C9/1999R Hazardous situation generated by a local train passing a "stop" aspect in a shunting signal at Kerava on July 15, 1999

On 15 July 1999, at Kerava a hazardous situation arose when an electric trainset being shunted towards a station platform track, passed a shunting signal displaying a ”stop” aspect. The train was being moved to leave for Helsinki in three minutes as a K local train. At the time of the incident an H local train heading for the opposite direction was standing on track 3 at Kerava station. Having passed the shunting signal, the K train trailed the turnout on the running route of the H train, breaking thereby three turnout machines.

The hazardous situation arose when at the specified hour, the remote-control system started to secure the running route for the K train waiting on track 653. On the shunting route leading to track 1, there are two shunting signals at a distance of 140 metres from each other. In this case the route could be set only up to the first shunting signal as a running route crossing the route towards track 1 had already been set for the H train. The engine driver saw the aspect of the first shunting signal changing to a ”proceed with caution” aspect, whereupon he set out to move. Because the departure time set for the train was approaching, the engine driver supposed his running route to be secured up to track 1, and he passed the second shunting signal displaying a ”stop” aspect.

In order to prevent corresponding hazardous situations, Accident Investigation Board Finland recommends that a protection turnout or at least two shunting signals be adopted as flank protection on such running routes where relatively high speeds are practised.

C9/1999R Report (pdf, 0.45 Mt)

•Recommendation S114

Published 15.7.1999