfare Division emergency plan describes the alert arrangements of emergency social services for launching psychosocial support and procedures connected to commissioning the city's crisis teams.

Turku Emergency Social Services was responsible for acute crisis support. The emergency social services were responsible for organising crisis emergency support for the coordinated accident and emergency services at Turku University Hospital and for the crisis helpline. In the evenings, volunteers from the FRC's mental health support helped staff the crisis helpline. The work was managed with the resources available, but it was a major strain.

The City of Turku's psychologist unit was responsible for long-term crisis support. Right from the start, the city's crisis team was recruited for the work. The crisis team includes psychologists as well as health care personnel, Church employees and persons who have retired from similar positions. The FRC's emergency team of psychologists supplemented this work. The crisis support kept the psychologist unit busy for a long time, causing other work to pile up.

The FRC's mental health support group in the Turku region has approximately 25 members, who were alerted based on a contract between the City of Turku and the FRC district. Mental health support groups from the surrounding area and neighbouring cities also contributed to the activities. Volunteers patrolled the Market Square and staffed the crisis helpline. By the end of August, approximately 120 volunteers had contributed, amounting to approximately 1,000 person-hours.

The FRC's emergency team of psychologists was responsible for professional work based on a contract between the City of Turku and the FRC for this individual situation. They served at Crisis Emergency Support, the psychologist unit and partly in the FRC facilities and, in the early stages, were partly responsible for acute crisis support, also supplementing the work of the city's psychologist unit in long-term crisis work. They were also responsible for the processing sessions for FRC volunteers.

According to the FRC, it was unusual that the situation did not follow the normal pattern of help needs. Usually, the need is the greatest immediately after the incident and then decreases gradually. In this case, there was a great need immediately afterwards, then it slowed down, and then increased again, lasting for a long time. For such cases, there should be a better readiness to activate extensive human resources quickly.

Vantaa Social and Crisis Emergency Services is a national operator in psychosocial support designated by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health referred to in the Health Care Act. The Social and Crisis Emergency Services have the capabilities to support the management of psy-

chosocial support and to provide expert assistance, thereby supporting local authorities. Vantaa Social and Crisis Emergency Services receive situation-specific assignments from the ministry. There was one assignment in 2015, six in 2016 and nine in 2017.

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has a duty officer with the authority to give assignments to Vantaa Social and Crisis Emergency Services. The ministry covers the costs incurred by the assignment.

2.4.9 The Church

The participation of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the management of crisis situations is laid down in the Church Act¹⁹, according to which parishes must be prepared to provide spiritual care in crisis situations. In crisis situations, the Church has activities on three levels.

Parishes and parish unions are responsible for the local implementation of spiritual care, for example by organising grief services and opportunities for discussion.

The cathedral chapter of the diocese supports the activities of the parishes, for example by handing diocese-level communications and agreeing on the role of the bishop.

The Church Council is responsible for national operations. Church communications, which is on the Church Council, has the capabilities to assist dioceses, parish unions and parishes in crisis communications. Church crisis communications can reach a large number of people. The operative division of the Church Council decides on the initiation of national crisis assistance. The Church Council agrees on the organisation of services on the radio and television.

In crisis situations, the Church has the ability to give authoritative representation of state authorities the opportunity to attend. The visible role of the Church in bringing together different groups is a good fit for Finnish society.

2.5 Recordings

The investigation team has had access to the ERC's emergency calls recordings and the communications traffic recordings from the call groups recorded by the authorities' telecommunications network. Also available have been a security camera recording that is a part of the pre-trial investigation materials, a video of a reconstruction created by the police and video recordings shot for a TV series.

2.6 Provisions, regulations, instructions and other documents

2.6.1 Provisions connected to applying for and receiving asylum

According to the Aliens Act²⁰, aliens residing in the country can be granted asylum if they reside outside their home country owing to a well-founded fear persecution for reasons of membership in a particular social group, for example. They must also, because of this fear, be unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country, in which case they are considered to be in need of international protection. Asylum refers to a residence permit granted to a refugee in an asylum procedure. The Aliens Act helps, for its part, in the implementation of the principles of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the European Convention on Human Rights.

¹⁹ 1054/1993

²⁰ 301/2004. By the end of 2017, 71 amendments have been made to the Act, 23 of them in 2015–2017.

An application for international protection must be submitted to the police or border control authority upon entering the country or as soon as possible afterwards. The police or border control authority must register the application without delay. The application is processed in an asylum procedure.

According to the Act, the authority that received the asylum application must record the basic information, take fingerprints and carry out the necessary register checks. The application is transferred to the processing queue of the Finnish Immigration Service and the applicant is directed to a reception centre, where they wait to be called in for an asylum interview.

The Immigration Service²¹ establishes the applicant's identity, travel route and entry into the territory as well as, orally, the information needed to determine the state responsible for processing the asylum application. During the establishment of the asylum seeker's identity, the personal information of their family members and other relatives is collected.

The Immigration Service carries out an asylum interview, in which the applicant's grounds of having experienced persecution, violations of their rights or threats thereof in their home country or country of permanent residence are established orally. In an individual case regarding international protection, authorities must not obtain information in a way that would allow the persecutor to gain information about it.

Applications for international protection are processed under a normal or expedited processing. Expedited processing can be used if the application is obviously baseless.

The preconditions for granting a residence permit are assessed individually for each applicant, taking into account their accounts of their circumstances and current information obtained from various sources about conditions in the country. The authorities must decide the case in the applicant's favour based on their account if they have, where possible, cooperated with the investigation of their case and if the authorities are convinced of the plausibility of the application in terms of the need for international protection. Foreigners who receive asylum in Finland get refugee status.

If the application is rejected, a decision is usually made at the same time regarding their refusal of entry or deportation. There has not been a time limit for application processing, but a time limit of six months will enter into force in July 2018.

An application can be considered as obviously baseless if, for example, the applicant's apparent aim is to abuse the asylum procedure, if they only submitted an application to delay the enforcement of their deportation decision or if they came from a safe country of origin to which they can be returned. The Immigration Service makes the decision on refusal of entry of foreigners who apply for a residence permit based on international protection²².

An application can be rejected without investigation if the applicant came from a safe country of refuge to which they can be returned.

Decisions on refusal of entry or deportation specify a period of 7–30 days within which they can leave the country voluntarily. A period for voluntary return is not specified if, for example,

²¹ Amendment 501/2016 to the Aliens Act transferred the duties described in this section to the Immigration Service on 1 March 2016. Until then, the duties belonged to the police.

²² Refusal of entry means removing from the country a foreigner who entered the country without a residence permit if they have not been granted a residence permit since entering the country. The removal from the country of a foreigner who has been granted a residence permit is deportation. Refusal of entry means a deportation procedure during which the recipient of the decision on refusal of entry or deportation either leaves the country voluntarily or is removed from the country.

there is a flight risk, the person is considered a danger to public order or safety, their residence permit application was rejected due to circumvention of entry rules or a decision has been made to dismiss the application for protection or to use expedited processing.

Cases connected to international protection for a decision of the Immigration Service in an asylum procedure can be appealed to the administrative court. The appeal must be submitted within 21 days of receiving notice of the decision.

The competent administrative court in cases connected to international protection is determined based on the location of the Immigration Service asylum unit that made the decision. For decisions made in the western area of the asylum unit, the competent administrative court is Turku Administrative Court.²³ Decisions of the administrative court may only be appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court if the Supreme Administrative Court grants leave to appeal.

The asylum seeker can submit a subsequent application after receiving a final decision to their previous application. A subsequent application that does not contain any new grounds that affect the decision in the case can be dismissed.

If the foreigner in question has applied for a residence permit on grounds of international protection, decisions on refusal of entry of the Immigration Service cannot be enforced until the case has been finally resolved. If leave to appeal is required from the Supreme Administrative Court in the case, an appeal does not prevent enforcement unless decreed otherwise by the Supreme Administrative Court.

However, if the decision on refusal of entry was made under expedited processing due to dismissal of the application or the application being considered obviously baseless, the decision can, under certain circumstances, be enforced even before a final decision.

The submission of a second subsequent application does not prevent the enforcement of a final decision on refusal of entry made based on the first subsequent application.

Asylum is not granted if, for example, there is a well-founded reason to suspect that the applicant has committed a serious non-political crime outside of Finland before entering Finland.

Asking about identity, age and other information about the country of origin is regulated by the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees²⁴, the Directive on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection²⁵ and the Aliens Act. According to them, information about applicants cannot be disclosed to a party suspected of persecuting them or causing them serious harm.

The EU Regulation²⁶ on the establishment of the Eurodac fingerprint register makes provisions for a database aimed at individualising the identities of asylum seekers. The provisions on storing and using the data are fairly clear-cut. According to the Regulation, fingerprints are taken for the Eurodac system from all the people who illegally cross a border if they are at least 14 years old. They cannot refuse to give their fingerprints.

²³ Previously, all appeals regarding international protection were processed at Helsinki Administrative Court. Due to the increase in the number of appeals, the processing of appeals was spread over several administrative courts. The change entered into force on 1 February 2017 under amendment 17/2017 to the Aliens Act.

²⁴ 77/1968

²⁵ 2013/32/EU

²⁶ 603/2013

If a person applies for asylum in a country other than the country where their fingerprints were first taken, they can usually be sent back to the first country in accordance with the Dublin Regulation. The fingerprints are stored for 18 months and then deleted. Only the fingerprint data and the person's sex is stored in the database and not, for example, their name, photo, date of birth or nationality. The data is also deleted if they, for example, are granted a residence permit.

The Eurodac database is managed by the European Agency for the Operational Management of large-scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA). The data can only be used for strictly specified purposes.

According to the Aliens Act, the cases of minor asylum seekers must be processed with urgency. Effort must be made without delay to trace the parents of unaccompanied minors or some other person responsible for their actual guardianship. Decision-making connected to minors must pay special attention to the best interest of the child and factors connected to their health and development.

A forensic examination can be carried out to establish the age of foreigners applying for a residence permit if there is obvious cause to doubt the veracity of the information they have provided about their age. Carrying out the examination is subject to the written consent of the examination subject and their legal representative. Refusing the examination without a valid reason results in the person being treated as an adult. Refusing the examination cannot be the sole grounds for rejection of an application for international protection.

Applications submitted by an unaccompanied minor can be resolved under expedited processing only if the applicant comes from a safe country of origin to which they can be returned.

According to the Act on the Reception of Persons applying for International Protection²⁷, unaccompanied minors must be placed in a group home. Children over 16 years without a guardian can be housed in supported housing if it is justified for their development and well-being. Full maintenance can be organised at group homes and supported housing.

A representative must be immediately appointed to a child applying for protection if the child is in Finland without a parent/guardian or another legal representative. The application for appointing a representative is submitted by the reception centre. The representative is appointed by the district court. The representative exercises the power of a parent/guardian to speak for the child in matters connected to the child's person and assets. The representative's duties do not include the child's daily care, education or other tending.

In two of its decisions²⁸, the Supreme Administrative Court has considered the actions of the Finnish Immigration Service to establish the guardian of a minor as insufficient and overturned the administrative court decisions to return them. The Finnish Immigration Service was unable to verify the possibility of a safe return. In case of the perpetrator, the applicant was asked directly about his parents, and the Finnish Immigration Service did not try to contact them directly or through the authorities. If the matter had been enquired from Morocco, the false name and age reported by the applicant might have been revealed.

²⁷ 746/2011

²⁸ Decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court KHO 2017:172 and KHO 2017:173, 10 November 2017

A person who misleads a public authority by giving a false name or otherwise providing false or misleading information on their identity shall, according to the Criminal Code of Finland²⁹, be sentenced for giving false identifying information to a fine or to imprisonment for at most six months.

According to the Aliens Act, refugee status gained by applying for asylum is cancelled if the applicant has, when applying for protection, knowingly given false information which has affected the outcome of the decision or if the applicant has concealed a fact that would have affected the outcome of the decision.

The Register of Aliens is a register of persons which is maintained and used for the processing, decision-making and control of matters relating to entry into Finland, departure from Finland, and residence of aliens in the country for ensuring the security of the state and for carrying out basic and extensive security investigations as referred to in the Act on Security Investigations. The register can be used to store and collect data about persons who have applied for international protection.

According to the Act on the Reception of Persons applying for International Protection³⁰, reception centre refers to a place where persons seeking international protection and receiving temporary protection are housed and which organises reception services for persons seeking international protection and receiving temporary protection. Group homes and supported housing for children are also reception centres.

The state covers the costs of the activities. The Finnish Immigration Service covers the cost of establishing and maintaining reception centres and hotspots and remunerates the service provider for the organisation of reception services.

Reception services are organised by the reception centre which registers the person applying for international protection or temporary protection as a client. Reception services include housing, reception allowance and spending money, social services, health care services, interpreter and translation services as well as exemplary employment and educational activities, as laid down in this chapter. Meals can also be organised as reception services.

Persons applying for protection are granted a reception allowance to secure the necessary subsistence for a worthwhile existence and to promote independence. The basic component of the reception allowance covers clothing costs, minor health care costs, the cost of local public transport and personal mobile phone and similar costs as well as food costs if the reception centre does not serve meals. The basic component of the monthly reception allowance of a person living alone is €290. The reception allowance is granted by the reception centre upon application.

Exemplary employment and educational activities must be organised at reception centres to promote the independence of persons seeking protection. If a resident at a reception centre repeatedly without a well-founded reason refuses to participate in their assigned exemplary employment and educational activities, the reception allowance paid to them can be reduced by up to 20 per cent for up to two months.

²⁹ 39/1889; Chapter 16 is about offences against the public authorities.

³⁰ 746/2011

2.6.2 Prevention obligations of the police and the Finnish Security Intelligence Service

The Police Act³¹ states that the duties of the police include maintenance public order and security and crime prevention. The police work in cooperation with other public authorities and with communities and residents in order to maintain security. The police shall seek to maintain public order and security through advice, requests and orders.

The duties of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service are laid down in the Police Administration Act³². The duty of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service is to prevent, according to the guidance of the Ministry of the Interior, any plans and crimes that could endanger the system of government, law and order or the internal or external security of the nation and to investigate such crimes. It must also maintain and improve the general preparedness to prevent activities that endanger national safety. The Ministry of the Interior gives orders to the National Police Board after hearing in more detail the subject groups to be investigated by the Security Intelligence Service and decides, after hearing the National Police Board in more detail, if necessary, on the cooperation and coordination between the Security Intelligence Service and other police units as well as their mutual investigation arrangements.

2.6.3 Provisions on the actions of state management

The Government Situation Centre is subject to the Act on the Government Situation Centre³³. According to the Act, the Situation Centre exists to support the decision-making and activities of the President of the Republic and the Government. The Situation Centre is at the Prime Minister's Office. Its duty is to compile and analyse information about the security situation and any disruptions and threats thereof that endanger important social functions. The information is used to prepare a situation picture, and information is distributed to the President of the Republic, Government and other public authorities. The Situation Centre's right to receive information is laid down in the Act.

According to the justifications of the Act on the Government Situation Centre³⁴, because the extensive effects of incidents extend to the mandates of several administrative sectors, this requires the ability to compile and distribute a cross-administrative and coordinated situation picture. The flow of information from the Situation Centre to the competent authority must also be ensured. The competent authority manages operative activities and is responsible for them in accordance with the division of mandates specified in the Government Rules of Procedure³⁵. The purpose of the Act was to clarify the exchange of information between the ministries and the Government Situation Centre as well as to remove obstacles in the flow of information between the competent authorities and the Situation Centre.

The Situation Centre is responsible for alerting the Government, ministerial committees, permanent secretaries, heads of preparedness and the Government officials required for the decision-making required by the regulations and convening them for sessions, meetings and discussions held at unusual hours due to an incident, crisis situation or another reason.

The permanent cooperation bodies of the cooperation between the ministries – the permanent secretaries' meeting and the meeting of the heads of preparedness – are laid down in the Government Rules of Procedure. During incidents, the meeting of the heads of preparedness serves as an important support for management. The meeting of the heads of preparedness

³¹ 872/2011

³² 110/1992

³³ 300/2017

³⁴ HE 261/2016 vp

³⁵ 262/2003

strives to discover the potential of all public authorities to support the administrative sector with the lead on resolving the crisis in question. The Government chief of security serves as the chairperson of the meeting of the heads of preparedness.

The Rules of Procedure also describe the duty of coordination of communications of the Prime Minister's Office and the general integration of the Government's joint situation picture, preparedness, safety and incident management.

There are no provisions of law on the Government's crisis management model. However, it was approved in a Government Resolution on Securing the Functions Vital to Society in 2006 and later repeated in corresponding Security Strategies for Society in 2010 and 2017. It was also described in the Government Resolution on Comprehensive Security in 2012.

2.6.4 Provisions on the duties of municipalities

Municipalities are governed under the principles laid down in the Local Government Act³⁶ also in crisis situations.

2.6.5 Terrorism in legislation

The perpetrator was charged on two counts of murder with terrorist intent³⁷ and eight counts of attempted murder. Provisions on crimes committed with terrorist intent were added to the Criminal Code of Finland in 2003.³⁸

The Act was amended due to a Framework Decision of the Council of the European Union³⁹. According to the decision, each Member State must take the necessary measures to ensure that offences committed with terrorist intent are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties, which may entail extradition. The offences must be punishable by custodial sentences heavier than those imposable under national law for such offences in the absence of terrorist intent.⁴⁰

The provisions of law connected to terrorism are currently being supplemented and amended. The need for amendments is connected to the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism⁴¹. The Directive also imposes requirements on the assistance provided to victims and their family members. For example, the services must be confidential, free of charge and easily accessible to all victims of terrorism.

2.6.6 Management of multi-authority cooperation situations

Public authorities each manage the operative activities in their mandate independently and according to their specific legislation. The law does not currently include a concept of general command, save for the Rescue Act⁴². The Rescue Act applies to accidents that involve rescue activities and the participation of other authorities. In other situations, the competent authori-

³⁶ 365/1995

³⁷ According to the Criminal Code of Finland (39/1889), an offender has terrorist intent if it is his or her intent to, for example, cause serious fear among the population.

³⁸ Act amending the Criminal Code of Finland 17/2003

³⁹ Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FI/TXT/?uri=celex:32002F0475>

⁴⁰ Exceptions are made for cases where the sentences imposable are already the maximum possible sentences under national law. In Finland, the sentence for murder is a life sentence, which is the maximum possible sentence according to Finnish law. The sentence for murder with terrorist intent is the same life sentence.

⁴¹ 2017/541/EU

⁴² 379/2011

ties resolve their mutual jurisdiction relations on a case-by-case basis. The police has been using the concept of a general commander in internal usage. The police have a special procedure for unusual situations, which does not include much on cooperation between authorities.

In rescue operations, the officer in overall charge of the situation is responsible for maintaining the situation picture and for coordinating the operations. Units from different sectors work under the direction of their own command in such a way as to, in overall terms, combat through the measures they take the consequences of the accident or the situation in an effective manner.

To support management, there must be a shared understanding of the situation: situation awareness. The authority with the most to do during the incident usually has the best situation awareness. In case of an ongoing crime situation such as the stabbing, the police usually has the best situation awareness. Therefore, it is natural that the police distributes the information needed by other authorities and the other authorities also request information, if necessary. In any case, each authority takes care of its own duties, taking the needs of the other authorities into account. Cooperation is needed during rapid situations and soon afterwards, when the focus shifts towards, for example, multi-authority communications and psychosocial support.

Management takes place at several levels, such as at the scene, the command centres of various authorities and the central management of sectors, such as the National Police Board or the ministries as well as state management level. Cooperation and sharing of information about the situation is needed at all of these levels. Cooperation at various levels is, by nature, normal cooperation between authorities, and there are no specific provisions of law about it.

2.6.7 Psychosocial support and services

Psychosocial support and its organisation is laid down in the Health Care Act and the Social Welfare Act⁴³. According to the acts, necessary psychosocial support for individuals and families organised by municipalities is a part of the mental health work carried out to promote the health and well-being of residents. The work is aimed at strengthening the factors that help to maintain the mental health of individuals and the community and at reducing and eliminating factors that stand to compromise mental health.

Mental health work also includes the coordination of psychosocial support for the individual and community in suddenly arising upsetting situations. Emergency medical services must refer patients, relatives of patients and other individuals involved in incidents to psychosocial support services. Psychosocial support must be provided urgently to everyone regardless of their place of residence, and emergency social services must be organised around the clock to ensure urgent and essential aid. According to the Social Welfare Act, emergency social services must be organised in such a way as to facilitate contact with service around the clock and the provision of urgent social services, such as temporary housing arrangements.

According to the guidelines⁴⁴ of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the aim of psychosocial support is to reduce the social and health issues caused to the individual and society by a

⁴³ 1326/2010 and 1301/2014. Psychosocial support and services refers to all activities organised to limit the consequences of a disaster or another unusual situation on people and to prevent and mitigate the consequences of the mental stress caused by the incident.

⁴⁴ Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (2009) *Traumaattisten tilanteiden psykososiaalinen tuki ja palvelut* ('Psychosocial support and services for traumatic situations'). Publications of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2009:16 Ministry of Social Affairs and Health: *Helsinki*.

stressful incident. Psychosocial support and services can be divided into mental health support, social work and services, and the support provided by the Evangelical Lutheran Church and other religious communities. Psychosocial support and services are used to support people's normal recovery. Timely support in the early stages is aimed at, for example, preventing the development of actual mental disorders, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

The Occupational Safety and Health Act⁴⁵ provides on the responsibility to organise the treatment of work-related health problems caused by accidents and violent situations at work or caused by the workload.

2.7 Other investigations

2.7.1 Special study on communications

The investigation team commissioned a special study on events in the social media following the stabbings. The study focused on social media discussions and coverage about the incident, starting from the time of the incident and ending seven days later. The focus of the study was on communications from public authorities and politicians that affected citizens' sense of security and the civil dialogue around the subject.

The raw data of the study included over 60,000 social media messages, amounting to over 2.2 million words in total. The data was obtained using various search terms and search term combinations in social media services⁴⁶, discussion forums, blogs and comments on news media websites.

The most popular topics were mapped using topic modelling, which involved reviewing all of the messages and identifying statistically illustrative content categories. A message can belong to several topics at the same time, but the analysis always picked the strongest topic of each message, such as the attack, politicians and the government, the victim and the incident or hate and fear.

Of all of the social media services, discussion forums, Twitter and Facebook contained the most messages. The monitoring results on Facebook was affected by the fact that only the messages of public profiles were included in the study. The sampling was also imperfect in other ways, such as the fact that most messages on discussion forums are posted anonymously. Quantitatively, Google+ and Pinterest were marginal platforms. The YouTube videos raised wide interest, but it was not possible to identify the videos. They were probably videos shot by citizens during the attack and immediately afterwards, such as the widespread video of people chasing the attacker in Turku city centre.

Among news media, the shared news items of Turun Sanomat focused the most on the incident and victims. The shared news items of Yle, Iltasanomat, Helsingin Sanomat, Iltalehti and MTV mostly focused on the police. MV-lehti, which was an exception alongside the mainstream media that attracted the most attention, mostly focused on politicians and the government.

Among the social media platforms, on Twitter people discussed mostly about police activities, on Facebook and blogs about the causes of terrorism, on discussion forums about the media, and in news comments on news media websites about asylum seekers. On YouTube, hate and fear manifested as the most noteworthy topics.

⁴⁵ 1383/2001

⁴⁶ Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Youtube, Google+, Pinterest

The social media focused the most on the authorities and media. Out of all of the messages from individual politicians, the most attention was gained in order by the Prime Minister, President, Minister of the Interior and one immigration-critical party leader.

The most shared news items of the mainstream media were in order by Yle, Iltasanomat, Iltalehti, Helsingin Sanomat, Turun Sanomat and MTV. Yle news items were shared the most by an overwhelming margin, and shares were also otherwise mostly focused on the first four mainstream media. MV-lehti was the seventh after MTV. The same person could have shared the same link or source several times, which may affect some of the results. It is noteworthy that with the exception of a news item by Turun Sanomat, the shared news items were not real-time situation bulletins.




Figure 5. The number of messages analysed in the study in two-hour intervals over seven days.

The intensity of the messages was at its highest immediately after the incident. The following day, the intensity peaked momentarily almost as high as the evening of the day of the incident. On Monday, the total number of messages was almost as high as on Sunday, but otherwise the diurnal variation and downward trend in the number of messages were unsurprising.

At first, discussion was sparked by the tweet published by the police at 4:37 pm, as the first information about the incident. During the first three hours, the social media were filled with shared news items, but they also featured video materials shared through streaming services and messages from the police. In the first few hours, topics progressed quickly towards wider situation assessments until the police put a check on presenting assessments of the situation too early on. News items based on interviews of the Southwestern Finland Police Department, National Police Commissioner, Turun Sanomat and, among politicians, one immigration-critical party leader were shared many times.

During the first three hours, the dominant topics were the attack and its analysis. During the second hour, the topics of the perpetrator and victims joined the discussion. During the third hour, various strong emotions gained control of the discussion. People both spread hate and fear and asked others not to spread them. For example, an Yle news item where people were asked not to spread hate in social media became one of the most shared news items.

The day after the incident, discussion continued almost as intensely as the night before. Almost all media reported on the events. The news items of the mainstream media, such as Yle, Helsingin Sanomat and Turun Sanomat, were in the lead of the most shared. When new information about the incident was not immediately available, the media space filled with interviews of individuals who had been at the scene and helped the victims. The information released by the authorities that the events were being investigated as offences committed with terrorist intent sparked spirited discussion. During the first 24 hours, the most important topics were the attack and the victims. There was also a lot of discussion about the perpetrator, fear and hate. The police and terrorism were also high on the list in terms of interest.

Throughout the monitoring, in addition to the mainstream media, the most shared news link included videos at streaming services, MV-lehti news items and news items from international media. For a moment, the three most shared news items were by Yle.

The overall social media discussion followed the 'pattern' of a conventional suddenly arising crisis in terms of coverage and handling. At first, the focus was on the incident itself and its analysis, after which the topics started to expand and meander.

Over the course of the monitoring period, the three topics that inspired the most discussion were the police, fear and hate as well as the media. Topics connected to the legislation, asylum seekers, young people and mental health problems as well as international terrorism emerged in discussion immediately among topics that filled the news topics but waned more quickly. The attack, the victims and the perpetrator sparked discussion mostly at the beginning of the monitoring period. The most retweeted tweets included tweets by the Southwestern Finland Police Department, a news item from the Finnish News Agency STT and tweets from the Minister of the Interior.

Fake news or disinformation did not play a proportionally significant role in the study. However, it must be noted that MV-lehti was among the ten most shared contents. Generally, audiences followed, handled, linked forward and raised as discussion topics news items from the conventional mainstream media, in addition to which the contents from public authorities, especially the police, were among the topics that raised the most discussion. Links to social media posts and videos from the scene were also shared to some extent.

At the beginning of the events, in particular, the authorities, such as the police, utilised social media and especially Twitter and Facebook to a significant extent. Over the first three hours, the police had a strong presence in social media and informed the citizens about the social media platforms it was using. In a time of crisis, the great majority of the public seems to turn to news contents from the conventional media and communications from public authorities.

The impact of the attack on the citizens' sense of security showed in the social media study. Hate and fear, spreading them as well as attempts to prevent them from spreading all stood out.

2.7.2 Crime and problems at reception centres

According to police statistics, in 2017, asylum seekers were complainants in 1,866 crimes and suspects in 2,690 crimes. Asylum seekers were complainants in 774 assault offences of various degrees and suspects in 655 assault offences. As a whole, assaults, thefts, petty thefts and illegal threats were the most typical crimes for both complainants and suspects. Asylum seekers were suspects in 19 counts of aggravated assault. The 2017 statistics do not include homicides other than the Turku stabbings.

Crimes against property by asylum seekers increased in 2017 compared to 2016, but crimes against life and health decreased. In 2015, asylum seekers were suspects in less than half of the number of crimes of 2016 and 2017. The police estimates that, as a whole, crimes committed by asylum seekers will increase in 2018. Moroccans are not often in these statistics as perpetrators of crimes. Of the typical asylum seeker countries, only Somalia and Iraq make the top 10 countries of origin of persons who commit crimes.

According to *Violent extremism in Finland – situation overview*⁴⁷, almost 100 offences suspected of being connected with violent extremism took place in 2017. Half of them were connected to right-wing extremism, one-third to religiously motivated extremism, and the rest to left-wing extremism. Religiously motivated acts were typically illegal threats and assaults. By far, the most acts suspected of being connected to religiously motivated extremism were recorded in Southwest Finland. According to the overview, an increase has been noted in cases related to radical Islamist terrorism that have exceeded the threshold of preliminary enquiry, criminal investigation and the bringing of charges. Some crimes linked to Islam are connected to conflicts between Sunni and Shia Muslims and between radical Islamists and Islamists with moderate views.

The overview divides potential perpetrators of terrorist crimes into two groups. The first group is comprised of individuals with a strong ideological commitment who consider violence justified. The second group comprises individuals who have a loose ideological commitment and for whom the threshold of using violence has become lower. For these individuals, organisations such as ISIS may provide justification for violent behaviour.

According to a report of the Criminal Sanctions Agency⁴⁸, by January 2018, 112 persons connected to violent radicalism had been identified in Finnish prisons. In January 2018, over half of them remained in prison or on supervised parole. The observations were connected to radical Islamism in 76 cases and to right-wing extremism in 28 cases. According to the report, most of the acts of terror in Europe in recent years have been committed by radicalised former convicts.

The Ministry of Justice has investigated the experiences of reception centre staff members regarding the safety at reception centres⁴⁹. The staff members felt that working at a reception centre was at least fairly safe. Typical threat situations included the throwing of items and breaking of fixtures, verbal threats and other mental violence. Actual physical violence or being threatened with a weapon is rare, although approximately 10% of the respondents reported having experienced them.

In the survey, the staff also assessed the causes of disruptive behaviour and criminal activities. The biggest causes were considered to be inactivity and lack of activities as well as concern for family members in the country of origin. The reception of a negative decision was thought to cause problem behaviour, although not as much as the reasons specified hereinabove.

Reception centres submit incident reports to the Finnish Immigration Service. During a sample month in 2017, 76 reports were received within the month. The amount corresponds with

⁴⁷ Ministry of the Interior (2018) *Violent extremism in Finland – situation overview 1/2018. Threat assessment of violent extremism in Finland in 2017 and trends. Women and children in radical Islamist terrorist organisations under special review*. Ministry of the Interior publications 17/2018.

⁴⁸ Criminal Sanctions Agency (2018) *Etelä-Suomen rikosseuraamusalueen projekti väkivaltaisen ekstremismin ja radikalisoitumisen tunnistamiseksi* ('Project to identify violent extremism and radicalisation in the Criminal Sanctions Region of Southern Finland'). Criminal Sanctions Agency report 28 February 2018.

⁴⁹ Piispa, M., Sambou, S. & Alanko, M. (2017) *Turvallisuuden kokemukset vastaanottokeskuksissa* ('Experiences of safety at reception centres'). The staff's views of the safety of reception centres in a safety survey in May 2016. Ministry of Justice publications 2017: 1. Ministry of Justice: Helsinki.

the monthly total around the time. Of these, around 30 were violent situations, including self-harm. There were significantly fewer threatening situations towards the staff. In the long term, approximately a quarter of the reports were threats connected to self-harm. Only approximately 4% of reports were connected to a negative asylum decision, and there was a similar share of reports linked to hate connected to religion.

Asylum seekers' uncertainty about getting a residence permit and the right to stay in the country and the duration of the asylum process are special risk factors after entry into the territory. Factors after the entry into the territory, such as lack of social support, difficulty in adjusting, the asylum process, loneliness and unemployment make asylum seekers susceptible to depression and anxiety. An uncertain situation in life full of challenges and restrictions reduces agency, or the ability and opportunity to affect the course of one's life. In such situations, it becomes difficult to maintain a positive identity.⁵⁰

A lack of agency reduces the possibilities of acting in accordance with self-imposed goals and finding ways to achieve those goals. The person acts in ways that do not meet their expectations or understanding. They also do not do things that they expect or would like to be doing, or do things that they do not want or wish to do. Their ability to self-regulate feelings and behaviour decreases.⁵⁰

It is typical for a young person's asylum process that their thoughts revolve around the future decision, and life is felt to consist of waiting. Life sort of stops, and living is management of uncertainty.⁵¹

2.7.3 Trends of Islamist terror in Europe

Recently, Europe⁵² has seen several terrorist attacks committed by violent Jihadists.^{53 54} In 2016, 135 people died due to Islamist terrorism and 718 people were arrested in connection to it. In 2016 and 2017, most of the terrorist attacks in Europe occurred in France, Belgium, Great Britain and Germany. In 2017, there were also attacks in Sweden, Spain and Finland.

Perpetrators have included networked groups as well as individual actors. Terrorist attacks are aimed at killing and injuring as many randomly selected people as possible.⁵⁵ Spreading terror and fear is another key goal. Jihadists have justified their actions with their interpretations of the Islamic faith.

Attacks have been both carefully planned and spontaneous. Some Jihadists have received instructions from the leaders of the Islamic State (ISIS), while others have been inspired by the message of ISIS. In a speech on 22 September 2014, a Syrian ISIS spokesman, Abu Muhammad

⁵⁰ Snellman, O., Seikkula, J., Wahlström, J. & Kurri, K. (2014) *Special features of mental health and psychological problems of adult asylum seekers and refugees*. *Journal of Social Medicine*. (51): 203–222.

⁵¹ Onodera, H. (2017) The diversity of waiting in the everyday lives of young asylum seekers. In V. Honkasalo, K. Maiche, H. Onodera, M. Peltola & L. Suurpää (eds): *Young people in reception centres*. Finnish Youth Research Network: Finnish Youth Research Network Electronic Publications 120.

⁵² According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM; World Migration Report 2018) most of the terrorist attacks worldwide are committed outside of Western Countries. Three of the ten countries that have suffered the most from terrorism are Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia, which also produce over one-half of the refugee flows worldwide. In this context, however, it is relevant to analyse the acts of terror that have taken place in Europe.

⁵³ Jihad (striving, struggling) can be divided into two divergent interpretations. The 'inner' or greater Jihad refers to an inner struggle to be a better person and striving to follow Islam according to the example of the prophet Muhammad. The 'lesser' Jihad is linked to a holy war on unbelievers.

⁵⁴ EUROPOL (2017) European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017>. Accessed 14 December 2017.

⁵⁵ Merin, O. et al. (2017) Terrorist Stabbings – Distinctive Characteristics and How to Prepare for Them. *The Journal of Emergency Medicine*. (53) 4: 451–457.

al-Adnani, urged a Jihad against unbelievers (kuffar) everywhere.⁵⁶ The perpetrators of terrorist attacks have used a wide range of weapons. The arsenal of weapons has included automatic rifles, explosives, knives, axes and vehicles.

Targets have typically included both 'hard' and 'soft' targets. The former include the police and soldiers. The latter include churches and synagogues as well as crowds at market places, concerts and city centres. Choosing to target large crowds is aimed at causing widespread destruction. At soft targets, victims are easier to kill, the element of surprise is maximised and attacks are almost impossible to prepare for. Some targets⁵⁷ are selected with the aim of attracting global attention. However, it seems that the use of fairly primitive methods, such as edged weapons and vehicles, and attacks on soft targets in Europe are here to stay.⁵⁸

The profile of the perpetrators of Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe has included asylum seekers and others from outside Europe as well as EU citizens who have lived in Europe for a long time or are descendants of earlier immigrants⁵⁹.

ISIS has also taken advantage of the immigration from the conflict areas in the Middle East to Europe, infiltrating terrorists among the stream of refugees and migrants. The Paris attack in 2015 is an example of this.

According to the IOM, research generally highlights three conditions that allow for radicalisation to take root. They are poor education, especially where the gap is filled by extremist religious indoctrination, a lack of work or other meaningful daily activities, and the absence of freedom of movement. Handling these issues can reduce the risk of radicalisation.⁵⁹

Terrorist groups take advantage of the socioeconomic problems of immigrants with Muslim backgrounds in their recruitment work and when urging individuals interested in Jihadism to commit terrorist attacks⁶⁰. Spreading propaganda has been a part of the operating principles of ISIS. In its publications⁶¹, ISIS states reasons why the war on unbelievers is justified. The articles and texts almost always contain direct, quotes from the Quran taken out of context that serve as justifications for violence.

Jihadist material by ISIS can be found on the Internet quite easily. Amaq, a supposed news outlet linked to ISIS, serves as a distributor for its propaganda. The dark net and social media contain closed groups where Jihadists have discussions and through which they also recruit new members. Face-to-face conversations between Jihadists living in Europe and individuals interested in Jihadism are also fairly typical. They may also take place in closed discussion circles that rise up around mosques known for radical Islamism. Most of such mosques have had funding connections with Persian Gulf nations. After the first meetings, a person who is interested in Jihadism may be spurred to start following influencers of opinion who spread the radical message.

Individuals who are susceptible to influence may be told, for example, that the West is at war against Islam and that the West supports the Middle Eastern dictators who oppress human rights in order to keep the Islamic world under heel. Once the person starts getting interested

⁵⁶ Muhlberger, W. & Ruohomäki, O. (2017) *Middle Eastern terror in flux: Mosul after Daesh, Daesh after Raqqa*. FIIA Briefing Paper 212, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

⁵⁷ For example, Zaventem Airport and Maalbeek Metro Station in Brussels.

⁵⁸ Schuurman, B. et al. (2017) Lone Actor Terrorist Attack Planning and Preparation: A Data-Driven Analysis. *Journal of Forensic Sciences*. (1): 1–10.

⁵⁹ According to the 2018 report of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the majority of the terrorist attacks in the United States and Europe were 'home-grown'.

⁶⁰ Roy, O. (2017) *Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of Islamic State*. Hurst and Company: London.

⁶¹ E.g. Rumiyah and Dabiq along with Inspire.

in this type of rhetoric and has swallowed the story, so to speak, they start discussing that something must be done. The discussion may include ideas of heroism and revenge. As the person becomes saturated with Islamist hate speech and listens to various religious songs praising Jihad (nasheed), they may start hating the values of the Western world and those who represent it. Now, they may not be far from crossing the threshold to committing an act of violence. ISIS, in particular, specialises in cultivating rhetoric against Western values. Populist right-wing extremist anti-immigration movements in Europe have given added impetus to the ISIS propaganda about the West being at war against Islam.

Exchange of information mostly takes place on closed messaging platforms in the social media (WhatsApp, Telegram and Signal).

Foreign fighters returning from Syria and Iraq strengthen Jihadist networks that have entrenched themselves in Europe. Women and minors also play roles in terrorist attacks that are not limited to support. For example, it is easier for female Jihadists to operate without getting caught for planning attacks.

According to European security agencies, Jihadist activities in Europe are increasing. It is estimated that there are at least 400–500 hardcore Jihadists in Europe with battle experience from the fronts in Iraq and Syria. They will constitute a significant threat to safety in Europe far into the future.

2.7.4 Profiles of individual actors

The department responsible for domestic security⁶² in the United States recently commissioned a study⁶³ about the profiles of individual actors⁶⁴. Based on the study, it can be concluded that there is no single general profile of an individual actor. The study was based on extensive data of terrorists with both Islamist and right-wing extremist backgrounds.

Attackers included single and married, uneducated and highly educated people. Some were unemployed and others had jobs. Some had a criminal background, others did not. Some had mental health problems and others had no health problems whatsoever. Their paths to committing a terrorist attack varied greatly.

According to the study, in most cases, other people had knowledge of the perpetrators' ideological inclinations, worldview and thoughts of committing an act of violence. Indeed, family members, friends, fellow students and co-workers play an important role in efforts to prevent a violent attack by bringing the information to the authorities.

There may not be an individual behavioural model based on which a potential act of violence could be identified. In light of the study, it seems that life-shaking events, such as unemployment, financial difficulties, experiences of discrimination or injustice, changes in relationships and religious conversion in case of Islam may have triggered the perpetrator to act.

Several perpetrators also had a tendency to socially isolate themselves. On the other hand, the same individuals also networked with like-minded people. Perpetrators who isolate themselves from others constitute a particular threat because it is more difficult to obtain information about their thinking and actions for use in the creation of forecasts.

⁶² Department for Homeland Security

⁶³ Gill, P. et. al. (2014) Bombing alone: tracing the motivations and antecedent behaviors of lone-actor terrorists. *Journal of Forensic Sciences*. 59 (2): 425–435.

⁶⁴ In some contexts, individual actors are referred to as lone wolves.

However, it appears that several individual actors have networks of contacts from which they get inspiration, instructions and advice. The networks of contacts may involve physical interactions or take place in the virtual world. As a result, traditional human intelligence gathering (HUMINT) and monitoring of messages are important in preventing potential acts of terror.

Terrorist attacks by individual actors are rarely completely spontaneous. Instead, they are preceded by a chain of events that involves internalisation of radical ideology, violent fantasies, acquisition of the tools needed for a terrorist attack and training. If information is obtained of these, attempts can be made to prevent the act. On the other hand, there is proof that even though the terrorist attack itself is rarely spontaneous, the time between the plan and action may be short.

Even though terrorists with different backgrounds have different profiles, it is apparent that Islamist terrorists are united by their young age, abuse of virtual reality in the learning process and seeking approval from terrorist leaders who they idolise. Terrorists with right-wing extremist backgrounds are united by unemployment, low education levels and informing their social network of the act of terror.

Terrorism research also indicates that although there is no single determining factor for a person's motivation to commit an act of terror, very often the lack of a direction or purpose in life plays a key role.⁶⁵ Contrary to what the sensationalist media suggest, terrorists are not necessarily sadists or psychopaths. The majority are ordinary people who, according to the social-psychological rules of group dynamics, are driven to do something evil for a cause they believe to be noble and just.

2.7.5 The path to radicalisation

The path to radicalisation goes through mostly the same social-psychological processes. The following characterisation is linked to the world of Islamist terror, in particular.⁶⁶

During stage 1, the recruiters strive to isolate the potential victim from their social environment. The rhetoric, most often in the virtual world, strives to convince them that the world in which the potential victim lives is a lie. The victim starts looking for information on YouTube, clicks various Internet links and ends up in a virtual world containing a radical message. At this stage, the victim may abandon their old friends and seek networks of new, like-minded people.

During stage 2, the recruiters usually suggest to the victim that Islam offers an answer to their questions. They get the experience of now belonging to a select group that possesses the truth. The victim changes their identity to better correspond with the behavioural model of their reference group. This includes changes in the mode of speech and, in some cases, changes in external characteristics, such as mode of dress and for men growing a beard in the Salafist style⁶⁷.

During stage 3, the indoctrinated victim strives to isolate themselves spiritually from the outside world and most often refers to non-Muslims as unbelievers (kuffar). The outside world is a world of lies, and interaction with it must be restricted or at least treated with hostility. There is a very strong underlying theme of 'us vs them'.

⁶⁵ Special report: The psychology of terrorism. *Scientific American*. March 25, 2016. Themed issue.

⁶⁶ Bouzar, D. (2016) Rescue mission: Freeing young recruits from the grip of ISIS. *Scientific American*, March 25: 1–13.

⁶⁷ Salafism is a movement within Sunni Islam with a tendency to interpret the sacred texts of Islam in a conservative and strict fashion. Salafists wear a long beard but usually no moustache.

During stage 4 of radicalisation, dehumanisation enters the picture. Everyone who does not follow the victim's path is wrong, and non-Muslim unbelievers are especially wrong. According to this way of thinking, killing them is not a crime. Beheadings and other barbaric acts committed by Islamist terrorist organisations such as ISIS are a part of the dehumanisation, which in part contributes to the twisted understanding of humanity of the radicalised person.

2.7.6 Prevention of terrorist attacks in Europe

In Sweden, Norway and Denmark⁶⁸, action plans to prevent radicalisation are partly or fully the responsibility of the ministries of the interior. Each country strives to ensure cooperation between public authorities. Another feature common to all of them is that the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism is not the sole responsibility of security authorities, such as the police, intelligence and prison authorities. The way of thinking of the welfare society is reflected in the comprehensive approach to the problem.

Health care, child welfare, social services and youth services are typical authorities involved. Education and culture contribute as well. The civic society and its organisations are involved in the work, although roles vary from country to country. Often, persons at risk of radicalisation are suspicious of the motives of public authorities. In Finland, the role of organisations that are based on religion is emphasised. They have credibility and competence in religious interpretation. They are more capable than authorities of working as a group that injects into the discussion its own interpretation that is contrary to radicalisation and extremism from its own religious starting points.

Coordination among and between different actors is being developed in all Nordic countries, but its closeness and levels vary.

All Nordic countries believe that radicalisation and extremism – the extreme right, the extreme left and Islamists – are social problems that can be prevented. They believe in the importance of early intervention. Under the circumstances, this highlights intervention in the problems of vulnerable groups and especially children and young people. The Nordic countries also emphasise that propaganda and hate speech must be addressed so that the ideals of democracy and the welfare state can work in practice.

All Nordic countries also share the leading principle that they must increase understanding and competence in issues connected to the complex of problems of radicalisation and extremism and develop methods and tools through which permanent solutions can be found.

In France and Belgium^{69 70} and Great Britain⁷¹, the government has reviewed the terrorist attacks committed in recent years and released recommendations for actions to address the phenomenon.

Belgium amended some laws after the 2016 terrorist attacks. A new chapter on terrorism was added to the criminal code. Travelling abroad for terrorist activities was criminalised.

⁶⁸ Ramboll (2017) Efforts to Prevent Extremism in the Nordic Countries. <http://uim.dk/publikationer/efforts-to-prevent-extremism-in-the-nordic-countries>. Accessed 8 January 2018.

⁶⁹ Kellner, A. M. (ed.) (2017) Democracy and Terrorism – Experiences in Coping with Terror Attacks, Democracy and Terrorism – Experiences: Case Studies from Belgium, France, Israel and Norway. International Policy Analysis. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/13552-20171023.pdf>. Accessed 14 December 2017.

⁷⁰ Stiftung, F. E. & Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, Enquête Parlementaire (2017). A report of the Belgian parliament on the acts of terror at Brussels Airport and Maalbeek Metro Station. 15 juin 2017, Chargée d'examiner les circonstances qui ont conduit aux attentats terroristes du 22 mars 2016 dans l'aéroport de Bruxelles-National et dans la station de métro Maelbeek à Bruxelles, y compris l'évolution et la gestion de la lutte contre le radicalisme et la menace terroriste.

⁷¹ Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2018) Annual Report 2016–2017. <http://isc.independent.gov.uk/committee-reports/annual-reports>. Accessed 14 December 2017.

New tools were added for terrorism-related investigation, including telephone tapping. It made it possible to withdraw the Belgian citizenship of dual citizens and temporarily void personal identification documents.

The other measures are connected to the organisation of the work against terrorism. Belgium has appointed a national security council to coordinate intelligence and safety policy and priorities for security services. The council is chaired by the prime minister. The council is also responsible for matters connected to the funding of terrorism. The law allows, for example, the freezing of assets of individuals guilty of funding terrorism. The monitoring of foreign fighters living in Belgium is being enhanced on a municipal level. Mayors have been asked to establish local cells for integral security. The action plan of a national work group on radicalisation includes administrative and judicial tools for the prevention of radicalisation. Radicalisation prevention work in prisons is under the supervision of the French Ministry of Justice.

The counter-terrorism work also involves concrete actions, such as the increase of the security budget by MEUR 400, development of police work with border inspection posts, adoption of new technologies, such as the expansion of voice recognition and telephone tapping, extension of administrative arrests from 24 to 72 hours, expansion of home searches to around the clock, ending of the anonymity of prepaid telephone cards, closing of unofficial mosques that spread Jihadism, closing of websites that spread hate speech and expansion of the CCTV network.

France has also invested in the development of legislation connected to the prevention of terrorism since the Paris terrorist attack in 2015. France has ordered an administrative travel ban on individuals who have become radicalised abroad and imposed strict punishments for the idealisation of terrorism and incitement to acts of terror. French law also facilitates administrative actions for closing websites that idealise acts of terror. Authorities can also examine cloud services and capture conversations at online discussion platforms. The counter-terrorism work also involves a large number of tools that utilise information technology.

The French police has gained several tools for the prevention of actions that threaten public safety by suspicious persons. For example, the police has the right to remove suspicious and threatening persons from specific areas in France. This also includes putting suspicious persons on house arrest. The police can search and examine suspicious persons.

After the terrorist attacks in France, the public authorities have invested in increasing the resources and competence of both military and civil security authorities. As a detail, let us note the creation of a new National Guard (la Garde Nationale) in October 2016. This force comprised of volunteer reservists aims to contribute to improving the security of the country and citizens. The underlying idea is freeing soldiers in active service from the task of guarding sensitive public buildings. The target strength of 85,000 people is divided between the French Ministry of Defence, Gendarmerie and the police.

France's counterterrorism work extends past the country's borders. France has invested in the fight against terrorism in Mali and Syria, in particular. In November 2015, France also activated Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union about mutual defence⁷², due to which several EU member states participated in the operations in Mali with additional resources.

⁷² Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union: If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.

Great Britain has also experienced several terrorist attacks in recent years. According to a recent report by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament of Great Britain, it is not realistic to assume that all terrorist attacks can be prevented. The security authorities of Great Britain believe that it is particularly hard to disrupt 'lone wolf' attacks

Despite this, the security authorities in Great Britain have sought to learn from the many attacks that have taken place in the country. For example, the capacity, capability and readiness of the police for armed interventions has been improved. This is a major change from before; the use of weapons in law enforcement has played a minor role in the tradition of British police operations.

The police invests in protective patrol operations in places where many people are gathered. There is greater investment than before in the safety plans of large public mass gatherings. The vulnerability of critical social infrastructure is mitigated and cooperation with private sector enhanced. The country has 170 terrorism prevention experts, who advise private sector actors on how to better prepare for threat situations through safety plans, operating models and temporary and permanent physical barriers.

Like France, Great Britain is applying a measure from counter-terrorism law (*Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures regime*) based on which potentially dangerous individuals can be placed 200 miles from their home and/or social network. The underlying idea is to break networks and cells dedicated to terrorist activities.

The European Parliament established a special committee in autumn 2017 to determine why so many terrorist attacks have been committed in Europe in recent years.⁷³ The committee started its work in September 2017. Its mandate is to determine what went wrong after attacks are committed. The committee has heard various representatives, the Commission, the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) and the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN). The committee has also made visits to member states, Europol and Eurojust, for example. The committee term will last until the end of 2018, and it will publish a final report with conclusions and possible recommendations.

2.7.7 Observations on actions by the authorities during the Stockholm attack

On Friday, 7 April at approximately 3 pm, a terrorist attack took place in Stockholm city centre as a man drove a lorry into a crowd in a pedestrian street. Five people died. Several authorities prepared reports on the incident^{74 75}, analysing the actions by the authorities and proposing improvements. The events in Stockholm and the actions and problems of the authorities had some significant similarities with the Turku attack.

The attack took place on a busy Friday in Stockholm city centre on Drottningsgatan, one of the city's major pedestrian and shopping streets. The attack was carried out by driving a lorry, which had been hijacked moments earlier, into a crowd. The attacker fled the scene.

When the police received notice of the attack, police command immediately started suspecting a terrorist attack based on previous experience and similar attacks that had taken place in

⁷³ European Parliament (2017) Setting up a special committee on terrorism, its responsibilities, numerical strength and term of office. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-0307+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>. Accessed 14 December 2017.

⁷⁴ Report of Stockholm rescue services on the Stockholm attack. Erfarenheter efter den 7 april SSBF:s behov av utvecklad förmåga vid en terrorhändelse. https://www.storstockholm.brand.se/globalassets/dokument/ovrigt/170621_storstockholms-brandforsvars-erfarenhetsrapport-efter-terroredadet-7-april.pdf.

⁷⁵ Report of Stockholm Police on the Stockholm attack. Utvärdering av den nationella särskilda händelsen Nimo. <https://polisen.se/siteassets/dokument/utvarderingar/utvardering-av-attentatet-i-stockholm-7-april-2017.pdf>.

Europe. Plenty of police resources were alerted to the scene. The rescue services and emergency medical services were also alerted to the scene. At first, the situation picture was unclear as was the threat scenario as to whether there were other attacks coming and whether the vehicle itself involved other risk factors, such as explosives. The rescue services thought that they were coming to handle a traffic accident and did not realise the true nature of the incident until they arrived to the scene.

In the early stages, bystanders at the scene played an important role in helping the victims before the authorities arrived. The helpers also included security guards and off-duty police officers. Staff from a nearby medical clinic also came out to help with the victims' treatment and stated that they were prepared to receive slightly injured victims, if necessary.

The first police officers reached the scene quickly after the alert. There was no time to take heavy weaponry or tactical gear with them at first. Police special units also reached the scene quickly. Other authorities arrived a little after the first police units.

Immediately after the incident, there was awareness of the risk that the next attack could be targeted at the authorities arriving at the scene. However, this did not prevent the authorities from acting. In Europe, in recent years, so far there have been no secondary attacks on authorities arriving to handle the situation, but the risk is obvious.

There were visibly armed plain-clothes police officers without visible police identification present at the scene, which caused confusion and possibly fear among bystanders. There was also a possibility that the uniformed police officers might have used force against the unidentifiable police officers.

The police established a command location in the city centre. The situation commanders of the rescue services and emergency medical services were not at the police command location but instead supervised their own crews closer to the scene. Two joint meetings of the authorities were held at the police command location, but there were no permanent representatives from rescue services and emergency medical services at the command location. Furthermore, the various authorities did not have a joint general command; instead, each operated within the framework of their own management system as parallel organisations.

The lack of a joint command of the authorities made it more difficult for the different authorities to form a joint situation picture. There was uncertainty at the command location about the number of victims. The police also did not share all of the information at its disposal with the other authorities in other ways because the perpetrator was missing and they could not disclose actions targeted at the perpetrator to those outside the police organisation.

The authorities' digital telecommunications network used in Sweden was criticised by all actors due to congestion and inappropriate call group structure. There were problems with getting vital messages through, both between authorities and in authorities' internal communications.

Rumours of other similar incidents started circulating soon after the incident, which required resources to investigate. The armed forces took part in securing critical targets.

The resources were sufficient for all the authorities. Emergency medical services and rescue services were able to operate effectively and the victims were transported to treatment relatively quickly considering the nature of their injuries. Plenty of off-duty police officers came in to work, and some had to be sent home in order to ensure the continuity of operations the following day. Work motivation in the police organisation was high throughout the initial stage.

Emergency medical services and rescue services operated with the staff at work at the scene. More staff were alerted to hospitals.

The Swedish police announced a national disaster situation within the police organisation. This was not done by any other authorities.

The perpetrator was arrested in a suburb in Northern Stockholm that evening. The police had released in the media an image of the perpetrator captured from CCTV footage. The perpetrator was located based on a tip-off from a member of the public, and the arrest was carried out by an ordinary police patrol investigating the tip-off. There were no other attacks and the vehicle used did not involve factors causing additional danger. Later, it was found out that the perpetrator sympathised with ISIS ideology.

Suggestions for improvement were proposed in large numbers in the reports submitted after the attack. All of the authorities emphasised the need for sufficient drilling of demanding assignments involving multiple authorities in future. Another joint development target was improving the structure and reliability of the authorities' telecommunications network. The importance of sharing the situation picture was emphasised, but the need for a joint command organ that would serve under the general command of the responsible authority was barely mentioned. Although a joint general command organ was not wanted for, all involved saw a need to further develop technological information distribution tools and solutions to support the situation picture. Cooperation should also be better synchronised.

The police called attention to the need to have sufficient protective equipment and armature at all police units so that the first unit to encounter the perpetrator would have the best capabilities possible to stop the act. Plenty of police officers came to work voluntarily, which caused a need to plan the distribution of the workforce and ensure continuity in future situations through better planning.

It was very noteworthy that although police special units reached the scene approximately 15 minutes after the attack, it is very likely that in terrorist attacks, police operations during the initial stage will be based on the competence and functional capacity of ordinary police patrols. For this reason, it was considered necessary to improve the capability of ordinary police patrols to respond to attacks.

From the police perspective, it would be important to create various models for warning people, all of which should be used. To reduce the risk of a new attack in, for example, public transport, there should be capabilities to quickly stop traffic in the incident area.

Restoring the public sense of security after the incident as quickly as possible was considered important and the role of the police therein vital. The most important duty would be to increase the visibility of the police in the city and at public events. The police should be easily approachable and able to communicate reliably and effectively with the public and media right from the beginning. Wearing uniforms and possibly visible weapons could also create a sense of security. An improved sense of security was considered to promote the society's recovery from the incident and prevent conflicts, for example between population groups.

The health services observed a need for better planning. The health services actors in the Stockholm area had three different disaster plans, which should be harmonised. Performance level requirements should be defined for hospitals for the management of abnormal situations. It should also be planned how to add private clinics providing treatment in the city into situations as resources. It was difficult to manage patient registration at the hospital due to the large influx of patients, which was considered to need improvement.

The emergency medical services system operated under the leadership of the situation command at the scene. The proposal for development mentioned was the development of the management system for emergency medical services in such a manner as to have a higher general command organ in the background of field activities. This could improve the flow of information between emergency medical services and the hospital, which must improve in quality.

Crisis support was also subject to suggestions for improvement. Crisis support must be launched quickly. In addition to the fact that persons directly involved in attacks may need crisis support, groups that were not present but still need crisis support also need to be recognised.

Crisis support should be planned in advance and drilled. Crisis support plans should be included in other health care plans, and the various actors should collaborate on the planning. During a major situation, hospitals should cooperate on the coordination of crisis support. Cultural factors should be considered better because different population groups and actors experience crisis support differently.

The City of Stockholm's operational assessment⁷⁶ paid attention to, for example, the launching of the activities of the city's crisis management group and its work methods. The cooperation between the city and regional actors was observed to have need for improvement. The city's external and internal communications, organisation of crisis assistance and support functions connected to the operations of the crisis organisation also had room for improvement.

⁷⁶ Report of the City of Stockholm, assessment of actions after the terrorist attack. Utvärdering av hanteringen i Stockholms stad av terrordådet i centrala Stockholm den 7 april 2017. August 2017 <https://insynsverige.se/documentHandler.ashx?did=1912835>.

3 ANALYSIS




Figure 6. Accimap diagram drawn up by the investigation team.

3.1 Arrival in Finland and asylum application

According to his own account, the perpetrator left Morocco due to a bad family situation and to disengage from a violent gang. He travelled to Finland through several European countries. During his journey, he spent time in Germany and Italy. In Germany, he registered as an asylum seeker, but the process did not get so far along that his fingerprints would have been taken, and thus his fingerprints were not stored in the Eurodac system. The perpetrator's fingerprints were apparently taken during a visit to Switzerland but because he withdrew the asylum application he had submitted there, his fingerprints were not stored in Eurodac. In Germany, the perpetrator got into difficulties and, apparently due to positive impressions linked to Finland, decided to go to Finland. As a whole, it seems that the European asylum application system, which is based on the Dublin Regulation, and its fingerprint database are not working as intended.

Many people from North Africa and the Middle East have tried and succeeded in entering Europe. Among them are individuals susceptible to radicalisation. After entering the Schengen Area, it is easy to move from country to country. Reasons for trying to reach Europe include driving factors, such as a crisis or unsafe circumstances and poor economic situation in the country of origin. Attraction factors, on the other hand, include the safety of many European states and expectations of a higher standard of living.

The perpetrator applied for asylum in Finland under a false name and age. Minors are more likely to be granted a residence permit than adults. They also have better opportunities to access education. Using his real information, the perpetrator's asylum application might have been found to be obviously baseless and processed under expedited processing. In that case, the applicant might not have developed unrealistic expectations about asylum. Removal from the country could also have been done more quickly.

It is fairly easy to apply for asylum under a false name and age, and the authorities do not use all the methods available for the establishment of identity. Forensic age estimation is not used for everyone who may have misrepresented their age. The information is also not verified with the stated country of origin. This is to shield the asylum seeker and their family from any persecution by the country of origin.

In practice, one can stay in Finland for a long time by applying for asylum. In March 2018, for example, processing times in the application process with the appeal period were approximately 18 months. Almost everyone who receives a negative decision goes on to appeal to the administrative court. The processing times grew longer due to the mass influx of asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016. Long processing times and uncertainty are key factors that impair the well-being of asylum seekers. Living under a false identity is also stressful.

The asylum system was created to protect people in need of international protection. Asylum seekers often arrive without identification papers due to the situation of their country of origin. A thorough investigation of an asylum seeker's background requires a lot of effort. The system can also be used dishonestly.

3.2 Getting interested in radical Islamism

As early as autumn 2016, the perpetrator voiced strict interpretations of what kind of behaviour is appropriate for Muslims. At the turn of 2016 and 2017, the perpetrator's interest in radical Islamism increased. This caused such concern among his immediate circle that a tip-off was sent to the police about threats and radicalisation.

The long wait, idleness, uncertain future and crushed plans make people susceptible to problem behaviour. Studies on the well-being of asylum seekers have shown that waiting and uncertainty about the future are key factors causing mental health problems. The uncertain situation can lead to a sort of loss of agency such that the person is no longer the subject of their own life. Once the experience of control of their own life and self-esteem start to fade, there is a risk of finding the wrong kind of content and purpose for their life. A stressful situation in life combined with the right personality traits led to an interest in violent radicalism and thereby fixated thoughts and, finally, the act.

A person interested in radical Islamism can easily find skilfully produced radical Islamist propaganda online. Terrorist organisations encourage and motivate susceptible individuals online and through personal interactions to carry out terrorist attacks.

The tip-off in January 2017 did not lead to making contact with the person who sent the tip-off or making contact with the perpetrator or any other practical actions, although the information was processed at the National Bureau of Investigation and the Finnish Security Intelligence Service as well as the local police. At the time, the police did not have a uniform nationwide method for processing tip-offs, and the distribution of labour in these matters between different police organisations was underdeveloped. Apparently, each actor assumed that the

issue was minor or being handled by another actor. The person who sent the tip-off also assumed that something was being done or had been done about the matter. The police usually do not provide feedback to persons who send tip-offs, so they may get this impression.

3.3 Deeper radicalisation

Through spring 2017, the perpetrator spoke more and more about ISIS to other asylum seekers and was eager to discuss matters of faith until his friends grew uncomfortable. In early summer, during Ramadan, the perpetrator started to attend prayers more actively. At around the same time, the perpetrator met a person who instructed him in using a closed instant messenger service that contained radical Islamist materials. The perpetrator stopped being interested in everyday matters, studying or, for example, sports. The perpetrator isolated himself from friends to some extent. The perpetrator's closest friend observed a clear change in him and was worried about him. The situation was made worse by the fact that the perpetrator was staying by himself at his friend's empty flat and only visited the reception centre to collect his allowance and to do his mandatory chores.

It is typical of the background of persons who commit an act of terror alone that their behaviour changes fairly quickly and their immediate circle observe worrying signs. The problem is that asylum seekers often distrust the authorities and there are no functioning low-threshold channels available for submitting observations. In case of a person planning an act of violence alone, the observations of their immediate circle are valuable. They must be listened to, they must be addressed and appropriate actors must be found to solve them.

Currently, the problems connected to radicalisation are too often referred to the police even though radicalisation is not a criminal case as such. The police has limited powers and procedures in things that are not criminal cases. The police may not have proper connections or procedures to direct individuals to another service, such as health care, social services or third-sector services. Such possibility exists in Anchor activities, but usually Anchor activities only involve cases where a minor has already committed a crime or been a victim of a crime.

Finland has a strategic level programme for the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism. The implementation of the programme is hindered by the fact that the preventive activities are project-oriented, under-resourced and disjointed. At the moment, a lot of expectations have been piled on Anchor activities regarding the prevention of violent extremism. In practice, Anchor activities currently only target minors, and the activities are not properly implemented in all parts of Finland. Many individuals at risk of radicalisation are excluded due to their age. Furthermore, asylum seekers are ordinarily not covered by municipal services.

A few organisations carry out important anti-radicalisation work. However, the activities are project-oriented, the human resources are limited and the activities are only local and not well known.

Muslim religious communities and other Muslim communities have potential for the identification and guidance of problem individuals. However, the problem is that the activities are based on volunteer labour and lack trained staff. It is important to get communities to commit to the activities.

3.4 The stabbings

The perpetrator acted alone and chose a method that does not require any particular preparation or equipment. Such individual attacks on soft targets using everyday implements are difficult to prevent, especially when the perpetrator is typically ready to die. This highlights the

importance of early identification of potentially dangerous individuals and intervention in their development.

The situation at Turku Market Square and its vicinity demonstrated that bystanders can mitigate the consequences of an attack by influencing the perpetrator and providing emergency first aid. However, this involves risk. Despite the risks, the activities of bystanders are vital because official intervention may take some time. Bystanders played a key role by making emergency calls, which allowed the Emergency Response Centre to convey a situation picture to the police and emergency medical services. People with special skills or experience are a resource in such situations.

3.5 Actions by the authorities

The eyewitnesses quickly made emergency calls, and the ERC alerted the police. The situation was challenging. There were many emergency calls but the ERC was able to form a picture of the events and victims. The police had resources in the city centre area. The perpetrator was detected quickly and the police were able to stop him very quickly and deftly, which prevented additional victims. The actions were in accordance with the operating models the police have developed and drilled for in recent years. The development work has been successful. However, the police cannot be expected to always manage to stop acts of violence this quickly. Ending within a few minutes, the situation did not cause a need to issue an emergency warning. It takes approximately half an hour to issue an emergency warning.

Emergency medical services were alerted quickly. There was a small delay in getting to the patients because the EMS stopped to wait for information from the police confirming that the area was secure. There was a slight additional delay due to the fact that information was conveyed to the EMS through the Emergency Response Centre. The use of joint call groups would have made for a faster flow of information. However, the delay did not compromise the treatment of the victims.

A direct speech connection between the police and EMS would have helped the EMS field supervisor to get information earlier about the location of the victims and a rough classification into, for example, the walking and non-walking. Resources could have been allocated earlier for the treatment of the victims with the worst injuries at Puutori Square. In this case, the treatment order was dictated by how the paramedics progressed towards Puutori Square. No harm was caused. From a medical viewpoint, all of the victims and the perpetrator received the treatment they needed in due course. The nature of the incident differed from the conventional idea of a major accident in which the patients are usually within a limited area. In a widespread incident, information about the situation picture is needed as soon as possible, which is made possible with agreed-on operating models and tools and instructions that support them.

The generally agreed-on principle is that, depending on the situation, the authority with the most central duties in handling the situation serves as the general commander. In this case, it was the police. The other authorities expected the police to take them more into account and provide more leadership. Another viewpoint is that each authority has its own statutory duties which it must independently perform as soon as possible. All authorities must actively contact each other when they need information or assistance. Correspondingly, authorities must know the needs of the other authorities, take them into account in their activities and distribute necessary information.

The rescue services were not alerted for the assignment because they are not among the authorities to be alerted for cases of stabbing. However, the rescue services independently came

to the scene and provided assistance to the police forensic investigation. There would have been opportunities to utilise the rescue services even more. In this case, there was no great need for such, but in more major situations, there must be ability to utilise the resources of the rescue services.

Based on the investigation of the stabbing case and some previous situations, the authorities do not have quite the same views of activities multi-authority situations or enough information about the duties, needs and capabilities of other authorities.

Turku University Hospital handled the treatment of the patients well, and all the patients received the medical care they needed. Victims started arriving approximately 15 minutes after the preliminary information arrived, which was fairly quickly for the raising of the readiness level. The hospital's emergency clinic had not had the time to perform all of the planned actions. The situation was unusual in that the hospital's security arrangements had to be increased quickly. Because the incident was a suspected terrorist attack, it caused more worry and fear among the staff than an ordinary act of violence. Some danger and threats also resulted from having the suspect at the hospital. The hospital would have preferred to receive more information about the situation directly from the police.

A hospital-wide disaster alert was not sent out, which affected the alerting of the top management and security management as well as, primarily, communications. If the situation had expanded, there could have been deficiencies in the allocation of resources, contact with the neighbouring hospital districts, contacts with the state administration and maintenance of the hospital district's general situation picture. Disaster readiness had been developed recently but, in the sudden situation, there was no time to start using the most recent activity cards. The documentation of the situation was incomplete.

Emergency Social Services were able to launch a crisis centre and open crisis helplines quickly. Official assistance was received from Vantaa Social and Crisis Emergency Services, for example in the form of guidance with handling the practical arrangements. The assistance was valuable. The FRC was able to launch volunteer activities quickly at the request of the authorities. The City of Turku decided to handle the acute psychosocial support of everyone in need, regardless of their municipality of residence. It was a good decision.

A problem was observed in obtaining the contact information of the victims and their relatives. It turned out that there is no legislation that would allow the disclosure of such information, so the police did not disclose it.

After the acute phase, crisis support was mainly provided by the psychologist unit of the City of Turku. The workload was so great that the unit became congested and its normal work was disrupted. The emergency plan of the city's Welfare Division comprehensively covers the launching and implementation of the acute phase. In this situation, a large number of people needed long-term psychiatric support, which overloaded the psychologist unit. The emergency plan did not address psychosocial support in this respect.

The incident resulted in actions and a need for information in several organisations up to and including the Government. Local and national authorities handled operative duties, but there was also a need for statements from political leadership. There were national impacts on many administrative sectors, which in turn required a flow of information between the sectors at the local and ministry level. In a more widescale and extended situation, there probably would have been a need for more exchange of the situation picture and nationwide actions. In that case, the duties of the Government Situation Centre and the meeting of the heads of preparedness as well as flow of information between the ministries would have been more

important than they were now. The different ministries need information in order to coordinate actions in their own administrative sector. Examples include increases the readiness level of hospitals nationwide, instructing schools for the next school day or decisions on foreign policy.

4 CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions include the causes of the incident. Cause refers to the various underlying factors of the incident and the direct and indirect factors affecting it.

1. Many people are trying to enter Europe due to unsafe conditions and poverty in their countries of origin and, as an attraction factor, the high standard of living in Western countries. According to his own account, the perpetrator left Morocco due to a bad family situation and the threat caused by a violent gang of football hooligans. He had not been particularly radicalised and did not belong to any networks when he left Morocco or arrived in Finland.

Conclusion: Countries in Northern Africa and the Middle East offer a growth platform for Jihadist thinking. According to crime statistics, only a small fraction of the people who end up in Finland have been seriously radicalised. Asylum seekers are not a particular problem from the viewpoint of violent crime, but they include individuals susceptible to radicalisation.

2. The perpetrator was able to easily make his way from Morocco via Turkey to Greece and the Schengen Area. He visited many countries and spent the longest time in Germany. There, he registered as an asylum seeker and apparently was registered as living at a reception centre for approximately six months. His fingerprints were not stored in the Eurodac database until he reached Finland.

Conclusion: The asylum seeking system, which is based on the Dublin Regulation and Eurodac database, is not working as intended. It is possible to move freely in the Schengen Area and, lacking fingerprints, a person can use different identities in different countries. The system can be abused for a long time.

3. The perpetrator applied for asylum in Finland as a person younger than his actual age, as a minor, and under a false name. Forensic age estimation was done and no enquiries were made to his country of origin. His asylum application as an adult could possibly have been considered as obviously baseless and processed under expedited processing.

Conclusion: It appears to be easy to use a false name and age, and not every method available is being used to verify personal data. The interpretation has been that information cannot be requested from the country of origin even when the threat is not posed by the state or public authorities of the country of origin. Convincing others to believe your lies gives rise to unrealistic expectations for the future. It is stressful to live under a false identity.

4. An uncertain and stressful situation in life makes people susceptible to maintaining their identity through undesirable means. The perpetrator started to become radicalised by watching easily accessible radical Islamist propaganda. Later, he received sympathy and support from a Finnish man with a foreign background. His path to radicalisation was usual.

Conclusion: Long asylum processes which, complete with their appeal periods, often last approximately 18 months, create a stressful situation in life that makes people susceptible to mental health problems and problem behaviour. The situation is made worse by gradually crushed expectations and living a lie. Radical Islamism is easy to cling to because the recruitment is purposeful and goal-oriented.

5. Members of the perpetrator's immediate circle were worried about him and some even feared him but only one person sent a tip-off to the authorities. The tip-off was processed

in the local police, National Bureau of Investigation and the Finnish Security Intelligence Service but did not lead to any practical actions.

Conclusion: The procedures of police organisations for handling tip-offs were undeveloped. It is difficult to obtain information about individuals who become radicalised alone, so the rare tip-offs must be addressed.

6. The perpetrator's radicalisation grew more intense, and his immediate circle saw a great change in him. However, nobody reported it to the authorities or other actors.

Conclusion: There is no low-threshold channel in Finland for reporting concerns connected to radicalisation. All in all, the handling of concerns and preventive work is disjointed and under-resourced. In the early stages of radicalisation, the best help is personal discussion. Many concerns are overwhelmingly left for the police to handle even though the most appropriate help could be provided by social and health care services, reception centres, organisations and religious communities. There are no uniform operating models for helping individuals who are becoming radicalised and directing them to an appropriate actor for help.

7. The perpetrator ended up carrying out the act as instructed by the propaganda, using everyday implements and targeting ordinary people. His initial plan was to attack soldiers: in practice, military servicemen. The perpetrator was ready to die at the end of his act. Bystanders started the intervention with the stabber's actions, and the police stopped the act three minutes after it started. The situation was over quickly, so an emergency warning was not issued.

Conclusion: Such actions by individuals are difficult to prevent unless intervention is possible in the early stages of radicalisation. In recent years, the police have greatly improved their functional capacity to deal with mass murder situations. However, it is not realistic to expect that similar situations can always be stopped so quickly. There is no quick way to warn people.

8. The police and emergency medical services were alerted to the scene quickly. In the early stages, the police were in a rush and did not start using the joint call groups of the authorities. The EMS stopped to wait for confirmation that the area was safe, which it received after a moment through the ERC. This caused a slight delay in the EMS units reaching the victims. The rescue department is not alerted to stabbing assignments but came to the scene independently. All of the victims received the help they needed.

Conclusion: Different public authorities have different views of the management methods and principles of multi-authority situations. Different authorities may not know each other's needs, operating methods and the resources available to them. Better cooperation would improve the possibilities of successfully handling even more large-scale situations than this one.

9. There was a great need for psychosocial support, which was launched quickly. The City of Turku quickly decided to shoulder responsibility for all psychosocial support. There were problems with obtaining the contact information of the victims and their relatives.

Conclusion: There are no provisions of law as to how parties providing psychosocial support could obtain the contact information of the people needing support from the police or health care.

10. The incident resulted in actions and a need for information in several organisations. The incident was mostly concerned with the mandate of the Ministry of the Interior but also

intersected with the mandates of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Prime Minister's Office and some of the political leadership. There were widespread indirect effects in Finland and also abroad. There was little flow of information between the administrative sectors. A meeting of the heads of preparedness was not convened, but the Government assembled.

Conclusion: Key government actors have duty officer arrangements and the Government Situation Centre operates between the administrative sectors. The formation of a situation picture at the Government Situation Centre and the distribution of information to the various administrative sectors is not smooth.

5 SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Processing times of asylum applications and appeals

The perpetrator was an asylum seeker. Despite their troubled origins, there has been little crime among them that was indicative of radicalisation. However, the comers include individuals who have already become radicalised or are at risk of radicalisation. There are also many applicants who do not meet the preconditions for receiving asylum.

The perpetrator had received a negative decision and was awaiting a decision on his appeal from the administrative court. According to the investigation, he was not radicalised until after he arrived in Finland. Contributing factors included his personality traits, ISIS propaganda, over a year's wait and uncertainty about the future. A loss of self-esteem leaves room for getting interested in radical Islamism, for example. The uncertain waiting period and gradually crushed unrealistic expectations make people susceptible to mental health problems and problem behaviour.

Registering as an asylum seeker means being able to stay in Finland legally awaiting a final decision for approximately 18 months on average. The processing time of a normal application is six months on average, and the processing time of an appeal is approximately a year. Almost everyone appeals a negative decision.

The investigation team recommends the following:

The Finnish Immigration Service and Ministry of Justice should ensure through resource allocation and other direction that the average total processing time of asylum decisions and their appeals to the administrative courts is significantly shortened from the current 18 months on average. Expedited processing should be used when permitted under law. Furthermore, processing must be expedited if a security authority considers the applicant as a security threat. [2018-S24]

In many cases, a negative decision received quickly may be better for the applicant than a long uncertain situation. Adjustment and integration are difficult during the wait because there is no certainty of establishing a life in Finland.

When expedited processing at the administrative court is based on a security threat, the fairness of the legal proceedings must be considered insofar that the administrative court is not provided information that could affect the decision on the appeal submitted.

There are also problems with how final negative decisions are implemented, or the persons returned to their country of origin. It is also possible to submit new asylum applications on new grounds⁷⁷. In this investigation, however, attention is drawn to the waiting period maintaining unrealistic expectations, which is detrimental for people.

5.2 Establishing the identity of asylum seekers

Upon arriving in Finland, the perpetrator reported a false name and age, which the authorities did not find out until after the stabbings. The issue involves several problems.

⁷⁷ According to the Finnish Immigration Service, the Directive on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (2013/32/EU) provides wider opportunities for preventing abuse than Finnish national legislation, but not all of the articles on further applications have been enforced in Finland.

If the lies had been discovered, the asylum application would have been more baseless and the opportunities for using expedited processing would have increased. His long-term legal stay in Finland could maybe have been prevented. Lies are indicative of the asylum application also being fraudulent in other respects. When lies seem to work, it creates false expectations. Having one's expectations crushed after a long wait is detrimental.

It is hard to live and use services under a false identity, and there is no easy return to your real identity. The situation increases the stress caused by other uncertainty and makes people susceptible to problems, such as seeking meaning for their life from radical Islamist ideology.

The investigation team recommends the following:

The Finnish Immigration Service should develop its operating methods in such a way as to utilise all reasonably available methods to establish the identity and age of asylum seekers. The methods include, for example, special examination of the matter during the asylum interview, utilisation of forensic age estimate and requesting information from the applicant's home country if the threat towards the applicant is not due to the state. [2018-S25]

According to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the Directive on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection⁷⁸ and the Aliens Act, information about applicants cannot be disclosed to a party suspected of persecuting them or causing them serious harm. If the applicant's home country is not suspected of persecuting the applicant or causing serious harm to them or their relatives, the international conventions do not seem to prevent enquiries about identity from the home country. As for minor asylum seekers, there is also an obligation to immediately start tracing their parents or other guardians. In such cases, it is a question of establishing the child's best interest, but a false identity and age may also be revealed in the same context.

If a false identity is revealed at some context later on, it should be reported to the police in order to determine criminal liability and to investigate how the lies affected the asylum process.

5.3 Opportunities of asylum seekers' immediate circle to share concerns

The perpetrator's immediate circle had over six months of observations and concern about the perpetrator's excessive interest towards radical Islamism and ISIS propaganda. As far as is known, just one person ever sympathised with the perpetrator's thoughts. Many others were tired of the things the perpetrator was saying and were occasionally concerned. Only one tip-off was sent to the police because the problems were apparently not considered serious enough and, on the other hand, asylum seekers often have little faith in the police. Contacting the police is also avoided for fear of one's own problems being revealed.

If a person's actions or behaviour are seen to constitute a clear threat, the natural party to contact is the police. However, a person who gradually becomes radicalised may show signs that their immediate circle can easily observe even before a concrete threat. In such cases, the appropriate party to contact is not the police but rather the staff of the reception centre, school or religious community. Still, they often lack the expertise to handle the matter or do not consider it to be their duty.

⁷⁸ 2013/32/EU

In practice, individuals who are becoming radicalised but have not yet committed crimes can only be identified by their immediate circle in everyday contexts. Asylum seekers are one of the key groups whose members include individuals at risk of radicalisation. At the same time, they are mostly outside the scope of the normal services for residents of the municipality. It would be important to give the immediate circle of asylum seekers low-threshold opportunities to express concern and ask for advice.

The investigation team recommends the following:

The Ministry of the Interior should ensure that a counselling service is established in the Finnish Immigration Service or a third-sector actor, which could be contacted for any questions or concerns connected to asylum seekers. The service must be familiar with the cooperating parties, such as the police, religious communities and various parties offering help, as well as give advice and always direct issues and individuals to the appropriate place. The service should be marketed in many ways, for example at reception centres, religious communities, on the Internet and during meetings with asylum seekers. [2018-S26]

Many countries have different kinds of services that can be contacted with similar issues. For example, since 2012, Germany has offered a service that people can contact when they observe an individual at risk of radicalisation⁷⁹. Great Britain also has many different channels for getting help. In a small country like Finland, a separate channel for contacts about radicalisation may not be necessary, and instead the service could be combined with the various needs of asylum seekers. This possibly nationwide service could also be built on a similar existing service. One example is the *Tajua mut* ('Understand me') operating model, which was developed for outreach youth work based on a Dutch model⁸⁰. The service must be available by telephone, e-mail, websites and the social media.

5.4 Development of the work for the prevention of radicalisation

Finland has a National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism, which introduces the parties actively working on the matter. Key actors include the National Police Board, police departments, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Finnish Security Intelligence Service. A few organisations have been actively involved in the practical work with people at risk of radicalisation or suffering from violence.

Work connected to serious threats of terrorism, such as international intelligence or the handling of target individuals, was not addressed in this investigation because the perpetrator was not known to have previously committed any crimes, did not belong to any networks and was not a target individual whom the police or the Security Intelligence Service would have acted on. It was essential to determine what kind of preventive work the actors are currently capable of with individuals who are in exactly the same type of situation as the perpetrator.

⁷⁹ Online and telephone service maintained by the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees for reporting observations connected to radicalisation. <http://www.bamf.de/EN/DasBAMF/Beratung/beratung-node.html>. Accessed 22 March 2018.

⁸⁰ Website of the Dutch organisation CPI for helping young people. www.publiekeinnovatie.nl/en/initiatives/multisignaal/. Accessed 22 March 2018.

In order for the police departments, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Security Intelligence Service to have chances of intervening in the actions of an individual, there must be concrete information. In the case under investigation, in practice, the only concrete information obtained in advance was the tip-off received in January 2017. In that situation, prevention did not work even though the information went to three different organisations. Since then, the operating methods have improved.

Nevertheless, it still appears that the preventive work of the aforementioned organisations does not form a clear entity in terms of the work done close to the people. A lot of information is collected but, for example, Anchor activities and the work done with religious communities varies between police departments. The resources of the organisations capable of helping are limited and their activities only local. The opportunities provided by organisations and religious communities are not well known. Muslim communities and religious leaders, in particular, play an important role in the recognition of individuals attracted to militant interpretations of faith that emphasise violence. The threshold for addressing the matter with the individual in question and directing them to services should be low.

Work done close to the people and communities would help spot problems and intervene in them early and effectively. There is no other way to find and guide individuals who become radicalised alone, like the perpetrator, other than to seize on the few tip-offs that may be obtained from them and their immediate circle

The investigation team recommends the following:

The Ministry of the Interior should determine with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health how to organise the funding and direction of the organisations necessary for the prevention of radicalisation and ensure that the activities are long-term and nationwide. The services provided by organisations must be properly brought to the attention of public authorities and other actors so that individuals who need help can be guided to appropriate assistance. [2018-S27]

Organisations mentioned in the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism include HelsinkiMissio, Vuolle Settlement and Finn Church Aid. All of them have the capability to deal with individuals at risk of radicalisation and help them out of a difficult situation.

The investigation team recommends the following:

The National Police Board and the Finnish Security Intelligence Service must agree on clear operating models for the prevention of radicalisation that include enough observation and building of trust close to people and communities as well as the ability to help individuals who have just started on the path to radicalisation in time and bring them within the scope of appropriate services (such as health care, social services and organisations). [2018-S28]

Cooperation between different actors may require development of provisions on the flow of information.

5.5 Management of multi-authority situations

During the investigation, it was discovered that there are some fairly divergent views among authorities about the management of multi-authority situations. In general, it is considered that, depending on the situation, each situation can be found to have a primary authority that must take responsibility for general command of the situation⁸¹.

The 'primary authority' perspective described above and the principle of general command based thereon are only referred to in law in the Rescue Act regarding rescue operations due to accidents. In urgent situations, each authority embarks on the urgent duties in its own mandate according to the specific instructions of its field, taking the safety factors required by the situation into account.

Multi-authority situations require close cooperation and functioning mutual communications. All actors must be active, understand the overall situation, share information about the situation and consider the duties and needs of the other authorities. In suddenly arising situations, the most important actors are usually the Emergency Response Centre, police, rescue services, emergency medical services and psychosocial support. They must all be able to join the situation without delay to perform their duties and receive the information they need.

In the investigated stabbings and some previous situations⁸², some of the actors have stopped to wait for another authority to provide a strong general command, which never realised. In Turku, a delay was caused when the emergency medical services stopped to wait for reliable information about the area's safety situation, which it did not receive right away. Rescue department units were utilised after the rescue department offered its support. Joint communications or press conference of the authorities were not coordinated. Information was not exchanged about the victims, which led to misunderstandings in the information released about the number of victims. Psychosocial support was left on the outside and did not receive the information it needed about the victims and their relatives smoothly. A joint command position was not convened at the scene or elsewhere. The joint call groups for multiple authorities were not used. This did not cause essential harm, but improvements are needed in order to successfully handle more complex situations.

⁸¹ The police also use the term 'general command' with the internal definition it has within the police.

⁸² Ministry of Justice (2009) *Jokelan koulusurmat 7.11.2007* ('Jokela school killings on 7 November 2007'). Investigation committee report, Publication 2009/2. Ministry of Justice: Helsinki.

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Safety Investigation Authority (2014) *Environmental accident at the Talvivaara mine in November 2012*. Investigation report Y2012-03.

Safety Investigation Authority (2015) *Aircraft accident resulting in the death of eight skydivers at Jämijärvi on 20 April 2014*. Investigation report L2014-02.

The investigation team recommends the following:

The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health should harmonise the management and communications methods of multi-authority situations so that the necessary authorities can join in and are actively included in all suddenly arising major incidents. Key actors include the Emergency Response Centre, police, rescue services, emergency medical services and social services (including psychosocial support). [2018-S29]

5.6 Warning the population

The police caught the perpetrator three minutes after the stabbings started. As such, there was no time or need to issue an emergency warning. Admittedly, the situation was unclear for some time because there was no certainty as to whether there were several perpetrators or whether the attack had been planned such that something more was going on. For this reason, the police posted a message to avoid Turku city centre. The media repeated the message and the city centre grew quiet.

Emergency warnings issued on the television and radio are not suited to such a rapid situation. It takes approximately half an hour to issue a warning. In addition to emergency warnings, it is also possible to use general danger signals issued using fixed public warning sirens or, in sparsely populated areas, sound trucks. It is used only rarely and there may be a threshold to its quick utilisation. The speakers of sound trucks can also be used to give spoken instructions.

The investigation team recommends the following:

The Ministry of the Interior and the Emergency Response Centre Agency should develop new operating models for warning the population quickly. It would be effective to convey warnings to mobile phones via SMS and applications (such as the 112 Suomi application). The advantage of a smartphone application would be the possibility of using a loud warning featuring lights and vibration, multilingualism and clear instructions. [2018-S30]

5.7 Development of the operations of the Government Situation Centre

During major accidents, terrorist attacks and other similar serious incidents, the state management needs to communicate to the citizens, assess the impact of the incident on future decisions and, in some cases, direct resources to recovery from the incident. There may also be effects on foreign policy. Among the state management, the President of the Republic, Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior were the quickest to react to the Turku stabbings. However, the management and handling of acute situations is the duty of the competent authorities.

If the actions of several administrative sectors are needed at a national or even international level, an extraordinary meeting of the heads of preparedness of the ministries can be convened. The meeting of the heads of preparedness coordinates the collaboration between the ministries and, if necessary, prepares matters for the permanent secretaries' meetings.

In the case of the Turku stabbings, a meeting of the heads of preparedness was not considered necessary even though, at first, there was no certainty that the situation was over. A meeting might have been needed if the situation continued to be unclear or if, for example, there was a need to raise the preparedness level of hospitals, the police, border control, rescue services and emergency medical services at a national level. There could also have been widespread effects on, for example, schools, reception centres or religious communities. The administrative sectors function independently but, in case of a widescale situation, a joint view of the situation produces better results.

In the activation of the state management, heads of preparedness and ministries, it is vital to ensure that the Government Situation Centre gets access to the necessary information so that it can distribute it to support decision-making and actions.

The investigation team recommends the following:

The Government Situation Centre should agree with the administrative sectors on how information about situations passes smoothly and without delays from the administrative sectors and their subordinate offices to the Government Situation Centre to be distributed to the state management and the different administrative sectors. The aim is to be able to launch the actions of the Government and the necessary administrative sectors without delay. [2018-S31]

5.8 Personal data of individuals in need of psychosocial support

The parties launching psychosocial support had difficulties with getting information about the identities of the victims and their relatives. The information was needed in order to be able to provide help as soon as possible. It is vital to provide help quickly, and the people providing help should also get to do their work smoothly. It emerged that the law does not contain any provisions that would allow the police to disclose information about individuals in need of support.

The investigation team recommends the following:

The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health should prepare provisions based on which the police and health care must, in case of accidents and violent crimes, disclose information about the identity of the victims and their near relatives for the needs of psychosocial support. [2018-S32]

Implementation of the recommendation is also necessary due to the Directive on combating terrorism⁸³. According to the Directive, there must be emotional and psychological support for the victims of terrorism. Such mechanisms or protocols must envisage the coordination of relevant authorities to be able to provide a comprehensive response to the needs of victims and their family members immediately after a terrorist attack and for as long as necessary.

⁸³ 2017/541/EU, Article 24(2–4). The laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive must be brought into force by 8 September 2018.

Victims of terrorism who are residents of other EU member states must have access to information regarding their rights, support services and compensation schemes.

Enforcement of the Directive requires planning, coordination, updating of emergency plans, drills and inclusion of the third sector, such as Victim Support Finland⁸⁴ in the planning as well as communication to the various actors about the operating principles.

5.9 Implemented actions

Over the course of the investigation, the investigation team has become aware of the following most essential actions implemented after the stabbings, which were aimed at preventing similar incidents or mitigating the damage:

The Ministry of the Interior has launched a number of actions aimed at harmonising the tip-off handling process across the police organisations and increasing the effectiveness of actions resulting from tip-offs. The ministry is monitoring the realisation of the actions.

The Ministry of the Interior has also appointed a Rajapinta ('Interface') project, which aims to improve the handling of observations connected to radicalisation. The National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism includes a plan for establishing a Helpline support service for families and the immediate circle.

The police and Security Intelligence Service have been developing a process connected to the handling of tip-offs. They are using a joint model for the recording of tip-offs, initial actions and assessment. The division of labour between the local police, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Security Intelligence Service in regard to potentially dangerous individuals has also been clarified in the months following the tip-off about the perpetrator.

The National Police Board has paid attention to the handling of tip-offs connected to radicalisation and reaction to them in order to ensure local operations in the result agreements of police departments.

Amendments of law have entered into force in the mandate of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, strengthening the cooperation between health care and emergency social services and clarifying the obligations to provide psychosocial support.

In the administrative sector of the Ministry of Justice, human resources for the processing of asylum cases have been increased at administrative courts.

The Finnish Immigration Service has improved the establishment of identity by recruiting experts for the asylum unit who will focus on that task. Furthermore, a cooperation development project has been launched between the immigration and security authorities of the Finnish Immigration Service and the National Police Board. The project focuses on the establishment of applicants' identity and background through a multi-authority model as well as the analysis of rights to obtain information.

A harmonised multi-authority alert has been planned and prepared for the authorities taking part in emergency response centre activities in case of incidents of mass violence. The Emergency Response Centre Agency is getting a new information system that enables the redirection of calls to other emergency response centres in case of congestion.

On 11 December 2017, a command centre capable of introducing solutions for the flow of information and formation of the situation picture started operations at the Emergency Response Centre Agency. The emergency warning system is improving thanks to the authority

⁸⁴ Victim Support Finland (RIKU) is a support service for victims of crimes maintained by several organisations.

bulletin feature already ordered for the 112 Suomi application. The new command centre of the Emergency Response Centre Agency also has the capability to warn the population through several channels.

Turku University Hospital (TYKS) has updated its plans in several ways. Systems for alerting the staff are being developed. Decision-making about disaster situation status has been shifted to a lower organisational level than before. Cooperation with the police has been increased, for example by having field patrols tour hospital facilities. A situation journal application is being introduced to improve documentation and the flow of information.

The City of Turku has improved personnel alert systems and created a crisis communications checklist, crisis news template and ready-to-use crisis communications templates for the Internet. The city has launched the construction of crisis support processes in order to clarify the roles. Analysis of the stabbing incident has clarified the items to be improved.

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Investigation materials

- 1) Pre-trial investigation materials
- 2) Hearings
- 3) Weather data
- 4) Summary of police communication actions
- 5) Police procedures connected to situation command, communications and preventive activities
- 6) The Finnish Immigration Service's information on the perpetrator
- 7) Finnish Immigration Service procedures
- 8) Information on the victims of the stabbing and their treatment
- 9) Service standard decision for emergency medical services
- 10) TYKS disaster procedure, alert practices and information on safety arrangements
- 11) Information on terrorist attacks that have taken place abroad and their prevention
- 12) Situation journals of the duty officers of the National Police Board, Government Situation Centre, the Ministry of the Interior Department for Rescue Services and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health
- 13) Reports on psychosocial support
- 14) Emergency Response Centre recordings
- 15) Video recordings for the 112 TV show
- 16) Rescue Department situation journal
- 17) Information on the resources of administrative courts and appeal processing times
- 18) Special study on communications
- 19) Video recordings of press conferences
- 20) Information on crimes committed by asylum seekers and other issues
- 21) Information on the activities and preparations of the Church
- 22) Actions of the Finnish Border Guard
- 23) Final report of the Reach Out project
- 24) Emergency plan of the City of Turku
- 25) Account of the private clinic on crisis work
- 26) Information on the activities of security companies
- 27) The rescue services' alert and accident write-ups

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT INVESTIGATION REPORT

The draft investigation report was circulated for statements at the Ministry of the Interior (rescue division, police division and immigration division), the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Ministry of Justice, Prime Minister's Office (Situation Centre), National Police Board, Security Intelligence Service, Finnish Immigration Service, Emergency Response Centre Agency, City of Turku and the Southwest Finland Hospital District. Relatives of the people who died in the stabbings, the injured victims and the perpetrator were also given the opportunity to give statements.

The Ministry of the Interior proposes specifications to several details of the investigation report and highlights the fact that the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism includes an action for establishing a Helpline support service. There have not been enough resources but the establishment of the channel is still very topical.

As for the counselling service for asylum seekers, the ministry states that the activities would require extensive resources, which are currently impossible free up. The service should also not overlap with the existing feedback and enquiry channels. Concrete concerns about radicalisation, on the other hand, should be referred directly to the police. The Ministry of the Interior is in favour of allocating funding in the budget for organisations that support the work of public authorities.

As for the management of multi-authority situations, the ministry states that the necessary procedure exists but the drilling varies and should be increased. As for the use of the communications network's joint call groups, the responsible party is the Ministry of Finance, which is also responsible, for its part, for legislation on emergency warnings. Emergency warnings have room for improvement in regard to situations where there is more time.

According to the Ministry of the Interior, the role division during incidents between local authorities, the duty officers of ministries, the meeting of the heads of preparedness and the Government Situation Centre was blurred in the draft investigation report. The Ministry of the Interior describes the role division and presents an accordant proposal for a recommendation on the issue and the grounds for the recommendation.

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health takes notice in its statement of the fact that the authorities' telecommunications network (VIRVE) is very significant during various types of incidents. Further development is needed for the operative VIRVE call group architecture of the police, rescue services and social and health care as well as its utilisation. The realisation should be directed and monitored at a national level, for example in a steering group and main user group for the authorities' telecommunications network managed by the Ministry of Finance. According to the ministry, the opportunities created by digitalisation for various management systems should be taken into account in the development of the authorities' field and general command.

According to the ministry, the draft investigation report does well in defining the challenges in the prevention of violent radicalisation in Finland. Cooperation between authorities and with organisations needs to be developed and expanded. At the moment, the preventive work does not form a coherent whole. The ministry concurs that the preventive work is hindered by its project-orientation, disjointed nature and lack of resources. Anchor activities only target minors, and the activities are not properly implemented at a national level.

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health considers cooperation with organisations as extremely important. Therefore, grassroots-level organisations should be engaged in the activities. Muslim communities also have potential for the identification and guidance of problem

individuals. Work done close to the people and communities would help spot problems and intervene in them early and effectively. The ministry considers it important that the immediate circle has a channel and opportunity to share their concerns in accordance with the recommendation presented in the draft investigation report. Furthermore, the ministry presents suggestions for improvements on several details.

The Ministry of Justice states that the back-log of appeals submitted to the administrative courts will be dealt with by the end of 2018 and that, with the changes that have been made, there are strong resources for the processing of asylum cases. An increased need for oral hearings has slowed down decisions. The ministry notes that some of the decisions are enforceable during the administrative court processing, so the processing does not delay enforcement. The Ministry of Justice sees to the resourcing of the administrative courts, but it is not possible to organise other guidance for independent courts.

For example, the authority handling the enforcement may call the administrative court and expedite an individual case for reasons connected to enforcement. If it is wanted to make it possible to expedite a case on the grounds of security threats, it can be legislated, if necessary.

The ministry pays attention to the enforcement of the Directive on combating terrorism and especially improving the situation of victims. The requirements of free-of-charge services, long-term after-care, financing, uniform quality and the ability to serve foreigners or Finnish victims returning to Finland are issues that will probably require clarification and analysis. Furthermore, various actors' awareness of Victim Support Finland (RIKU) should be increased and victim support services should be added to the national, regional and local emergency plans and drills. There may be a need for a website describing the support services. The possibility of utilising the Government Situation Centre for coordination is another idea that needs deliberation. According to the ministry, three recommendations of the draft investigation report can be used to support the enforcement of the Directive on combating terrorism.

The Prime Minister's Office states that the draft investigation report gives an accurate view of the situation and has no comments on the matter.

According to the National Police Board, the draft investigation report analyses things in a fairly comprehensive and detailed manner. The conclusion are mostly consistent with the understanding of the police of the events. The National Police Board presents several detailed observations for the consideration of the investigation team.

The practice has been that paramedics do not enter specific dwellings alone but instead wait for the police to inform them that it is safe. This operating model is out of the question in public places. In suddenly arising situations, police patrols operate in "daily operation" call groups. In a rapid situation, the switching of call groups compromises the joint situation picture of the patrols. Therefore, using the Emergency Response Centre as a communications centre until the situation is under control is the right course of action. Authorities transfer to the joint call groups based on an invitational call group. In this case, an invitation was not sent to the police, and the police did not send invitations, either.

The National Police Board highlights the fact that the tip-off about the perpetrator was taken under assessment but a need for further actions was not recognised based on the assessment. The National Police Board has noted the necessity of the actions that have been and are still being done to improve the handling of tip-offs.

For the most part, the safety recommendations are advisable. As for the counselling service for asylum seekers, the National Police Board states that resource and language issues must be sufficiently considered. In radicalisation prevention work, legislation must make it possible

for mainly health care and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to disclose information of their own initiative.

The National Police Board does not consider the recommendation on the management multi-authority situations completely realistic. In rapid situations, it is unrealistic to immediately have "strong" general command with all parties. The most important thing is that each actor fulfils its fundamental duties by reacting quickly and operating as effectively as possible. The arrival to the scene of voluntary resources that are less significant for resolving the situation may, under certain circumstances, even disrupt pre-planned procedures and complicate management.

The Finnish Security Intelligence Service calls attention to the sections of the draft investigation report which state that the tip-off about the perpetrator received by the police did not lead to actions. The Security Intelligence Service reminds that the tip-off was preliminarily processed and assessed at the Security Intelligence Service according to the normal process and entered into the Security Intelligence Service's information system, and normal register checks were carried out. The tip-off was interpreted as not reflecting a concrete risk of a terrorist attack, though possibly indicating a connection to ISIL (= ISIS). For this reason, it was recorded in the incident document that interviews would be conducted in the case to acquire more detailed information. However, at this juncture, there was seen to be no reason to elevate the tip-off past the rest of the tip-off queue and ongoing operative activities. The Security Intelligence Service must constantly prioritise its operations. International information exchange has increased enormously, and the Security Intelligence Service's own intelligence gathering also produces a great deal of information. Tip-offs are only one part of the whole.

In its statement, the Finnish Immigration Service presents corrections and observations on several details. The Finnish Immigration Service clarifies that asylum procedure is a matter of administrative procedure, which does not involve special powers of investigation. Oral hearing of the individual is the key method of investigation.

As for the recommendation for quick processing of applications, the Finnish Immigration Service states that decisions on applications for international protection are made within the limits of the resources available and the circumstances without delay yet without compromising careful individual assessment. Expedited processing can be used when certain preconditions provided in law are met, which requires individual assessment. Based on the draft investigation report, it is not clear under which grounds the perpetrator's application would have been considered as obviously baseless if his adult status had been established.

Effort has been made to increase the effectiveness of establishing the identity of asylum seekers. In its interpretation, the Finnish Immigration Service has exercised caution and held that it cannot request information about asylum seekers from the public authorities of their home country. Even if the applicant is not a subject of interest to the public authorities of their home country, it is difficult to predict how the public authorities would react to such enquiries and where the information about the applicant would end up. The applicant's situation, grounds for asylum and persecutor may also change. Knowledge of the enquiry to the public authorities of their home country could also damage the applicant's faith in Finnish authorities. It is unclear how it could be ensured that requesting information will not cause harm to the applicant and their family members.

As for the recommendation on a counselling service for asylum seekers, the Finnish Immigration Service states that such activities are not its statutory duty. Organising the activities would require both human and financial resources.

The Emergency Response Centre Agency expresses in its statement that the investigation report is extensive and also includes unusually extensive international background. The course of events has been analysed in detail, and the actions they spurred in the various authorities have been taken into account. The Emergency Response Centre Agency comments and specifies several expressions used in the draft investigation report.

The arrival of emergency medical services to the scene was delayed, presumably mostly due to a breakdown in the flow of information, so the procedure should be specified in regard to such situations. The Emergency Response Centre had difficulties with creating a situation picture because there was little communications between the authorities from the situation centre to the Emergency Response Centre and the Emergency Response Centre did not conduct active monitoring of the social media. Under the circumstances, it would have been useless to issue an emergency warning. The social media showed its strength.

In the initial situation of the incident, the rescue services did not have a clear role. In terms of management, the uncontrolled arrival to the scene of an external authority could disrupt the activities of another authority that is performing its statutory duties. The view of the investigation team that the authorities did not have quite the same views about the management of multi-authority situations or enough information about the duties, needs and capabilities of the other authorities, is partly correct.

The Emergency Response Centre Agency concurs with the safety recommendations of the investigation team. In order to develop the activities of the Government Situation Centre, there must be a clear obligation to disclose information. The competent authority must immediately assess the information to be sent, and it must be simple and fast to transfer the information. It is noteworthy that the Government Situation Centre has more extensive rights to obtain information than, for example, the deputies of various departments of the Ministry of the Interior. Moreover, the ministries do not have an actual role in regard to operative situations that are in the mandate of various authorities.

The City of Turku states that the statements of the city's actors heard during the investigation have been taken into account well in the investigation and that the recommendations of the draft investigation report are good and well-founded. The city proposes corrections to three details of the draft report. The city also describes actions through which the crisis support process has been developed. Effort is made to prevent similar incidents through cooperation between authorities on the prevention of violent radicalisation. The actions include Anchor cooperation with the police and cooperation between authorities in integration and in working with immigrant communities.

The Southwest Finland Hospital District states that the nature of the incident deviated from the conventional understanding of a disaster, which is often thought to involve a large number of patients in a small area. In the early stages of the incident, the number of patients and their location was unknown. As such, the only option open to the EMS staff was to proceed in the crowd and provide emergency first aid to the patients they found, just as should be done during patient classification. However, there was no need for actual classification because the necessary transport could be arranged for each patient to a hospital that was within a few minutes' drive, roughly in accordance with the rate of progress of the emergency medical services. According to the view of the hospital district, there is a need for operating models that are better suited to situations where it is impossible to determine the scope of the operating area, the locations and number of the patients and the threats in the work environment in the course of the assignment.